That is the job of the Magicians at DPMO, turn fact into fiction and fiction into fact, all in an effort to fit a preconceived conclusion. It is in this office, on a daily basis, that history is rewritten to conform with preconceived conclusions, of death. It is in this office that once valued intelligence reports are turned into fabricated hearsay.

Recently, we received a note from Jeanie Hasenbeck, sister of POW/MIA Paul Hasenbeck. Here is what she had to say.

"... I simply cannot comprehend how the rule of "credibility" is applied Without confirmation, it sometimes is creditable and it sometimes is hearsay. Just how does that work? When it doesn't confirm their determination of fate, it becomes hearsay, when it does confirm their determination it is creditable. This is truly an ART as any rule of SCIENCE is thrown out the window...."

She continued; "...Just wanted to pass this DETERMINATION on to you. It truly is an amazing logic they apply - most unique and never experienced anywhere else in my world."

What upset Ms. Hasenbeck was a DPMO memo, received via Army Casualty. Dated February 22nd, 2000, the memo dismissed all intelligence reporting regarding the capture of her brother, Paul Hasenbeck and the three men with him, Thomas Mangino, Daniel Nidds, and David Winters.

In discussing the reports of capture DPMO stated; "Not only do we not know the source of the data reported in the field comment, we do not know the number of people the information was filtered through before the informant reported what is obviously hearsay."

They don't know where the information came from, who reported it or if it was first, second or fifteenth hand hearsay. Yet, they state the report is "obviously hearsay." They base this determination on statements of Vietnamese witnesses. How do they know the Vietnamese witnesses are telling the truth. How do they know the information, contained in the original reports, is not absolutely 100% correct?

The simple fact is DPMO can not consider the possibility that the information is true. It needs to be hearsay, to fit with Vietnamese version of the "truth."

Background: On April 21, 1967, in Quang Ngai Province, a patrol consisting of one officer and seventeen men was returning from a blocking missing. The patrol had a considerable amount of supplies and munitions. A decision was made that seven of the men, would return by sampan the remaining eleven would return over land. Two sampans were confiscated for the job. Passengers for the first sampan were the Lt., his RTO and another enlisted man. The second sampan, filled with the supplies and munitions, carried SP4 Thomas Mangino, and PFC's Paul Hasenbeck, Daniel Nidds and David Winters. The first sampan, with the three men reached base camp. The sampan caring the Hasenbeck, Mangino, Nidds, and Winters was never seen again.

The Search: The four men were not reported missing for almost two hours, after the arrival of the first sampan. An exhaustive search, lasting days, was initiated. That search found no evidence of ambush, spent munitions, the sampan, the supplies and munitions on board, or the missing men. It was as if they had disappeared off the face of the earth. Swift boats patrolled the mouth of the river. The river was too shallow, for them to go up river. Helicopters flew overhead. Amtracks and navy divers were brought in, to search the river. Villagers reported gravesite locations and the men of 4/31 investigated every report. They dug every grave. In fact, they dug more sites on this case, than JTF-FA. All they ever found was a 250 lb. bomb. The search continued. In fact, the search was so large it was reported in the May 1967 edition of Stars and Stripes. (To view photos of the search click here.)

Today, DPMO would have you believe the four were ambushed, and killed. They would have you believe that gun shots were heard in the area the men were last seen. They would have you believe the four men were buried not once but three times. They would have you believe these burials and exhumations took place under the noses of American search teams. The unit duty logs for the period 22 April 1967 - May 10, 1967 describe detailed search operations. The families have spoken with members of the search teams. We have the written statements from the Board of Inquiry and Lynn O'Shea has spoken with one of the divers who participated in the search.

Based on the information provided, it is extremely hard to believe that the Vietnamese buried and exhumed the bodies of four adults with all this activity in their village and the surrounding area. Yet, that is exactly what DPMO wants the families to believe.

We wonder, did anyone at JTF-FA or DPMO interview the members of that patrol, or the search team, or the navy divers? They are the real first hand witnesses. The facts are in the reports filed with the Board of Inquiry and in letters and conversations between members of the search team, the families and representatives of the National Alliance of Families.

