12
The pace of the plan must be increased. We have to quickly move these
people from North to South Vietnam in order to destroy a large quantity of
enemy personnel. In other words. the elimination of all traitors.
reactionaries. and counter- revolutionaries who currently make up a fairly
significant part in South Vietnam is an important mission of the "Ba Be"
plan.
We must attract the neutral forces to our side; those who are fighting
for national independence from the USA; those forces who earlier fought
against the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem and now fight against the regime of
Nguyen Van Thieu. We must do everything necessary in order to successfully
carry out the "Ba Be" plan.
Along with that, we must work on the demoralization of the puppet army
on all fronts. Under good conditions, such work will lower the fighting
spirit of the puppet army soldiers in the future and increase the number of
servicemen who defect to our side. This is a basic requirement which helps
us create the conditions for revolts in the puppet army. We were faced with
this matter after the victory in Quang Tri.
Was there actively a collective anti-military uprising in the puppet
56th Regiment? No. in actuality it was not like that at the front. After
we surrounded hill 241. the Regiment command understood the futility of
further resistance and surrendered along with its soldiers. However, to
increase the effect, we announced that because of good use of propaganda,
there was an anti-military uprising in the 56th Regiment. This is a new
form of stimulating anti-military uprisings in the puppet army.
The political views Of puppet army Officers captain and above are very
reactionary. Previously they were officers or soldiers in the French Army.
Now they are remaining in the army and speak in favor of the previous Saigon
government. inciting counter-revolution and anti-nationalism. They hate
the revolution. Therefore, applying propaganda amongst soldiers and
especially amongst the officer corps is difficult and varied, demanding
study from all sides
13
and a creative approach in the choice of methods and means.
The brilliant results must be given their due: results which we in the
propaganda organization recently achieved among the High Command staff,
right up to Saigon Army generals.
We had contacts and meetings with a number of officers. For example,
with General Khoang Xuan Lain, the former 1st Regional Corps Commander. He
was very reactionary and spoke against our revolution. After the defeat at
Quang Tri, Thieu removed him, and he began to make contact with us. At the
meetings, Khoang Xuan Lain told us--if it can be said this way--a number of
his views. In his opinion, the Saigon puppet army will not be able to
execute missions which the plan of ,,Vietnamization" of the war places on
the army. He believes that the revolutionary forces will achieve victory
and that the puppet army will not be able to impede this. The Thieu regime
is a dictatorship, is pro-fascist, and does not have the support of the
people. These are some of the basic tenets expressed by General-Lieutenant
Khoang Xuan Lain.
As for the closest person to the Thieu regime--General Ngo Dinh Dzu--in
meetings with us, he expressed the opinion that even the 2nd Regional Corps
will be lost and that the puppet army will be unable at any cost to
withstand us in this region, i.e. the Tay Nguyen region. Thus, Dzu has
expressed the same ideas that Khoang Xuan Lain has. He also said that the
puppet army will be unable to withstand us if the Americans leave Vietnam.
Ngo Dinh Dzu sees an increase in insurgency and revolution in South Vietnam,
an increase in authority for the National Front for the Liberation of South
Vietnam, a rise in the level of our strategic and tactical leadership as
well as in the level of combat actions. Dzu understands that Nguyen Van
Thieu is a bloody dictator, a fascist and that the regime he created is
wholly anti-democratic.
Thus, we see that these meetings with the generals are a great victory
for us and will be beneficial to us. In order to successfully manage a
resolution of the issues linked to conducting propaganda work with the South
Vietnamese Army generals aimed at awakening their consciousness and winning
them over to our side,
14
it is necessary to understand that the outcome of the coming battle depends
upon the solution of these important issues. It is necessary to attain a
clear understanding among the generals that the Thieu regime will never
employ popular support and cannot exist. Such are the fundamental issues
which we should resolve in the near future.
From the utterances of the generals set forth above, we see that the
situation is developing in a direction favorable to us. We can bring Plan
"BA BE" into being, but for this we should expand the net of communications
and contacts with people who will carry out Plan "BA BE," in order to obtain
from them all necessary materials. We should likewise search for ways to
establish connections with officers and officials of the Saigon government.
This matter occupies a significant place in the implementation of Plan "BA
BE." The Supreme Command and Ministry of State Security discussed all
matters related to successful implementation of this plan and levied new
tasks upon the commands of the combat zones responsible for implementation
of this plan. We successfully inserted and deployed our forces in all
regions and are now conducting the final work in order to complete
preparatory measures for this Plan by September 30th of this year. In
comparison to other plans, the preparation of Plan "BA BE" is developing
well. This is the first time we are implementing such a plan on the
territory of South Vietnam. In the course of its realization we will
acquire experience which can help us counter the designs of the enemy at the
front.
The more savage the bombings and barrages of the enemy may become, the
more victories we should grasp at the front, because such victories will aid
realization of Plan "BA BE." We are linking great hopes to the
implementation of this plan, especially in accelerating the pace at which
the offensive at the front develops, of which I reported to you above. The
favorable development of the situation will be a huge and significant factor
in the collapse of US military designs and of the puppets at the front in
South Vietnam. We must thwart the reactionary and treacherous plans of the
enemy; successful carrying out of Plan "BA BE" will indeed help us to grasp
new victories. These victories will have great strategic significance in
implementation of Plans TS-6 and
15
1)
Plan S-6, which were topics above.
