GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR
Top Secret
REPORT
OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE
Moscow 1972
For Official Use Only
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Dear comrades!
I reported to you earlier about the situation which has developed and
about the fundamental characteristics of the past stage of our people's
conflict against the American imperialists. I will cover the main tasks of
the people and the army of North and South Vietnam which were proposed by
the 23rd plenum of the TsK PTV.
These tasks once again confirm our resolve to attain victory. This is
a very correct course for our party and people at the present stage of
conflict. We have already worked out measures for achieving the resolutions
of the 23rd Plenum of the TsK. We will also cover a number of the Supreme
Command's and the Government Defense Council's positions, in which an
evaluation of our victories gained over the period from 30 Mar 72 to the
present is given.
The military situation for us is developing favorably on all fronts. A
number of profound changes which took place in the military situation
demanded that we develop a necessary frame of reference for solving all
issues which arise during the war. Several meetings between us and the US
aimed at developing measures on resolving the Vietnam issue have already
taken place.
We have decisively rejected a number of proposals put forth by the
American side. With assistance from a number of countries. there were to be
secret meetings in Paris and in other places aimed at drawing up a solution
to the Vietnam issue. Such meetings took place. They once again testified
to the deranged nature of the proposals put forward by the American side.
As before, we have maintained our position, the essence of which includes
the following: if the US truly wants to resolve the Vietnam issue, then
above all else it must refuse to support the Nguyen Van Thieu regime, and
on]y afterwards will we engage in a discussion about a cease fire. This
demand is the main tenet in our conflict against the American imperialists.
If Nixon continues adhering to his policy of Vietnamization" of the war
and desires to leave the present Saigon Government of Thieu in power, then
the peace negotiations between us and the US will not yield any results.
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During our general offensive on the fronts of South Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia, the progress which we have attained in implementing our strategic
and tactical line [direction, orientation] was clearly evident.
Earlier, I analyzed the activity of our command, elucidated the great
victories we have attained and also explained the shortcomings and mistakes
that we made during the general offensive. The lessons we learned from
analyzing the mistakes we made were also discussed. I stated all of this
to the Politburo in order to work out a direction for solving the
fundamental principal problems.
Today I will report a number of positions regarding expanding the scope
of our future offensive.
We organized meetings with South Vietnamese representatives aimed at
preparing a solution of the military and political issues in South Vietnam
according to the Politburo's and State Defense Council's plan. These
meetings have great significance for us, and we are linking several of our
plans with them [South Vietnamese representatives]- A number of our
comrades have met with representatives of the South Vietnamese authorities,
and it can be said that we have succeeded in winning their sympathy at these
meetings. We were able to exchange ideas not only orally, but also in
written form during these meetings and contacts. This gave us the
opportunity to draw definite conclusions- Recently, we have conducted 8
similar meetings with representatives of the Saigon authorities and South
Vietnamese political figures.
First, we will cover meetings with General Ngo Dinh Dzu. Earlier Ngo
Dinh Dzu was listed as a candidate for president of South Vietnam and fought
with Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky for this post. Ngo Dinh Dzu is a
prominent South Vietnamese capitalist and well-known political figure. He
occupied the post of chairman of the upper chamber of the Saigon Parliament
and during the Ngo Dinh Diem government, he was a senator in the upper
chamber. Ngo Dinh Dzu, in his own opinion, is a nationalist- He speaks
1) Commander of the 2nd Regional Corps of South Vietnam, General-Lieutenant
(GRU's note).
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against American troops on South Vietnamese territory, and also against
several policy positions conducted by the Saigon authorities. At the same
time. he is characterized as a reactionary an enemy of communism.
Afterwards, as Ky and Thieu attained victory in the presidential elections,
the latter undertook all measures to take revenge on General Dzu. Dzu used
the pre-election campaign to criticize the Saigon regime and to undermine
its security. He spoke against American troops on South Vietnamese
territory, for which he was subjected to bitter attacks from Nguyen Van
Thieu. General Dzu was forced to leave the political arena after 9 months
under pressure from Thieu. Afterwards, General Dzu became an even greater
enemy of Nguyen Van Thieu and his government. This is why we tried to win
this person over to our side.
