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Were American POWs captured during the Korean War, Cold War and Vietnam
transferred to the former Soviet Union?
Earlier this year a long time government employee involved with the POW/MIA issue resigned.
In his good-bye note to the “few good people left in DPMO,.” he provided a laundry list of
DPMO failures. We initiated email correspondence and met with this individual twice. Our
email correspondence continues.
Our Sept. 11th Bits N Pieces was based on information obtained from our meetings and
correspondence. Among the topics we asked our source to comment on was the transfer issue.
We received the following response.
“Begin Source: When one considers the number of reports to the effect that American
POWs were transferred from Vietnam to Russia, you simply have to question whether the
reporting is true or not. It makes sense that the Russians would have considered moving POWs
from Vietnam to interrogate them further as to any technological expertise that was lacking in
Russia. DPMO’s JCSD personnel have investigated some of these reports to an extent, but
without adequate investigative resources and other support from within DPMO, have
made little headway.”
“The first of these reports surfaced during the 1992 Senate Select Committee on POW /MIA
Affairs hearings when the FBI provided information to the committee from one of their
sources to the effect that POWs had been transferred. DIA personnel paid little attention
to the report, and after the formation of DPMO in 1993, no effort was ever made to go
back to the FBI source for further information. “
“The Russian head of the joint US - Russian commission to investigate the POW issue
indicated in writing that he had seen documentation about such a transfer program; then
the Russian President indicated that the transfers may have taken place. DPMO then
interviewed a Russian living in Israel who stated he was told about such a program when
he visited Vietnam and Laos with Russian journalist Schederov during the 1960's. “
“Until these various reports are subjected to thorough, in-depth investigations, the
collection of reporting has to be deemed compelling. Investigations into these reports have
to be initiated with the governments in SEA. [End Source]
Were American POWs captured during the Korean War, Cold War and Vietnam transferred to
the former Soviet Union? Lets take a closer look.
Russian Colonel Korotkov says – POWs from Korea Taken to the Soviet Union....
Recants after call from KGB
From the Biweekly Report of Task Force Russia dated 15-28 August 1992 - “During the
reporting period, the Moscow Office conducted the most significant interview to date. Col.
(Ret.) G.I. Korotkov, currently employed by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation,
provided a wealth of information and leads.
SYNOPSIS: Korotkov stated the following:
--U.S. POW's from the Korean War were transferred to the Soviet Union, where they were
imprisoned and interrogated.
--He personally interrogated two U.S. POW's, although he could not recall their names.
--He recalled the name "1TC Black" from among the POW's.
--Khabarovsk was a transit and interrogation point for the POW's.
--The POW's were under the control of the N~JD, although GRU interrogators had
professional access to them at Khabarovsk.
--He believed the number of POW's processed through Khabarovsk was in the hundreds.
--He identified the channels through which interrogation reports were forwarded.
--The Soviets attempted to "turn" U.S. prisoners, but were relatively unsuccessful in comparison
to their experience with German POW's from WWII.
--He asserted that the declassification process under the General Staff, which had targeted
documents relative to the Commission's charter, has essentially ceased functioning since LTG
Lobov's dismissal.
--He asserted that pertinent collected records are being held in the General Staff headquarters
and that the current military leadership views their declassification as a low priority.
--He identified five archives as critical to the Commission's efforts:
(1) the External Policy Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
(2) the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense at Podol'sk,
(3) the Archives of the Main Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, which are
held separately, (4) the Archives of the KGB, and (5) the Archives of the
Politburo/Central Committee.
--He implied that some records dealing with U.S. POW's of the Korean War period may have
been intentionally destroyed.
--He also identified potentially-lucrative lower level and out-of-channels archives.
--He identified individuals who might be useful to TFR's future efforts.
--He provided additional experiential and second-hand details on the handling of U.S. POW's.
ASSESSMENT: Interviewers assessed Korotkov as highly credible. His testimony is
important not only for the valuable details highlighted above, but because he directly contradicts
previous Russian assertions, both direct and oblique, that no U.S. POW's from the Korean War
were ever transported to or held on Soviet soil. Historical sources available to the Washington
office circumstantially corroborate Korotkov's specific claim that U.S. POW's were held in
the vicinity of Khabarovsk. Further, an interview conducted by the Washington Office
with an emigre source also surfaced the claim that "Americans" were held in a camp
between Khabarovsk and the Komsomolsk region; however this source could provide no
eyewitness details.