The Intelligence: A May 5, 1967 sighting reported 4 POW in the area with 2000 NVA. The evaluation done at the time states: "Note: Mangino, Winters, Nidds, and Hasenbeck are missing for vic 622987 on 21 Apr 67. The unidentified US PW in this sighting of 5 May might well be them." According to the source the four had been captured on April 21, 1967. Unit duty logs reported that Republic of Korea (ROK) Marines shadowed the unit taking small arms fire. If there is additional reporting on this mission, it's locked away.

In July 1967, the CIA sent a cable discussing two topics. (Note: this report is available on the CIA website. We downloaded it and you may view it by clicking here.) The first reported the use of Americans to teach english to the Viet Cong. The second topic under the heading "Field Comments" reports the capture of 4 men on the Thuong Hoa River by a Binh Son District VC Main Force. A second report stated the four Americans had been captured at a "secret tunnel" and were to be moved to a western area. Most of the document was heavily redacted.

In 1993, we filed a request, with the CIA, for declassification of the document. Three years later, they responded declassifying a very small portion of the previously classified material. The majority of the material was withheld, citing source, methods and the famous national security excuse as their reasons for withholding the redacted portion.

During our three year wait for the CIA's response we learned two thing. First, we learned that Defense Intelligence Agency had filed an identical request for declassification, in the late 1970's. On March 13th, 1978, the CIA responded, denying the request and supplying a "sanitized version" of the document. (To view this version of the document click here.)

We also learned that if you file enough FOIA's its likely you'll get the same document from various agencies. You may also get the document in various stages of declassification. With time and perseverance we acquired over 10 copies of the CIA report. One of those copies a 99% unredacted version of the report.(To view this report click here.) This is what does the unredacted report tells us:

1 -- the reports were "evaluated possibly true by each of the sources mentioned hereunder.

2 -- one of the sources "from the same service.", was rated "fairly reliable,"

3 -- information from the second source was "from an informant of unknown reliability of an official Vietnamese Security Service Field Office."

We also know from various versions of the report, including the version on the CIA website that the officer evaluating the report wrote across the bottom of the report "Note: Army E4 Mangino, E3 Nidds, E3 Winters and E3 Hasenbeck fit the description of the report."

There is a second undated handwritten CIA report released to the Library of Congress, on which their July 1967 report may be based. The report reads:

Ref: [One full line redacted]

"Four Americans were captured on 21 April at the Thuong Hoa River by a Binh Son District VC mainforce..."

The next four lines are redacted but written above each redacted line is the following: (DOB 16Mar44) (DOB 11May47) DOB 18Oct48) (DOB23Aug48) The birthdays match Mangino, Hasenbeck, Winters and Nidds.

The document ends saying "All above captured during ground combat operations at BS 622987 - All members of 4th SN, 31 Inf, 196 Inf. Bde." (To view document click here.)

In their February 22nd, 2000 memo DPMO stated: "To further comment on the CIA report, the first portion of the document does not relate to Refno 6046 loss. Nevertheless, the field comment analytical data in paragraph two relates to 0646 but the informant(s) incorrectly reported it to the collector. The informant apparently knew that something happened to four Americans, but was wrong in claiming their capture. Not only do we not know the source of the data reported in the field comment, we do not know the number of people the information was filtered through before the informant reported what is obviously hearsay."

The memo continued: "The person who obtained the information related in the field comment portion of report most likely had access to JPRC (JCRC/JTF-FA predecessor) files in Vietnam that detailed US losses. Based on the date of the "capture," the location, and the number of men, the report writer probably made his own correlation to incident 0646. Again, his correlation of that portion was accurate. It was the information reported by the source in claiming that the men were captured as opposed to killed, which was inaccurate."

Talk about convoluted logic! The correlation is correct but the information was reported incorrectly. The informant knew something happened... but was wrong in claiming capture. What does DPMO base this on. The answer is simple. They base it on the statements of the Vietnamese witnesses.

