A Joint Casualty Resolution Center Biographic report, as 2 Oct 1986 summarizing Captain McDonnell's loss incident, makes no mention of the Ba To sighting. Of the Lao sighting the Biographic report states "The rallier made no positive identification of Cpt McDonnell's phot, (sic) but states that his photo looked very similar to the PW who wore a large ring. (Information in this report correlated to Cpt. McDonnell).

In the late 1980's the name of John McDonnell was placed on the "Original 119" Vessey Discrepancy List.

What was the significance of being on the "Original 119" Vessey Discrepancy List? In a November 15th, 1989 letter to then Congressman Bob Smith, General John W. Vessey Jr. writes "The discrepancy cases I presented to the Vietnamese were those in which Americans were known to have survived the incident in which they were involved. We believed they came into Vietnamese hands and probably were prisoners of the Vietnamese. These individuals did not return during Operation Homecoming in 1973, nor were their bodies returned in the intervening years and no explanation was provided by the Vietnamese. Because these cases may shed light on the fate of an American serviceman believed to have been alive after his loss, they are the priority of our efforts."

On April 25th 1991, Kenneth Quinn, then Chairman of the Administration's POW/MIA Inter Agency Group testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. In response to a question from Senator Alan Cranston, Mr. Quinn stated "In terms of actually conducting investigations on the ground, General Vessey has focused on 119 discrepancy cases, which is to say those cases, which represent, from looking at all the information we know about them, represent the greatest possibility that the men involved might still be alive. We had evidence that they were alive after the incident occurred where the plane was shot down or they were lost on the ground and we don't know what happened to them and what their fate was."

"So those represented to General Vessey the possibility where it is most probable or most likely that they might still be alive."

Statements by General Vessey and Mr. Quinn re-enforce our position that Capt. McDonnell, listed as an "Original 119" Vessey Discrepancy Case, was alive in February 1973.

The United States Government possessed strong evidence placing John McDonnell in captivity. That evidence shows John McDonnell alive in February 1973. With the exception of "Project X," we were unable to locate any information or intelligence dated after July 1973. In fact, as demonstrated by Project X, the 1972- 1973 sighting was not even considered in the evaluation of John McDonnell case. Why?

1992 - JTF-FA all but ignored the two sightings in case narratives, on John McDonnell, presented to the Vietnamese. Of the three JTF-FA Narratives available to us, dated, August 1989, July 1990, and Jun 1993, only the July 1990 Narrative mentions the 1972-1973 sighting. None mentions the 1971 sightings, in which JCRC concluded " that source probably observed Capt. John T. McDonnell."

JTF-FA ignored the strong evidence of John McDonnell's capture. They ignored evidence of his imprisonment and survival along with five (5) enlisted men.

Instead, in 1992 JTF-FA chose to interview witnesses supplied by the Vietnamese. All claimed to have witnessed the helicopter crash. None, however, saw Captain McDonnell. None witnessed his capture. None witnessed his death or participated in his supposed burial on March 7, 1969.

September 30, 1992 -- In their field activity report JTF-FA said, of the Vietnamese witnesses, "Although none of the witnesses actually took part in the capture and burial of the American, they all provided hearsay information that he died while being escorted probably to the Tri Thien Hue Military region Headquarters..." According to the hearsay information the POW sustained a leg wound and died the next day. Note: Lt. Greenfield suffered a severe leg wound.

Captain McDonnell's identification card was located in the Hue City Museum. The card, according to records arrived at the museum in 1975. Field Investigators excavated Captain McDonnell's alleged grave site. The excavation yielded no human remains.

Based on the hearsay of 4 Vietnamese the 1993 Narrative incorporated the "corroborating hearsay testimony concerning the crash of a U.S. helicopter in 1969 and the subsequent capture and burial of an American." We wonder, would "corroborating hearsay testimony" be admissable in a court of law?

In other words, since the Vietnamese witnesses all told the same story, it was true.