The Korotkov Recant - from the report of “The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs To The
Soviet Union” – “In his first interview, Colonel Korotkov stated that he had interviewed a U.S.
officer, LTC Black. We believe that this may have been USAF LTC Vance Eugene Black who
was reported by other POWs to have died of mistreatment and malnutrition in a North Korean
POW camp. Another retired Soviet officer, GRU Colonel Aleksandr Semyonovich Orlov, stated
that he had arranged for an interview by a Pravda correspondent with LTC Vance Black. In his
subsequent interview with MG Loeffke, Colonel Korotkov denied having interrogated LTC
Black, stating that he perhaps we had confused the name with a black POW. Task Force Russia
interviewers, however, were adamant that he had been referring to the family name "Black"
rather than to the black race. In this second interview, Colonel Korotkov remembered that the
first officer he interviewed had been an Army first lieutenant, most likely from the 24th Infantry
Division, but that he could remember nothing else. He had better recall about an Air Force pilot
because he found much in common with him, such as color of hair (light), height (about 6'2"),
rank (captain). He also said the pilot was about 28 to 30 years old. Colonel Korotkov also
stated that while he was assigned to the project of interrogating Americans in the Far East
during the Korean War, he also interrogated Japanese POWs, captured in World War II,
and still held in Soviet custody. Here is an admission that foreign POWs were part of an
overall system of exploitation.
Colonel Korotkov changed his statement in a subsequent interview with Major General
Bernard Loeffke, former Director of Task Force Russia (now Joint Commission Support
Branch - JCSB), in September 1992 after being contacted by a member of the Russian Foreign
Intelligence Service. He then stated that the interrogations took place somewhere undefined,
which he could not remember, in the Chinese-Korean-Soviet tri-border area. In MG Loeffke's
words:
“Since that encounter, the colonel changed his story as to the location where he interrogated
U.S. POWs. Even after having been contacted by the KGB official, COL Korotkov agreed to
answer questions on tape in front of Russian LTC Osipov, General Volkogonov's assistant. This
interview took place on September 29. He said he and other Soviet officers in Soviet and at
times Chinese uniforms had interrogated U.S. POWs over a 1-2 year period (1951-52) in an area
near the borders of USSR, Korea and China. In this new version, Korotkov claims that he did
not know, if that particular location was in Russia or not. The important point is that he
would not say that it was not inside Russia. In all previous interviews he had specifically
said that these interrogations took place in Khabarovsk. The colonel was obviously willing
to oblige the security services by not saying that it took place in Khabarovsk; but he was not
willing to say that it did not take place on Russian soil. The colonel's official statement on
tape, and in front of a Russian officer assigned-to the-Joint POW/MIA Commission cannot
easily be refuted. Korotkov is a respected military officer with prestigious academic
credentials.”
“What Colonel Korotkov did not do was to deny that Soviet military personnel, including
himself, were directly involved in the interrogation of a "large" number of American POWs
during the Korean War. In a subsequent videotaped interview recorded by Mr. Ted Landreth,
an Australian journalist, Colonel Korotkov clearly stated that American POWs had been taken
"through Khabarovsk" into the camp system. Their ultimate destination he did not know.”
The Plotnikov Interview – from a report titled “The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs
To The Soviet Union” prepared by the Joint Commission Support Branch, Research and
Analysis Division DPMO dated 26 August 1993, states: “Colonel Georgii Plotnikov was asked
hypothetically if it would have been possible to effect such a transfer without GRU officers
being aware of it. "Yes," he answered without hesitation. "It would have been a KGB [MGB]
operation in cooperation with North Korean intelligence. The Soviet Army had no Gulag and
was not prepared to deal with a stream of prisoners. The KGB [MGB] could do all of these
things." The Soviets had the capability to move POWs, the Koreans would have permitted
such an operation, and transport across the PRC would have been no problem, in
Plotnikov's view. "At the time there was train service from Pyongyang to Moscow with a
stop in China." The POWs, he stated, "would have been loaded into trucks with canvas
drawn around them, then transferred to trains at night . . . The North Koreans hated
Americans. They would have cooperated in such an operation if asked by the Soviets. The North
Koreans could have not said no to a Soviet request."