Despite General Dzu remaining an enemy of communism, his relations with
Nguyen Van Thieu and the present Saigon factions, as well as our meetings
with him have allowed him to see the nature of the Americans and the true
colors of the Saigon Government.
We sent one of our comrades from the Supreme Command to Saigon for
meetings with General Dzu. At the meeting, which lasted 3 hours, General
Dzu agreed to enter into a future coalition government and spoke out against
the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war carried out by Nixon and also
against the Nguyen Van Thieu clique. During this meeting he also stated
that he will fight against Nguyen Van Thieu's clique and Nixon's present
designs.
Now, we see clearly how significant changes have taken place in General
Dzu's life and way of thinking. He is no longer the same ardent
anticommunist. Now prevailing in his views are those features such as the
conflict against Nixon's policy of Vietnamization" of the war and against
Nguyen Van Thieu's clique which he considers as fascist and as expressing
the interests of the financial oligarchy which is against freedom and
independence. And finally, General Dzu is for the expansion of democracy
and freedom over the entire territory
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of South Vietnam. Such are General Dzu's basic national qualities which
correspond to our present course. This is why we are attempting to win
General Dzu over to our side and why we entered into contact with him.
After the first meeting, there were three other recent meetings during which
he expressed his opinions. During these meetings, we understood what kind
of major changes took place in his way of thinking and in the position he
has taken and in his approach to solving the problem.
Thus, we can ascertain that these meetings and contacts with General
Dzu had very good results. Recently, General Dzu requested to meet with one
of the prominent leaders of the NFO [National Liberation Front] of South
Vietnam. We are now busy preparing for the upcoming meeting between General
Dzu and Hyuyn Tan Phat. This meeting will be conducted in secret to insure
the fulfillment of our main principles as we understand that this new person
is contradictory - he is among those in the Saigon Government whose number
is daily growing.
The second person is Nguyen Khanh. He earlier occupied the post of
prime minister for three years after the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem. Nguyen
Khanh is a representative of the army. Earlier he served in the French Amy;
now he is a prominent South Vietnamese capitalist whose capital is invested
in various foreign enterprises, especially in France. Nguyen Khanh is a
representative of the new trend. This is why we have entered into contact
with him. These contacts took place in Paris, where we have conducted 5
meetings.
Nguyen Khanh maintains constant contact with military circles in the
Nguyen Van Thieu government. After being removed from his post, he left the
country, but periodically returns to Saigon where he engages in political
activities in the capacity of an emigree representative-
In summarizing the five meetings, we noticed in Nguyen Khanh the
following: first, as regards the ruling faction he believes that Nguyen Van
Thieu is a dictator and fascist who is not capable of being the head of the
government. Khanh considers the present government to be rotten to the
core; second, he is against the bombing of North
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Vietnam; third, while criticizing the Nguyen Van Thieu faction, he speaks
against the participation of Saigon troops in combat actions on Cambodian
territory. He believes that the Saigon Army is in danger of disintegration
and that it has poor morale and combat spirit. Nguyen Khanh speaks for the
establishment of a new government which would have authority with the
people and which would carry out a nationalist policy, while receiving
foreign aid. These are the views of Nguyen Khanh. He says nothing about
his feelings toward the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war. This is
explained primarily by his connections with military circles. Therefore,
we are not striving to directly attract him to our side. Presently, Nguyen
Khanh is maintaining connections with the current Saigon generals.
The third person is Duong Van Mirth, who also represents the military
circles. Previously, he occupied the post of prime minister after Nguyen
Khanh, and was then sent out of the country as an ambassador. The
political views of Duong Van Min' differ from the political views of Nguyen
Khanh. This is first expressed in Duong Van Min' speaking out against
Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization" and for the independent solution of
internal problems by the Vietnamese without US interference. He believes
that the US should be responsible for prolonging the Vietnamese War and for
its consequences. He subjects the Vietnamese policy of Nixon to sharp
criticism, as well as the policy carried out by the current Saigon
Government. These are very good political views. He speaks against
Thieu's clique, considering it to be pro-fascist, anti-democratic and not
capable of carrying out the leadership of the country. These are the
primary political views of Duong Van Min'.