During Joint Field Activities in conducted in April 1998, JTF-FA surfaced witnesses who supposedly participated in the burial of Capt. McDonnell. The summary reads, in part; "witnesses emphatically asserted the location previously excavated was in fact the burial location, but bombing during the war and subsequent heavy rains and flooding completely wiped out all evidence or remains or an grave site. Consequently, the witnesses claimed it would be impossible for them to more accurately locate the burial site."

Today, the case of John McDonnell is considered fate determined. This determination is based, in part, on 4 hearsay accounts of Vietnamese witnesses who claimed they heard about a captured American, who died the next day. JTF-FA routinely ignores hearsay information about live POWs. Yet, in this case they are willing to believe hearsay information regarding the death of a POW. A POW, who by their own records and correlations, was alive in February 1973.

One must wonder, if these same four Vietnamese provided information that Capt. McDonnell was in the Quang Ngai POW Camp at Ba To, would JTF-FA investigators be so willing to believe them.

In a memo dated 23 August, 1994, we get a glimps of how a "determination of fate" is made. In the case of Capt. McDonnell, the memo reads; "JTF-FA did not agree with DPMO, argued there was sufficient information to confirm fate." In the end, the "panel voted 3 - 0 to confirm fate."

We were plesantly surprised to find that someone at DPMO realized there was enough evidence to keep this case open. However, that anyalist was overruled. In the end, DPMO management prevailed, along with JCS and JTF-FA and voted 3 - 0 to confirm fate. It is our opinion that when in doubt, the presumption should be in favor of the POW and the case in question should remain open. Instead, cases are routined stamped "fate confirmed" in spite of evidence and objections.

We, at the National Alliance of Families, believe that based on the information cited above, there can be only one conclusion. Capt. John McDonnell was alive as a Prisoner of War at least until February 1973. We further believe that Capt. John McDonnell survived in captivity, as the Nixon Administration was declaring him, and the 5 NCOs with him, dead.

We believe that this case is ample evidence that the Vietnamese government is not "cooperating in full faith" on the POW issue. How many other cases, like this, are ignored?

We have been unable to locate any documentation that would indicate a follow-up on the 1972-73 sightings. We have found no record of attempts to investigate the MR-5 Prison Camp, referred to by the source. We have found no indication of any intelligence gathering efforts by the intelligence agencies of the United States government. And, sadly we have found no record of an official inquiry of the Vietnamese regarding the 6 POWs held at the Quang Ngai POW Camp.

However, DPMO states, in a memo dated 9 July 1998, that "our records indicate that the source was reinterviewed several times in 1973." Requests, by the McDonnell family, for copies of these reports remain unanswered.

The United States and the Vietnamese Government must be held responsible for the fate of John McDonnell and the 5 NCOs with him.

Additionally, we are extremely concerned about the misrepresentation of information on this case contained in the February 14, 1996 - Comprehensive Case Review issued by Defense POW/MIA Office and in letters from DPMO dated 17 April 1998 and 9 July 1998..

Of the 1971 live sighting the Case review describes it as "A wartime source reported observing 2 U.S. POWs in 1971 in Laos. He reported the POWs were collaborating with the NVA. He picked a photo of Cpt McDonnell as possibly resembling one of the POWs he observed. Correlation to case 1402 is based solely on the tentative photo ID. It is highly unlikely that Cpt. McDonnell was seen two years after his incident in Laos. The source was very hesitant in picking out a photo of McDonnell."

In a letter dated 17 April 1998, a Defense Casualty Liaison Officer stated; "In 1973 the Joint Casualty Resolution Center correlated the report to Captian McDonnell based primarily on the jewelry described in the report. During a reinterview the source was shown Captain McDonnell's photograph mixed with those of 15 other missing servicemen, but he was unable to make a positive identification."

The actual document states that the source would not make a positive ID based on photos because of length of hair and nose. Those who have reviewed the pre-capture book of American servicemen, Prisoner and Missing, will agree that, many of the photos are of poor quality. Clearly, Major Watson regognized the problem with the photo book, in 1973. Shadowing could account for a difference in the length of a nose. Certainly, a POWs hair length would very likely change, in captivity.

