Information was also requested on the live sighting report from Laos and the reason John McDonnell was among the 57 missing servicemen evaluated as "possibly alive" by the Project X study.
The response came in November of 1997. According to DPMO the first sighting, in Laos, was a fabrication. They came to this conclusion, stating "JCRC analysts believed one of the POW's described was Captain McDonnell. They apparently based this belief upon the physical description and the source's agreement that one of the POWs resembled a photo he was shown of Captain McDonnell. Aside from the identity of the alleged POWs, in looking at the substance of the sources claims our analysts question the validity of the information. At the heart of the report, and most particularly suspicious, is the source's claim that the two American POW officers were clad in PAVN uniforms, wearing wearing "Seiko" watches and gold rings..."
In conclusion DPMO stated "Based upon the information contained in the report, DPMO analysts have not correlated it to any American and view it as a fabrication on the part of the source."
However, in 1973, JCRC stated in the "Field Comment" -- "Records indicate that source probably observed Capt. John T. McDonnell, USA (JCRC Nr. 0176).... There is an indication that McDonnell may have been captured.... McDonnell's description follows: age in 1971 was 31, height: 1.77 meters; weight 75 kilos' hair; brown; race; caucasian; wears white silver seiko watch and large ring on left hand."
In 1986, JCRC maintained its position that "information contained in thie report correlated to Cpt. McDonnell."
No mention was made of "Project X."
Of the 4 sightings reported by Nguyen Thanh Son, DPMO stated "In regard to the analyst notes comparing Captain McDonnell with Army Sergeant Glenn Tubbs, the notes refer to a scar behind Captain McDonnell's left ear, but do not list any tattoos."
Ignored is the fact that two independent sources provided almost identical descriptions of a POW, whom we believe the evidence shows is Captain John McDonnell.
As of this date, (see letters dated 17 April 1998 and 9 July 1998) DPMO has deemed both source reports as fabrications. Requests to have Nguyen Thanh Son and the camp interperter, Sr. Lt. Hinh, located and reinterviewed were denied. In the words of DPMO, "The camp where Lt. Hinh allegedly worked didn't exist at the time and location cited by the source, thus the existence of the interpreter is moot."
The Camp - DPMO insists that the camp we beleive existed in the Ba To area of Northwestern Quang Ngai Province was not operational in 1973. Yet, CIA "Intelligence Information Cable" #314/03268-73, distributed 10 April 1973, the very day Nguyen Than Son rallied, states, in part; "As of early March VC Prisoner of War Camp centered on BS3128 was located in Kontum Province to the West of Gia Vuc in Ba To District, Quang Ngai Province. This camp held both GVN Military and civilian official prisoners from Quang Ngai Province. This camp was subdivided into eight compounds. Some of the prisoners, the total number of whom is unknown, were used as laborers on nearby agricultural production sites. The camp was managed and guarded by a staff of about (unreadable)5 people."
Another CIA "Intelligence Information Cable" #311/01523-73, distributed 6 April 1973, discusses activities in the Sa Huynh area during the period 28 January - 15 March 1973. The cable states the camp held "Government of Vietnam (GVN) prisoners who had been captured at Sa Huynh in Duc Pho District Quang Ngai Province, during late January and early February 1973. On three different occassions between 28 January and 14 March POW's arrived at the POW camp. The first group, consisting of 83 Prisoners, arrived at the POW camp on 29 January 1973. The second group, consisting of 100 POWs arrived on 2 February. En route to the camp two POWs from this group were shot and 10 died from injuries. The third group, which included 80 prisoners arrived on 13 Feburary...."
During his Press Conference, Son stated that; "the Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary Government plans to establish its capital in South Vietnam in Ba To district of Quang Ngai Province, about 20 miles northwest of Sa Huynh."