As a result of these contacts with Duong Van Minh, we have attained an
important victory, which has forced him to reflect. He also met with Nguyen
Thi Binh several times in Paris. At these meetings, Duong Van Minh felt
that, as before, he was close to the Fatherland and that he is Vietnamese.
This is why he began to conduct this great work with us and with the
intelligentsia and military circles located outside of the country. He did
this with the aim of entering into a coalition government and in the hope of
solving the Vietnamese issue
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on the basis of conducting consultations and negotiations between
the various political factions of South Vietnam. This is Duong
Van Min's desire.
The fourth person is the former emperor Bao Dai. At one time the
possibility existed that the former emperor would have been behind us. But,
under pressure from reactionary factions after the August revolution, he was
forced to emigrate to France. As before, Bao Dai holds great influence
amongst the political figures in the Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces and
also in the city of Hue, the ancient capital of Vietnam. This is why we
moved to make contact with Bao Dai. We are not hoping that Bao Dai becomes
a part of the coalition government, but to attract him to our side is to
attract his supporters in the regions where he has influence. As a result
of the meetings conducted, we clarified that Bao Dai will come out against
the presence of American troops on the territory of South Vietnam, and he
also criticizes Nguyen Van Thieu's existing regime. Bao Dai is also calling
for all political factions to create a free, neutral, peace-loving
government that would resolve the tense situation that has taken form in the
country. This is why we entered into contact with Bao Dai and are trying to
win him over to our side. We hope that he, in turn, will work with his
people in a plan for securing peace and freedom for our country.
The fifth person is General Nguyen Van Vi who previously occupied the
post of Minister of Defense of South Vietnam. Tkhieu removed him from his
post for disorder and chaos in the army's financial affairs. The real
reason, however, for Nguyen Van Vi's retirement was the series of serious
defeats that the puppet army has suffered. From Nguyen Van Tkhieu's
viewpoint, the military circles responded to this move with a specific
reaction. We also had contacts with General Nguyen Van Vi which allowed us
to understand his political position. He thinks that the US will certainly
suffer defeat in this war and that a war in Vietnam is not the
responsibility of the American Army. This is why Nguyen Van Vi is also
coming out for the creation of a coalition government in order to resolve
the Vietnam issue through peaceful negotiation between all of the political
factions of South Vietnam.
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Nguyen Van Vi is also coming out against Nixon's ,,Vietnamization" of the
war. Such are the basic political views of General Nguyen Van Vi. We
scored a great victory at the meeting with him; we received his agreement to
take part in a coalition government to resolve the Vietnam issue through
peaceful negotiation between all of the political factions of South Vietnam.
Nguyen Van Vi also officially recognized the victories won by the National
Liberation Front of South Vietnam, i.e. our victories.
As concerns our contacts within the South Vietnamese governing
apparatus, it is fitting to mention here the letter from Nauyen Cao Ky
addressed to us. In the letter, he lays out his views on the course to a
resolution of the Vietnam problem.
I have reported to you today on the contacts with all of these people so
that you would know how the Politburo's instructions to win over these
people to our side is being carried out.
The strong protest from their side is a result of a growth of
contradictions within Nguyen Van Tkhieu's clique and of contradictions of
Nixon's ,,Vietnamization" of the war. We can use these contradictions to
improve the situation in South Vietnam and to resolve the issue in our
favor. Their agreement to enter into a coalition government will precisely
go in our favor. In addition to a resolution of the issue by military means
on the battlefields of South Vietnam, we have engaged in contacts with
several South Vietnamese political figures, who may be able to join the
ranks of a coalition government. As a result of these contacts we have
gained an understanding of the political views of these people and have
expressed our point of view on ways to resolve the Vietnam problem.
These contacts with people who occupy high stations, prominent military
and political figures, ministers and senators of the upper and lower
chambers of the Saigon parliament provide the basis for making the following
conclusions:
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2. The majority of them are against Nixon's "Vietnamization" of the
war, against the escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam, and think that
Nixon does not want to resolve the Vietnam issue or the Indochina issue as a
whole.
3. They consider that the National Liberation Front has recently scored
enormous victories on the military, political and diplomatic fronts. They
recognize that on the military front we were able to win over extensive
heavily populated regions. They also recognize the National Liberation
Front's great success with the strengthening of the army, the increase in
its combat ability and leadership level, the improvement in cooperation
between the branches of service and many other areas.