“In Plotnikov's view, "specialized organs" in the Soviet Union would have made requests for
particular types of Americans. "Design Bureaus might have made such requests," he said. The
Deputy Chairman of the KGB [MGB] would be the lowest political level that could have
approved such an operation that kept the GRU out of the picture. Grabbing American POWs
[would have been a] political decision in response to a request. Infantry was of no interest to
Soviet intelligence. There would have been no regular transfer. American POWs would have
been moved as specialists fell into the camps. They would be identified and moved. The interest
would not have been in people who operated equipment as much as it would have focused on
people who understood the principles of how things worked....”
The Manchouli Transfer - In 1954, then Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles recognized
information on the transfer of POW's through China to the Soviet Union during the Korean War
was reliable. In message traffic Dulles stated “reports have now come attention United
States Government which support earlier indications that American Prisoners of War
Korea had been "transported into Soviet Union and are now Soviet custody. Request
fullest possible information these POW's and their reparation earliest possible time."
The 1954 cable marked "Secret" bearing the Dulles, name (Note: Cable below is reproduced as
is - with all typos and misspellings) states; "According Despatch 1716 from Hong Kong
airpouched you a recently arrived Greek refugee from Manchuria reported seeing several
hundred American POW's being transferred Chinese trains to Russian trains Manchouli late
1951 and early 1952. Some POW's wore sleeve insignia indicating they were Air Force non-coms. Great number Negro troops also observed. This report corroborates previous indications
UNC POW to might have been shipped to Siberia during Korean hostilities."
"United States has been greatly concerned general subject UNC personnel who may still be
Communist custody. Department has just accepted British offer make representations Peiping
behalf UNC personnel who may be Chinese Communist custody. Question raising this matter
informally Geneva under careful consideration."
"Unless you perceive objection request you approach highest available level Foreign Ministry
and leave Aide Memoire undicating (sic) reports have now come attention United States
Government which support earlier indications that American Prisoners of War Korea had
been "transported into Soviet Union and are now Soviet custody. Request fullest possible
information these POW's and their reparation earliest possible time."
"In your discussion with Foreign Office, you may desire inform Soviets without revealing
source that we have reliable accounts transfers POW's Manchouli."
"Prisoner of War Not for Direct Repatriation" -- On May 16th, 1954, the Chief of the
Army's Legal Division, Col. John K. Weber submitted a memorandum regarding statements
made by Lee Sang Cho. The memorandum is written on the letterhead of "Headquarters United
Nations Command Military Armistice Commission." According to the memorandum Mr. Lee
made the following statement, during the 42nd meeting of the Military Armistice Commission.
"The prisoners of war of your side once held by our side were already completely
repatriated in accordance with the Armistice Agreement. The prisoner of war not for
direct repatriation are held by our side pending the final disposition of the
entire prisoner of war question...."
"There is one feature about the language used by the enemy which definitely should be
explored by us. In all the communications and statements made by the enemy, a singular
phrasing has been used. That expression in substance is: 'prisoners of war not for direct
repatriation.'"
"The Armistice Agreement refers to such prisoners as 'those prisoners of war who have not
exercised their right to be repatriated.' It is here pointed out with much emphasis that the
expression 'prisoners of war not for direct repatriation could included not only
such prisoners who had not exercised their right to be repatriated, but others
whom the enemy had decided were not for direct repatriation."
"It is my thought that the Chinese and Korean language versions used in the Armistice
Agreement should be compared with the Chinese and Korean language versions used by Lee
Sang Cho in his letter of 26 January 1954, and in the Lee Sang Cho statement at the 42nd
meeting of the MAC. If the Armistice language is found to be substantially different from
these later statements we have a very substantial and embarrassing opening to follow-up on
the more than three thousand prisoners who have not been returned."
What was the State Department saying in 1955 - A memo from the office of the Secretary of
Defense, dated Sept. 16th, 1955 and signed by G.B. Erskine, general USMC, Assistant to the
secretary of defense, special operations, on the subject of Geneva Negotiations on Prisoners of
War, states;
“In accordance with telephonic conversations with representatives of this office today, it is the
position of the Department of Defense that the Chinese Communists should account to the U.S.
for the ultimate fate of all 450 U.S. armed forces personnel.”