In the limited reports available to us, Nguyen Thanh Son describes the Ba To camp as housing 200 ARVN military (GVN Military), who were housed seperately from the American POWs. According to Son the American NCOs were required to grow their own food. Growing their own food might indicate "agricultural production sites," described in the CIA "Intelligence Information Cable," distributed 10 April 1973.
By our calculations 251 GVN POWs were at the camp described in the CIA cable distributed 6 April 1973. This is reasonably close to the figure of 200 reported by Nguyen Thanh Son. The cable goes on to say; "...The whole camp was located under dense jungle follage to prevent aerial observation, there was only one trail leading to the camp. The trail orginated in Nghia Hanh District and terminated at the camp...."
Clearly, a POW camp, or camps, existed in the Ba To area. Could one of these camps be the camp described by Nguyen Thanh Son, as holding 6 American POWs?
On June 9th, 1973, the day the Balitmore Sun Article was published, records indicate that the Navy flew a reconniance mission in the area, we beleive the Ba To camp was located. The only written reference to this mission comes in the form of a handwritten note which reads; "Aerial photographs: An area [blacked out] photograph, classified [whited out] , is available in CDD-PT for viewing in addition those picutres in the target folder."
Two photocopies of the photographs available to us are of extremely poor quality. With no experience in photo anaylsis, we would describe these photos by saying they show a large dark area (perhaps dense jungle canopy) with pinpoints of light escaping. These pictures show no evidence, to our untrained eye, of a POW camp. However, this does not mean the camp did not exist!
It simply means, as the CIA cable states; ""...The whole camp was located under dense jungle follage to prevent aerial observation..."
DPMO's dismissal of the Ba To camps existence is premature. It is a fact that during the war U.S. intelligence was unaware of several operational POW camps. This was discussed in a study done in May 1982 by Colonel Harold E. Johnson USAF. The study titled "I will never forget.... An Analysis of the POW/MIA Episode in the War in Southeast Asia" was done for the Air War College. Col. Johnson's credentials are impressive. According to his biographical sketch Col. Johnson is a "graduate of the USAF Squadron Officer School (1964), the Air Command and Staff College (1974), and the Air War College (1981.)" In addition to his impressive credentials, Colonel Johnson has first hand experience with the Vietnamese, having spent almost six (6) years as a Prisoner of War, in North Vietnam.
Colonel Johnson describes how after the unsuccessful POW rescue attempt, at Son Tay on November 21, 1970, prisoners throughout North Vietnam were consolidated. He goes on to describe what happened about one (1) year later.
Col. Johnson stated "over 200 of us were blindfolded, bound and moved stealthily in covered trucks at night. We were taken to a camp near the Chinese border at a point north and west of Dong Khe. The camp was constructed among the Karst ridges and had surrounding barbed-wire-tipped walls and building made of solid stone. It had been obviously constructed especially as a permanent prison facility. There was not any electricity, and we depended on the stream flowing down the mountain for our water supply. We named the camp Dog Patch in association with our mountainous surroundings and primitive living conditions. We remained in this camp until January 1973, when we returned to Hanoi to be released. The U.S. did not know the location of this camp until after the returnee debriefing."
Col. Johnson discussed the brutal treatment of POWs and the constant threat of trial as "war criminals." His study also mentions how in 1968, all references to trials stopped. Col. Johnson hypothesed as to why the Vietnamese dropped their threat of trial against the known POWs.
According to the study, Col. Johnson stated ".... perhaps the communist captors made other arrangements." Col. Johnson continued "the Communists could have decided to designate certain individual PWs or entire PW camps as inmates for eventual repatriation. Other PWs kept in camps secreted in the hinterlands could have been designated as recipients for the proposed trials. All loyal cadres could be instructed on the underhanded plans, and further references to and emphasis on the subject could be dropped. Such a plan would have required meticulous cross referencing to insure what released POWs had been in contact with or knew each other to reduce possibilities of repercussions about those remaining being designated by name and supported by specific testimony after the big release." Col. Johnson acknowledges this is "pure conjecture" on his part but continues "... but it makes sense from my experience in looking at it from a Communist viewpoint."