May we suggest that DPMO talk to the CIA. They obviously know more than they are telling. Bet, they know who reported what. Bet, they know the truth.

One of the witnesses on whom DPMO depends is a Mr. Bong. Mr. Bong gave a detailed description of events and a description of the four men. He described them as "3 white and 1 black" and stated the black man was the tallest. Members of the Vietnamese Office Seeking Missing Persons (VOSMP) present during the interview became visibly upset. We can understand why. All four men are Caucasians.

If It Doesn't Fit, Twist It - So how do you explain the discrepancy in the description? JTF-FA justified the witness discrepancy stating that Vietnamese sometimes mistook dark skinned Americans, such as the Italian Mangino, as African American. They offered no explanation to declaring the "black" American the tallest, when Mangino was not the tallest of the group.

In 1969, a source said he saw three American POWs. Shown the pre-capture photo book the source picked out the photos of Daniel R. Nidds, Harry M. Ravenna and Michael J. Burke. At the time the report was deemed less than creditable. Why? Because the source reported the three as "two Negroes and a Caucasian." All are Caucasian.

But the rules are different for DPMO, as Ms. Hasenbeck stated in her note. "When it doesn't confirm their determination of fate, it becomes hearsay, when it does confirm their determination it is creditable."

Here is the rule - when a Vietnamese is describing dead Americans, they can sometimes mistake dark skinned Americans for African-American. When a Vietnamese is describing live Americans no such mistake is allowed and he is deemed less than creditable.

On November 12th, 1971, a memo was issued by the Department of Army and signed by LTC George V. Jenks. The memo reads; "Inclosed (sic) documents contain intelligence reports from three separate sources that four US personnel were captured in the general area where [Name], SP4 Hasenbeck, [Name], and SP4 Nidds were reported missing. Two of these sources one of whom is rated "fairly reliable", further reported the date of capture as 21 April 1967, the date these same four individuals were reported as missing. Although no physical descriptions are given, the number of personnel and location and date of capture coincide so closely as to fairly well substantiate that these four men were in fact captured."

If The Truth Doesn't Fit, Force It, Turn It, Twist It, Distort It, But Make It Fit. A 1993 case summary, prepared by JTF-FA, states; ""The platoon leader from the first sampan returned to base and reported that Sp4 Mangino was in conversation with a local resident when he lost sight of him. The platoon leader also reported hearing 20-30 rounds of small arms fire 15 minutes after losing sight of the second sampan." It certainly bolsters the claim of ambush and death. The problem is the JTF-FA statement is not accurate.

According to Board of Inquiry statements dated 23 April 1967, the team was last seen at 1545 hours (3:45PM) at coordinates 622977. The Time Sequence of events established by the Board of Inquiry states that Lt. K. (we are withholding the name of the Lt. as he was reprimanded for his failure to report his men missing, in a timely manner.) and others heard sniper rounds. This was at 1630 hours (4:30 PM) some 45 minutes after losing sight of the men in the second sampan, not the 15 minutes as stated in the JTF-FA report. The Board of Inquiry also established the shots came from "hill vicinity coord: 623983."

During question and answers Lt. K. was asked "Did you hear any firing?

A: "Yes Sir."

Q: "What time." A: "About 1630."

Q: "What Direction?" A: "The firing came from the south and I think it originated 623983."

Q: "How may rounds do you guess were fired and what type weapon?" A: "I approximate 2 or 3 clips or about 25 to 30 rounds all of which originated from the vicinity of coordinates above. I do not think there were any return rounds."

Q: "What did you think then?" Gun jeep in Bunker position #1 called and stated there was a squad from Delta Company pinned down, but the pinned down (sic). I then went up to the top of the hill to see if I could see the sampan."

The platoon leader NEVER thought the firing involved the 4 missing men.

