BITS 'N' PIECES APRIL 12, 1997
THE DEED IS DONE -- Late Thursday evening, almost early Friday morning, the Senate voted to confirm Douglas "Pete" Peterson as Ambassador to Vietnam. At this point we would like to make it perfectly clear, we had no objections to Mr. Peterson, personally. Our objection is now and always has been to the stationing of any Ambassador in Vietnam.
The Vietnamese government has not cooperated on the POW/MIA issue. President Clinton's certification of Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue is based on wishful thinking and not sustained by facts in evidence.
The confirmation vote had been on hold, thanks to the efforts of Senator Bob Smith. However, Senator Trent Lott, in his position as Majority Leader, bowed to pressure and removed the hold allowing the matter to come to the Senate floor for a vote.
We were well aware that our small group of supporters in the Senate did not have the votes to stop Mr. Peterson's confirmation.
WHO PASSED INFORMATION DIRECTED TO THE U.S. SENATE TO THE VIETNAMESE BEFORE SENATORS OR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC HAD A CHANCE TO SEE IT?????
On April 1, 1997, Reuters Hanoi Bureau published a story titled "Vietnam Slams 'Russian Document' on U.S. POWs." The article rehashed the Vietnamese claim that information contained in the 1205 document was false. Tram Van Quang, head of the Vietnam Association of War Veterans said "Vietnam rejected as flatly slanderous and ill-intentioned the so-called 'Russian Document' on POW and MIA."
According to the article, the comment was made to "Charge d'Affaires of the U.S. embassy Desaix Anderson, who confirmed that Washington considered the report null and void...."
"...One diplomat, who declined to be named, said he believed anti-Hanoi hardliners in the United States were peddling old and discredited reports on POWs to block an exchange of ambassadors. "This issue is about to hit the press again and people who are outside the system are going to get ready to state their position again," he said.
With the publication of the article many in the POW community sat scratching their heads in wonder. Why were the Vietnamese raising the question of the "1205 Document" again? It was almost "damage control" in advance. Now, we have our answer and it is an extremely disturbing one. Someone, either in the White House or the Senate passed information to the Vietnamese prior to providing it to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott or the American Public.
As you read the following, remember the Reuters article was published April 1st, 1997.
On March 24th, 1997, Senator Lott requested that the Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, Richard Shelby, direct his staff to conduct an inquiry "into certain documents pertaining to American POW/MIAs from the conflict in Southeast Asia."
Senator Lott's letter referenced concerns raised by Senator Smith "relating to two documents acquired from the archives of the former Soviet Unions."
In closing Senator Lott stated "I would appreciate your directing a staff inquiry examining the intelligence basis for the President' certification - specifically addressing the two documents - in as expeditious a fashion as possible. Because I hope the full senate can consider the pending nomination of former Congressman Peterson to be Ambassador to Vietnam the week of April 7th..."
Senator Lott received his response from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on April 8th, 1997, Eight (8) days AFTER the Vietnamese did their damage control. Typical of Vietnamese "cooperation" Reuters was not provided with the full facts of the story.
The following is excerpted from the letter signed by Senator Shelby as Chairman and Senator Robert Kerrey as Vice Chairman:
"In response to your March 24th 1997 letter, we are attaching the findings of a preliminary staff inquiry into the U.S. intelligence Community input that formed the basis of the 1996 Presidential determinations regarding Vietnam's accounting for American POW/MIAs, including accelerating efforts to provide POW/MIA related documents...."
The staff inquiry has found:
1. That the Intelligence Community appears to have played no formal role in the determination.
2. That regarding the so-called "735" and "1205" documents from the Russian archives:
* they have not been subject of a coordinated community-wide analysis. Elements of the Intelligence Community did contribute to a 1994 Department of Defense assessment and the State Department's Office of Intelligence and Research (INR) prepared several memoranda analyzing the documents;
* the 1994 DoD assessment and the 1993 INR analysis identified numerous errors in the documents and raised questions about their accuracy, but could not dismiss them as fabrications; and
* time constraints have not allowed the Committee staff to completely investigate all activities taken since 1994, but attempts by the Intelligence Community to gain additional information on the documents appear to have been limited."
In closing the Senators stated: "We want to emphasize that this is not a comprehensive Committee review. We will explore whether the Committee should conduct further inquiry after consultation with all the Committee Members."
Along with the letter a five page report of the Staff Inquiry was attached. We will focus on one item of that report, item 1: The Intelligence Community appears to have played no formal analytical role in the determination.1
a. Prior to the 1996 Presidential certifications, or in this case "determinations,"2 the National Security Council did not request an intelligence Community assessment on whether the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was cooperating in full faith on POW/MIA issues specified in Public Law 104-134 and Public Law 104-208, which included "accelerating efforts to provide documents that will help lead to the fullest possible accounting of POW/MIAS."
________________
1) In response to a staff request for DCI's 'input" on the President's certifications, an April 3, 1997 CIA letter to Committee staff states "[b]ecause the Defense Department's Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) is responsible for intelligence bearing on the POW/MIA issue, other elements of the community were not formally involved in the certification process."
2) In Presidential Determinations #96-28 and #97-10, the President noted his Administration's position that related sections of Public Laws' 104-134 and 104-208 are unconstitutional because they "purport to condition the execution of responsibilities --- the authority to recognize, and to maintain diplomatic relations with, a foreign government -- that the Constitution commits exclusively to the President."
REFERRING TO POW/MIA INTELLIGENCE GATHERING -- Item c of the Staff Inquiry states: "Apparently, collection requirements pertaining to the POW/MIA issue were in place during the 1980's and early 1990's, but were removed from the President's Decision Directive on the Intelligence Community's priority requirement list on the recommendation of the National Security Council in 1995."
On April 10th, 1997, Majority Leader Lott received a letter, on White House stationary, from Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. In his letter Mr. Berger states:
"... First, the President commits to continue to press the Government of Vietnam to cooperate on full accounting. We have established mechanisms through which the Vietnamese can respond to request for information available only to them.
As you know, the President has determined that Vietnam is providing full-faith cooperation with U.S. efforts to obtain this information. We believe the President's determination is backed up by tangible assistance provided by Vietnam to the Department of Defense Joint Task Force (Full Accounting). I will direct the intelligence Community to prepare a special National Intelligence Estimate on this matter, something that was last done in 1987. We will consult with the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Intelligence Committee concerning the terms of reference for this new study.
Second, we will take immediate steps to ensure that collection requirements pertaining to the POW/MIA issue remain as a high priority for the U.S. Intelligence community, and we will stay in close contact with the Intelligence Committee on this matter.
Third, I will ask for an updated assessment from the Intelligence Community on the so-called "735" and "1205" documents from Russian archives. We will continue efforts already underway to acquire additional information on these documents from the Vietnamese Government, including access to the alleged "735" author Hoang Anh, as well as other relevant party and government archival materials.
Fourth, the President asserted when we agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam that our principal goal was to enhance the full accounting process. This issue will be Mr. Peterson's highest priority as Ambassador. This task will include pressing for additional unilateral efforts by the Government of Vietnam to provide records and remains....."