In his conclusion Col. Johnson writes; "during annual torture sessions we call purges, the interrogators were always interested in whom you had been communication with and who else you knew in the rest of the camp. Their records were fairly complete, so they could cross reference the information to confirm which prisoners knew each other. Names of POWs confirmed as alive at the time a propaganda release was made could have designated that group for eventual release, thereby reducing their worth as possible pawns in special negotiations."
Col. Johnson continued "When I began this study, I had a firmly-held personal opinion that all the living POWs had been returned or completely accounted for as a result of the returnee testimonies. I do not believe that any more. It is my humble opinion, based on my research, common sense, personal experience, and a gut feeling, that there are still some live Americans pigeonholed by the Communist somewhere in Southeast Asia. Testimony by refugees and other people about live sightings of Americans are too numerous and accurately described to be complete fabrications. I feel that the identification question relating to specific identities having to be accurately tied to the reports of live sightings is irrelevant. If any non-indigeous personnel are currently sighted as groups in captivity there, the overwhelming probability is that they would be Americans. Why should their presence be such a surprise?"
Indeed, why should their presence be such a surprise and why should we be surprised to learn that "Codeword Classified" information may exist relating to Capt. McDonnell. A partial index of documents from Capt. McDonnell classified file contains the notation "This Material Contains Codeword." Could that be a reference to Codeword Classified Intelligence on Capt. McDonnell?
The National Alliance of Families challenges the Clinton Administration, represented by the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) to live up to the commitment of a full and truthful accounting. A good place to begin is with the case of John McDonnell and the 5 NCOs in the Quang Ngai Prison POW Camp, in February of 1973.
We challenge every Senator and Congressman to stand up and ask where is John McDonnell?
The evidence outlined above is overwhelming. On behalf of the McDonnell family and the families of all our POW/MIAs, we:
- request a reversal of the determination of fate and return the case of John McDonnell to
the priority case list of last known alive.
- request JTF-FA present this case to the Vietnamese detailing all available information
and get answers that are "truthful and "fully cooperative."
- request JTF-FA locate and re interview the source of the 1971 Lao sighting.
- request JTF-FA locate and re interview Nguyen Thanh Son, the source of the August 1972 - Feb. 1973 sighting.
- request JTF-FA locate and interview Lt. Hinh, the interpreter at the MR-5 POW Camp in Quang Ngai Province.
- request explanation of Bright Light Report IR No. 6-797-0251-72, dated 10 Nov 72
"Sighting of Three (3) American PWs" Quang Ngai - Why is this report filed in Capt.
McDonnell's Army Intelligence file and his Casualty File?
- request explanation of Bright Light Report IR No. 6-797-0153-72, dated 11 Aug 72
"Sighting of Three (3) sus PW's with 48th Main Force Battalion Quang Ngai" - Does this report also relate to Capt. McDonnell ?
- request copy of classified (C) letter dated 22 August 73
- request actual copy of IR 6 918 5058 73
- request explaination as to why there is no follow-up documentation relating to the 1973 re-interviews of Nguyen Thanh Son, in Capt. McDonnell's files.
- request copies of all reports of re-interviews referred to by DPMO, of Nguyen Thanh Son.
- request immediate all agency search of documents relating to Capt. McDonnell and
their immediate declassification and release to the McDonnell family.
- request immediate CIA compliance with Presidential Executive Orders to declassify all
POW/MIA related documentation starting with the immediate release of the debriefing of
Nguyen Than Son.
- request an investigation as to why the Defense POW/MIA Office misrepresented the
Details of the two live sightings in their Comprehensive Case Review, done in compliance with the 1994 Defense Authorization Act, for presentation to Congress.
All the evidence indicates John McDonnell and 5 NCO's were alive in a Quang Ngai POW camp, in mid- to late February 1973.