Additional information regarding the supposed "small arms fire" comes in the form of a letter from the Dept. of Army dated 9 June 1967, to Connie Mangino, wife of Tom Mangino. In a letter signed by Col. C.A. Stanfiel, Acting Adjutant General the Army states; "The first boat succeeded in reaching the shore at approximately 4:15 p.m. and the men waited on the beach for the arrival of your husband's boat. Shortly thereafter, weapons fire was heard in the area, However, the firing involved a squad of men in an area other than where the second sampan was last seen."

Clearly, JTF-FA choose to extract a small portion of Lt. K's statement to bolster the governments position that the men were ambushed and killed immediately.

Also ignored were the statements of other platoon members given during the Board of Inquiry. The question "Did you hear gun fire" or "Did you hear any small arms fire on the way back to camp" was asked of seven (7) men testifying before the board. ALL seven (7) answered NO. An eighth man was asked "Would you have been able to hear any firing?" His answer was "Oh yes sir."

We also contacted one of the divers who participated in the search operation. He provided the following information: "Diving conditions were excellent, the weather was clear, water warm, little or no wind and water visibility approximately three feet. As the bottom could be seen to a depth of approximately three feet from the air, our search was concentrated on the area of deeper water. A zig zag search pattern was used to ensure that complete coverage was accomplished. This, I am satisfied was accomplished."

He continued; "The only thing the search turned up was a few spent small arms casings. There was no sign of a firefight (large amounts of spend casings) no sign of any boat, or munitions of any kind. It was my opinion then that the search was properly executed by experienced dives and had there been anything to find we would have found it, especially with all the favorable conditions."

Today JTF-FA and DPMO would have you believe the statements of the Vietnamese witnesses interviewed in the 1990's. The Vietnamese witnesses report an ambush, gun shots and grenade blasts and at least three burials and two exhumations with the final movement of remains, by boat to a sandbar for burial.

In November 1992, members of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs traveled to Hanoi. During that visit, Sr. Col. Phan Duc Dai turned over his wartime journal supposedly detailing the ambush, death and burial of four men, from the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, on April 21 1967. Dai was interview by ABC TV News, and the New York Times. He told them how he participated in the death and burial of the four Americans.

Senator John Kerry was exuberant in his praise of Vietnamese cooperation. Using the revelations contained in the diary, Kerry called for further U.S. trade concessions to the Vietnamese and he announced that he had gotten an accounting of four men.

Dai, when interview, by Theodore Schweitzer, for the book "Inside Hanoi's Secret Archives" provided additional details of the ambush and stated he directed the burial and could lead U.S. investigators to the sight but no one had asked.

The diary could have been damning evidence of ambush and death, Except for one fact. The diary, is not a firsthand account but second hand hearsay. Col. Dai did not participated in the ambush, or burial and admitted he never saw the American's, alive or dead. This was confirmed by a fax memo from JTF-FA, Detachment 2 Hanoi, dated April 14th, 1993. However, since the diary describes the death of American servicemen, in spite of evidence of capture, this second hand hearsay is acceptable.

What the media didn't report - the diary not only dealt with the supposed ambush and death of the four, it also described efforts of the search team to locate their missing buddies and the measures, according to Col. Dai, that they would go to.

From the Diary of Col. Pham Duc Dai - "The US paint of democracy, civilization had gone. The most cruel monster of the 20th century revealed his true colors. The US troops jumped into the crowd, seized 10 of our people, blindfolded them and took them away. Gun shots were heard from the far away fields. Then they returned to force our compatriots to observe one minute of silence for the dead. The same thing happened again and again for three times. The last time they arrested up to 25 people. The rest of the crowd, who counted about several hundred, remained indifferent, astonishingly calm. Not a single cry was uttered, even their breathing remained stable. A quiet atmosphere prevailed, full of pride, typical of the genuine Vietnamese in face of threats of imprisonment, killing by the barbarous enemy."

According to the Diary the villagers laughed saying the American's were shooting into the air. We've spoken to members of the search team. According to them, this incident never happened. They do admit beating several individuals they believed had information on the missing men. That is not mentioned in the diary.