The Comprehensive Case Review ignored the physical description of the POW and JCRC's own comments which read: ""Records indicate that source probably observed Capt. John T. McDonnell, USA (JCRC Nr. 0176)...."

Of the 1973 live sighting the Case review describes it as "A different source reported observing 6 POWs in an MR5 POW camp. The personal details provided for one of the POWs superficially matches McDonnell. However, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest he was ever a POW in MR5 given his loss in Thue Thein."

The information provided in that second live sighting, of February 1973, is far from superficial.

Judge for yourself.

Catagory	John McDonnell	Ba To POW - as described by source
First Name	John	John
Rank	Capt./Arty	Capt./Arty
Captured	March 6, 1969	Captured 1968 - 1969 time frame
Loss Location	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh
Height	70"	75"
Weight	175 lbs	described by source as thin
Hair	Light Brown	Blond
Eyes	Hazel	Blue
Scars	behind left ear	behind left ear
Tattoos	unknown	2
Home of Record	Texas	Texas
Married	Yes	Yes
Number of Children	3 Son 11, Son 9, Daughter 8	2 Daughter 11, Son 5

Long discussed within the POW/MIA issue was information regarding a press conference held in Saigon in June 1973. During this press conference, a defector provided information regarding POWs not released. Until now little was known about what went on during that press conference as it was rumored that the story was "spiked" at the request of the American Embassy.

That defector was Nguyen Thanh Son, source of the sighting of the American "Captain" and 5 NCOs in Quang Ngai Province between August 1972 and February 1973. During the Saigon interview, in June of 1973, attended by members of the media representing Associated Press, United Press International and NBC, Son spoke of POWs. To our knowledge there is only one record of that interview. It is a short Associated Press Article from the Baltimore Sun, dated June 9th, 1973. In that article, Nguyen Thanh Son is represented as a "junior North Vietnamese officer" not the "commanding officer for the 157 Co. 21st Bn, 2nd Div," as described in the DIA message.

Mr. Son spoke of North Vietnamese plans to infiltrate the South and discussed a North Vietnamese "plan not to launch a general offensive until 1976 - before the U.S. presidential elections." " Right now, they don't want to launch an offensive. They're afraid of the reaction of world opinion as well as President Nixon," he said.

Perhaps the Nixon resignation in August of 1974, allowed the North Vietnamese to move up their time table.

On the subject of POWs Mr. Son, according to the AP article, stated "he also believes the North Vietnamese are still holding some American prisoners in effect as hostages to insure that all mines are removed from North Vietnamese waters and that Hanoi receives United States reconstruction money. They want to keep U.S. prisoners because there are many problems to be settled with the U.S. government. They want to keep prisoners in case the U.S. government launches war again, they will have some prisoners."

That quote is followed by standard DoD debunking -- "Defense Department officials said they had no information from returned prisoners or any other source to support the defectors claims concerning U.S. POWs."

The article went on to say that "Mr. Son refused to elaborate further," on the subject of POWs.

If Mr. Son did not have information deemed credible, why did the Defense Intelligence Agency, on June 15th, 1973 issue their message of "URGENT POLITICAL SENSITIVITY." Why did the Embassy in Saigon go to extreme lengths to have the story killed? The bigger question is why did the media in the person of UPI and NBC agree and kill the story.

A telegram dated June 11th, 1973, from the American Embassy Saigon to the Secretary of State Washington D.C., states " NVA rallier/defector Nguyen Thanh Son was surfaced by GVN to Press June 8 in Saigon. In follow on (sic) interview with AP, UPI and NBC American correspondents, questions elicited information that he had seen six prisoners whom he believed were Americans who had not yet been released. American officer present at interview requested news services to play down details; AP mention was consistent with embargo request, while UPI and NBC after talk with Embassy Press Officer omitted item entirely from their stories.

Details on rallier's account being reported septel (sic) through military channels by Bright Light Message today, [word missing] White House."

No where in the Associated Press article is the number of POWs mentioned. Nor is it mentioned that Mr. Son actually saw the POWs over an extended period of time. Or that he spoke with one of them on 4 different occasions. Instead a carefully crafted sentence states "he also believes the North Vietnamese are still holding some American prisoners..."