The memo also discusses what are now known as Cold War losses stating: “There is also
evidence based upon radar plots and intercepted voice messages, as well as upon the recovery of
casualties, that a small number of Air Force crews whose missions involved flights over the Sea
of Japan during the Korean War were shot down by aircraft based in the Soviet Far East, some of
whom are probably held in the Soviet Union. These cases (some 33) are of course not directly
relevant to the current negotiations at Geneva. The missions on which these aircraft were flying,
while related to the Korean War, are highly classified and the names of these individuals have
never been included on any lists for which we have demanded an accounting from the Chinese
Communists.”
As for the possibility of POW’s held back by the Soviets, the memo states: “The U.S. should
not be surprised, particularly in light of Japanese and German experiences with the Soviets
in World War II, if a number of completely unrecorded Americans are ultimately found to
be alive or to have been alive and in Communist hands. Such individuals do not appear on
the list of 450 nor on any other list which has ever been presented. Nor is there any
significant evidence available at this time that such individuals exist. Neither do we suggest
that any action can be taken with regard to this possibility.”
Russian Memoirs - Best described as a diary, the memoirs provide detailed information
obtained through various sources of American POWs from World War II, Korea and the Cold
War transferred to the former Soviet Union. According to a February 26, 2000 Associated Press
article by Robert Burns "the assertions, while not confirmed, appear to support, and in some
important respects strengthen, a case the Pentagon has been building for several years:
U.S. servicemen in the 1940s and 1950s were silently swallowed up in the U.S.S.R.'s brutal
gulag system of forced labor, never to be heard from again."
"There has to be something to this,'' said Norman Kass, who helped translate the unpublished
personal memoir from Russian and interviewed the author on behalf of the Pentagon agency in
charge of Prisoner of War and Missing Personnel Affairs.... "
"...the memoir is exceptional because it provides names of individual servicemen. For
example, it identifies by name 22 men said to have been held in late 1951 at the Kirovskij
Mining camp near the Kamenka river in the sub-arctic pine forests of the Krasnoyarsk
Region. The memoir's author cites secondhand accounts of area residents seeing the Prisoners,
``wearing bare threads and half-frozen,'' being led from the Kirovskij Camp Along a road to an
undetermined destination - ``a dead-end....''
"...Kass said that although the events described by the author have not been independently
verified, he believes the man is credible... There is no question that he spent many years in
the Gulag network of forced labor camps. The man, now in his late 70s, was exiled to
Siberia and worked as a permafrost engineer in the early 1950s near the Kirovskij Mining
camp where the 22 Americans were said to have been held."
"In the translation from Russian, only one of the 22 names can be matched with a missing
American servicemen. He is listed in Army casualty records as Chan Jay Park Kim, a
Hawaiian of Korean descent. Kim was a private first class in the 24th infantry division's
34th infantry regiment, captured by North Korean forces on July 8, 1950. On that day, the
34th infantry collapsed in its defense of the town of Ch'onan south of Seoul, giving the
advancing north korean army entry to most of the rest of southern Korea."
"According to Pentagon records, fellow members of the 34th infantry who survived captivity in
Korea told Army debriefers that once he became a POW, Kim tried to mask his ethnic
background by using the name George Leon. It is that name which appears among the 22 on the
list from the Soviet labor camp..... Army casualty records list Kim as having died in Korea in
January 1951, but his body was not recovered.... "
"...another section of the memoir describes the fate of 10 members of a 12-man crew of a
U.S. Air Force B-29 reconnaissance plane, which was shot down by Soviet forces over the
Sea of Japan on June 13, 1952. American search and rescue teams recovered no remains from
the plane, and in July 1956 the U.S. government appealed to Moscow for information about the
crew. The State Department note said an officer believed to have been a member of the crew
was seen in October 1953 in a Soviet hospital north of the Siberian Port of Magadan. The
Soviets replied that no American servicemen were on Soviet territory. "
"The Russian emigre said that in the 1980s he was told by an associate with extensive
experience in the far eastern reaches of Siberia that he had learned the names of two of the
captured B-29 fliers: ``Bush and Moore.'' the B-29's Commander was Maj. Samuel
Busch. A crew member was Master Sgt. David L. Moore. The memoir indicates that
Busch and Moore were killed - possibly beaten to death - in the Siberian city of
Khabarovsk,