Footnotes are denoted as F1 etc. Spelling errors are in the original report.

This Study is for internal use only. It contains subjective evaluations, opinions, and recommendations concerning on-going analysis that may impact future U.S. foreign policy decisions. This document has not yet been finalized for public release.

U.S. Korean War POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union and never repatriated.

This transfer was a highly-secret MGB program approved by the inner circle of the Stalinist dictatorship.

The rationale for taking selected prisoners to the USSR was:

o To exploit and counter U.S. aircraft technologies;

o to use them for general intelligence purposes;

o It is possible that Stalin, given his positive experience with Axis POWs, viewed U.S. POWs as potentially lucrative hostages.

The range of eyewitness testimony as to the presence of U.S. Korean War POWs in the GULAG is so broad and convincing that we cannot dismiss it.

The Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps which supported the North Korean and Chinese forces in the Korean War had an important intelligence collection mission that included the collection, selection, and interrogation of POWs.

A General Staff-based analytical group was assigned to the Far East Military District and conducted extensive interrogations of U.S. and other U.N. POWs in Khabarovsk. This was confirmed by a distinguished retired Soviet officer, Colonel Gavriil Rorotkov, who participated in this operation. No prisoners were repatriated who related such an experience.

o Prisoners were moved by various modes of transportation. Large shipments moved through Manchouli and Pos'yet.

o Khabarovsk was the hub of a major interrogation operation directed against U.N. POWs from Korea. Khabarovsk was also a temporary holding and transshipment point for U.S. POWs. The MGB controlled these prisoners, but the GRU was allowed to interrogate them.

o Irkutsk and Novosirbirsk were transshipment points, but the Komi ASSR and Perm Oblast were the final destinations of many POWs. Other camps where Americans were held were in the Bashkir ASSR, the Kemerovo and Archangelsk Oblasts, and the Komi-Permyatskiy and Taymyskiy Natinal Okrugs.

POW transfers also included thousands of South Koreans, a fact confirmed by the Soviet general officer, Kan San Kho, who served as the Deputy Chief of the North Korean MVD.

The most highly-sought-after POWs for exploitation were F-86 pilots and others knowledgeable of new technologies.

Living U.S. witnesses have testified that captured U.S. pilots were, upon occasion, taken directly to Soviet-staffed interrogation centers. A former Chinese officer stated he turned U.S. pilot POWs directly over to the Soviets as a matter of policy.

Missing F-86 pilots, whose captivity was never acknowledged by the Communists in Korea, were identified in recent interviews with former Soviet intelligence officers who served in Korea. Captured F-86 aircraft were taken to at least three Moscow aircraft design bureaus for exploitaiton. Pilots accompanied the aircraft to enrich and accelerate the exploitation process.