We also tried to win over to our side the category of people from the
provinces and many towns who occupy less important positions in the state
apparatus. It is possible to say that they are also ready to aid in the
creation of a coalition government. They are also against the policy of
"Vietnamization", against Nguyen Van Tkhieu's clique and want to resolve the
Vietnamese issue on the basis of a cessation of war.
Thus, on the orders of the Politburo we have been preparing to conduct
meetings with various categories of the South Vietnamese population, aimed
at resolving the South Vietnamese issue through peaceful negotiations
between all of the political factions of South Vietnam. As a result of the
contacts that have taken place to win these people over to our side,
conditions have presented themselves so that these people will be able to
aid us in the creation of a coalition government and in the overthrow of
Nguyen Van Tkhieu's dictatorial regime. We see that we have chosen the
correct course. This is also clearly indicated in the resolutions of the
23rd Plenum of the Central Committee.
In other words, we should win these people over to our side, and bring
them into the coalition government so that we
10
can use them to our favor in the diplomatic and political plan. In order to
create a base for the successful resolution of the issues that stand before
us. we specifically want to bring into the coalition government those people
who earlier worked in the South Vietnamese state apparatus and held or are
holding at the present a high post in the power structure.
If we are successful in resolving these issues, we will be concluding a
mammoth case on which we will again report to the Politburo so that you are
well informed on these issues and have formed a plan of action for mission
completion. Thanks to these meetings, we are able to know who supports us
and who is against us in South Vietnam. We have also worked out a new plan
for the realization of our new intentions in South Vietnam and now know
which representatives of the present South Vietnamese power apparatus are in
favor of the war.
The meetings and contacts which we initiated were conducted with
complete equality of rights and helped us win over representatives of all
strata of South Vietnamese society to our side. This is our grandest
victory, won in the course of these contacts with the aim of resolving the
Vietnamese issue.
Thus, thanks to these contacts we understand which part of the
population considers the course we are taking to be just, i.e. we have
exposed all of those who are against Nixon's politics for the prolongation
Of the war. against Nguyen Van Thieu's clique and will join with us in the
creation of a coalition government.
In addition to the military issues, this is one of the problems we are
trying to resolve. We are therefore conducting these meetings and contacts
directed at the resolution of political and diplomatic problems.
With the goal of realizing these aims, the Supreme Command, in
conjunction with the Governmental Council of Defense, has developed
directives for the army to prepare and conduct the "Ba Be" plan, which is
scheduled to be executed in October. The "Ba Be" plan provides for the
resolution of a number of goals. Four hundred and six individuals [406]
were sent to execute the plan in South Vietnam. These individuals had gone
through sufficient training and
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are well armed. Earlier, these people worked in the governing apparatus of
South Vietnam. After the August revolution, during the period of the war of
resistance against the French colonials, we left these people behind. They
actively worked for the enemy and subsequently joined various organs of the
Saigon governing apparatus. We trained and armed them well to carry out the
"Ba Be" plan before they left for South Vietnam.
The basic aims of the "Ba Be" plan:
Elimination of all people who are resistant and oppose our course and of
those who occupy leadership positions at the province-district level and
above; a full paralysis of the will of such people.
Conduct of activities to carry out a disruption of the Saigon governing
apparatus at the province level and below with the goal of a subsequent
replacement of this apparatus with new people. We are attentively observing
those people who oppose us and our decision with regards to this group must
be very serious and firm. This matter has an important place in the
execution of the "Ba Be" plan. We must have lists and full dossiers on
these people beforehand in order to conduct the preparatory training to
quickly do away with them and disrupt their routine.
Search for and acquire materials which testify to crimes by Americans
and their puppets with regard to the Vietnamese people, so that during
opportune conditions, we can accuse them of committing these crimes by
publishing the materials.
These are the three basic missions for the people who were dispatched
for execution of the "Ba Be" plan. As for the time of completion, it is
generally believed that it will be executed simultaneously with the TS-6
plan (Chyong Shon-6). i.e. in the month of October. This plan must be
executed well in order to influence the course of the Paris Peace talks on
Vietnam as well as the development of the situation in the near future.