When questioned about the Baltimore Sun article, DPMO stated, in the 17 April 1998 letter; "We are not familiar with the referenced newspaper article." We find that interesting, as the article was discovered by a member of the McDonnell family, during a routine review of the casualty file, while in Washington D.C. for the annual briefings.

That's correct! The article DPMO claims no knowledge of is in Capt. McDonnell's Army Casualty file.

Not only do we have our first clear evidence of Americans left behind but we now have evidence of media complicity in government efforts to "play down" details of Americans left behind. The U.S. and Vietnamese governments know what happened to John McDonnell and when it happened. Only his family and the American public remain in the dark.

In their 9 July 1998 memo,DPMO discussed Nguyen Thank Son's press conference. According to DPMO; "Of note, during his first interview this source never mentioned seeing six American prisoners.... It was not until his news conference a few days later that the source came up with the story of the six American POWs at the MR-5 camp. Following the new conference he was reinterviewed, resulting in the data reported in IR 6 918 5058 73."

This statement is completely untrue. The information contained in IR 6 918 5058 73, regarding six American POW was obtained by U.S. officials on May 22, 1973. The press conference referred to, was held on June 8th, 1973. That is 17 days after the information was acquired by U.S. officials.

Records indicated that the information released during the press conference was reported back to Washington D.C. on June 11th, 1973. That June 11th report clearly reads; "Place and date of AQN; Saigon, RVN, 22 May 1973."

The DPMO attempt to make Nguyen Thanh Son's disclosure of POWs at Ba To look like some stunt to draw publicity, is at best incompetent, at worst it is criminal.

Almost 25 years later, on November 19, 1997, a Freedom of Information Act request filed with the Central Intelligence Agency for the National Interrogation Center debriefing report of Nguyen Thanh Son, was denied. (It is interesting to note that in a 17 April 1998 letter, to the McDonnell family, DPMO claimed no knowledge of National Interrogation Center Records, stating; "This request is somewhat confusing. Although the United States and our allies had interrogation facilities in Vietnam during the war, they did not maintain flies on missing U.S. Servicemen." Again, this statement is misleading, at best.)

According to the CIA, they could "neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to your request on the basis of Freedom of Information Act exemptions (b) (1) and (b) (3)." (Note: Exemption (b) (1) applies to material which is properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Exemption (b) (3) applies to the Director's statutory obligations to protect from disclosure intelligence sources and methods, as well as the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries or number of personnel employed by the Agency, in accord with the National Security Act of 1947 and the (1A Act of 1949, respectively;)

While we have no documentation to prove it, we believe it possible, that Nguyen Thanh Son was working for the United States Government as a "Controlled American Source" (CAS). That might explain the "defection" of an NVA officer after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords. Perhaps his defection was actually an extraction. This would also explain the CIA denial of our FOIA based on "... Director's statutory obligations to protect from disclosure intelligence sources and methods, as well as the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries or number of personnel employed by the Agency..." Since Nguyen Thanh Son spoke publicly of his defection and the intelligence information he provided, denial based on protection of source and methods is ridiculous. Denial of the debrief is also in direct violation of two Presidential Executive Order signed by Presidents Bush and Clinton to declassify all POW/MIA related material.

On April 12th, 1998, the Central Intelligence Agency denied our FOIA appeal. The Agency Release Panel determined that the CIA "must neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of any records.... Such information, that is, whether or not any responsive records exist, would be classified for reasons of national security.... the fact of the existence or nonexistence of such documents would relate directly to information concerning intelligence sources and methods..."

Is this document truly classified for reasons of national security or is it classified based on national embarrassment?

During the 1997 government briefings, held in Washington D.C., representatives of Army Casualty and the Defense POW/MIA Office were presented the information relating to Nguyen Thanh Son. Also provided was the name of the camp interpreter. The family requested that an effort be made to locate these men for the purpose of a re-interview. The response of the DPMO's representative was an incredulous "you mean you want us to do a live sighting investigation?"