The diary also describes the missing men as wearing cards on their chests with the words "Light Infantry Brigade No 196." Upon hearing this one member of the 196th wrote stating; "Light Infantry Brigade 196 is not spelled out and is not embroidered. Our unit patch is solitary and says or spells out nothing to indicate who we were."

What Did They Know and When Did They Know It - In an article titled "The Odd, Pat Story of Col. Pham Duc Dai," dated December 18, 1992, noted author Sydney H. Schanberg wrote; "...days before Kerry left for his November trip, credible sources told me that one of the press events on his itinerary would be some disclosure about four soldiers who were killed in one place. And suddenly Col. Dai appears. Scripted? You decide." (To view full text of this article click here.)

In another article written by Garnett "Bill" Bell titled "Greed vs Honor - A Case In Point" Bell states; "...the information professed to be new by Sr. Col. Dai was passed to me by the political officer of the museum, Sr. Col Quan, while I was assigned as chief of the U.S. Office for POW/MIA Affairs in Hanoi during June 1991."

As shown by Mr. Schanberg and Mr. Bell, the release of the diary, in November 1992 during the Kerry visit was a staged event that contributed to the "tawdry illusion of progress" so aptly described by Col. Mike Peck.

The JTF-FA - DPMO Version - In 1993, JTF-FA wrote, "Analysis of witness testimony along with Senior Col. Dai's diary indicates that the four American soldiers were led to an ambush site, killed and buried as reported. Team members interviewed a total of 8 witnesses, of which one, Mr. Bong, (the same Mr. Bong who described the men as "3 white and 1 black"), provided strong firsthand information concerning his participation in the ambush and killing of the four American soldiers." Mr. Bong described the uses of rifles, and grenades in the ambush. Yet, no American in the area heard arms fire or grenade blasts.

"Three additional witness, all of whom had personally seen the four bodies and had helped bury them in the third and final grave site. A sand bar in a tributary to Tra Bong River indicated site now under two meters of water due to broken dam upstream. Location nominally consistent with that given by earlier witnesses."

In early 1999, JTF-FA's excavated the underwater site described above. No remains were found and nothing was found that could be associated with the four missing Americans. This came as no surprise to the families or those familiar with the case. The four were captured and moved from the area, probably before U.S. forces even knew they were missing. Or, perhaps they were held in the tunnels known to be beneath the village, until it was clear to move them.

Various personal papers belonging to the four were displayed at the Da Nang Museum. These papers range from Id cards, to shot cards, to drivers licenses, and business cards. There is even a Texaco credit card and an IOU. . None of the personal papers on display show any signs of blood, or water damage. In fact, they are in perfect condition. (To view the Texaco credit card click here.) Of the some 15 - 20 items for each man, it should be noted that only Paul Hasenbeck's dog tags were displayed.

All intelligence reports, the inconsistencies of the witness statements, the failure of the search teams to find anything, cast strong doubt on the DPMO contention that the four were ambushed and killed on April 21, 1967.

As for Col. Dai's Diary, we can only conclude that the diary was a carefully constructed propaganda piece of the times. The writing style and propaganda contained within the diary make this account suspect at best.

Between January and June of 1994, the families sent three letters to DPMO. The third letter, signed by the Primary Next of Kin of all four men, detailed point by point the concerns of the families and the discrepancies in this case. Six years later, in spite of several promises of a response, the families are still waiting for answers to their letters.

DPMO hasn't explained why this case is among the 44 cases representing 57 men, included in the "Project X" study. "Project X" was a study to "evaluate the possibility of any of the unaccounted for being alive. The conclusion reached is: There is a possibility that as many as 57 Americans could be alive...."

Among the 57 Servicemen mentioned in "Project X" are Sp4 Thomas Mangino, and PFC's Paul Hasenbeck, Daniel Nidds and David Winters. The analysts reviewing POW/MIA records in 1975, didn't believe the information contained in the the CIA reports were "obvious hearsay."

Connie Mangino, wife of POW/MIA Tom Mangino summed up her reaction to the latest DPMO determination saying: "I am so tired of being lied to."