This is very important task. Its outcome may help us make a more
successful advance on the front. We need to increase the pace of
development on the front to win great victories in a short span of time.
Therefore. the "Ba Be" plan is already being executed and we are continuing
to train people to carry_ it out.
The TS-6 plan is a VNA plan of military action in South Vietnam with the
main effort concentrated in the Hue region (GRU note).
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It is necessary to resolve this issue taking into account settling the
military and the political aspects of the Vietnamese problem. If we take a
path of concession toward Americans and release POWs, then we would lose
much. That is why our point of view on this issue remains the same: this
issue must be resolved on the basis of military and political aspects of
settlement.
Holding 1205 POWs creates certain difficulties for us, but more
importantly, the loss of 1205 POWs, particularly aviators, is a great
detriment to the American Army, particularly the US Air Force. At the same
time, we were able to collect data about American weapons and also valuable
scientific materials about the US Army, for instance, material on how to use
different types of weaponry, tactical/technical characteristics of aircraft,
Air Force directives, as well as materials about other types of armament of
the US Army. We have been able to uncover US intentions in the
international arena and on a number of other issues which are related to war
in Indochina.
That is why we are convinced that our position concerning POWs has and
continues to be correct. If we could successfully resolve the POW issue,
then the other issues would not exert any influence on our policy toward the
US. That is why we are now concentrating on the successful resolution of
this problem on the collection and study of materials from interrogations of
American aviators who were shot down over North Vietnam and American
scientists captured in this war, particularly Air Force specialists, as well
as scientists in other technical areas. Their loss is a major liability for
the American Army, because in no other war have there been so many captured
Americans as there are in this war of aggression.
The 1205 American POWs kept in the prisons of North Vietnam represent a
large number. For now, we have officially published a list of only 368
POWs. The rest are not acknowledged. The US government is aware of this,
but they do not know the exact number of POWs, or they perhaps only assume
an approximate number based on their losses. Therefore in accordance with
the instructions from the Politburo, we are keeping the number of POWs
secret.
We continue to collect and study materials from interrogations
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of POWs in order to have a basis in specific circumstances to expose US
designs in the Indochina war of aggression as well as in other matters.
Collection and study of these materials has provided us great assistance in
studying the scientific discoveries of the US, in developing methods to
counter contemporary weapons, including chemical, which have inflicted
great harm upon us in this war.
I reported to the Politburo several fundamental aspects related to the
matter of American POWs, namely: concerning the policy we are implementing
on this matter, I gave the specific number of American POWs seized in North
Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
We still have among us Comrades who think: why do we keep these POWs and
not take advantage of the Nixon proposals? Do we really want to resolve
this matter after all? It needs to be noted that such a point of view is
profoundly mistaken. This is not political bargaining but rather a key
condition and serious argument for successful resolution of the Vietnam
problem. That is why the matter of the American POWs has great
significance in exposing Nixon's designs in this aggressive war in Vietnam.
We are completely unanimous in this matter and condemn individualistic
mistaken views current among us on this matter. We firmly hold to our
position -- when the American government resolves the political and military
issues on all three fronts of Indochina, we will set free all American POWs.
We consider this a very correct course.
Dear Comrades!
I have reported the following matters to Politburo sessions: the course
of our party on the general offensive conducted in South Vietnam from March
30th to the present; our errors and deficiencies in the offensive and
summing up results of the offensive in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia;
positive and negative aspects of the offensive; immediate plans of the enemy
and our operations; analysis of errors permitted in strategic and tactical
leadership; our contacts with political figures of South
MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE [GRU]
Copy NO. 6
VNA [VIETNAMESE PEOPLES ARMY] GENERAL-LIEUTENANT TRAN VAN QUANG
AT THE POLITBURO MEETING OF THE TSK PTV
15 SEPTEMBER 1972
(translation from Vietnamese into Russian)
1. They are against the present regime of Nguyen Van Tkhieu,
considering that Nguyen Van Tkhieu's clique is dictatorial, pro-fascist,
rotten and not
capable of carrying out the leadership of the country under the present
situation that has developed in South Vietnam. They also think that if the
US withdraws its troops from South Vietnam and stops aiding the regime, the
government would instantly collapse.