The goal of Plan "BA BE" is introduction of division into the ranks of
the enemy and lowering of his will to resist. Successful implementation of
Plan "BA BE" will help us to attain successes at the Paris negotiations on
Vietnam. The nearer the victory, the more clearly will appear the
treacherous designs of the Nixon-Kissinger-Laird clique, and likewise those
of the puppet government of Nguyen Van Thieu. Therefore implementation of
Plan "BA BE" will be a great step in the resolution of many issues in the
current situation. Because of this, its significance is so great.
For successful realization of this plan we should as soon as possible
insert our forces, in order to begin implementation of this plan in the
month of October in accordance with indicated deadlines.
In the Paris negotiations on Vietnam we have met with a series of
difficulties in recent days. These difficulties are explained by the fact
that Nixon being stubborn as before and is trying above all to achieve a
solution of the military issue and only then to move to settlement of
political issues, which will exercise great influence on the course of
development of the contemporary situation in Vietnam. As a result of
exchanging opinions in private meetings with Kissinger--Nixon's advisor--
Kissinger, we understood that Nixon as before is being stubborn on settling
the situation which is developing today in Vietnam. To attain settlement we
should conduct careful preparation to counter Nixon's designs. Let him
understand: if he does not renounce this war, then precisely the US will
suffer defeat in it. However, Nixon is being stubborn in continuing the
aggressive war and maintaining the status quo. That is why we think, that
with the US taking such a position, peaceful solution of the Vietnam issue
is not possible. We see that the US obstinately continues aggression, while
Nguyen Van Thieu as before holds to his insolent position. That is why we
are resolved to carry out Plan "BA BE," the realization of which will be a
turning point in the settlement of the situation at the front.
This would be our first military thrust on the front aimed at resolving
the complicated political issue at the present stage.
I) Plan S-6 -- Plan for military operations in the Saigon region (footnote
of the GRU)
16
Until this, the Supreme Command had never tried working out a plan similar
to the plan "Ba Be".
Over the course of six months, we prepared to execute this plan. During
this time, we gathered everyone who should take part in its realization, and
then conducted a thorough training of them. The intelligence directorate of
the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of State Security
conducted the training of these people. We well understand that the better
the training of these people is conducted, the fewer the losses we will
suffer and the faster we will be able to attain execution of this plan.
Thus, once again evaluating the plan "Ba Be", the thorough training
which is now going on, and which will be realized jointly with the plan TS-6
in October, it can be said that its successful realization will assist us to
attain new great victories at the Paris negotiations on Vietnam. These are
very serious issues which we must devote constant attention to.
Yesterday the State Defense Council directed the Supreme Command to
conduct a conference for the cadres responsible for training and carrying
out this plan. At this conference, the forms, means and methods were
stated, which were worked out according to the organs and confirmed at a
Politburo session.
We can now say that we have achieved great successes and we are
convinced that this plan will be realized. Presently, this plan is being
carried out. We have already succeeded in inserting a portion of our
comrades into South Vietnamese territory- We succeeded with difficulty in
certain areas and for this we had to procure all possible means. In other
areas, this operation was carried out more successfully, and now our people
are occupying stable positions in the puppet governing apparatus.
Dear Comrades! In summing up what is stated above, it can be said that
we are going in the right direction in carrying out our plans, especially
the plans TS-6 and "Ba Be", and also in training for the realization of our
plan S-6, the realization of which is slated for the near future.
17
In addition to these issues, in accordance with the instructions from
the Politburo, I will also report to you today on American POWs captured on
the various fronts of Indochina.
The work with American prisoners of war has always been within the field
of vision of the Politburo and has been reflected in its decisions, such as
decision No. 21 DST dated 23 Mar 71, and decision No. 21 E dated 4 Apr 72.
Both of these decisions concern the issues of exploiting these American POWs
captured during the war. This disturbs the public opinion of the whole
world and of the US. There are various thoughts on the American POW issue.
Some of these are correct, others are not, but even among us there are a
number of comrades whose opinions differ from the opinion Of the Politburo.
These comrades are not taking into consideration the particulars of the
developing situation nor the inherent difficulties in their judgments.
These opinions harm us in our search for methods of resolving the American
POW issue.
Dear comrades! The American POW issue is very complex. The peoples of
the world [world opinion] and the peoples of our fraternal socialist nations
[allied popular opinion] as well as our [people] want to know the exact
number of POWs located in North Vietnam. Allow me to inform you
specifically on this matter. We have captured a very large number of
American POWs on the fronts of Indochina since the time that the US
introduced their troops into Vietnam, escalated the air war against North
Vietnam, and expanded the total scope of their aggression by spreading this
aggression onto the territories of Laos and Cambodia. At first, the number
of American POWs was not large and world public opinion paid little
attention to them. The number of American POWs in North Vietnam grew day by
day after 5 Aug 65 when the US imperialists started massive air bombing and
off-shore bombardment by the 7th fleet of the territory of North Vietnam,
and after having expanded their aggression onto the territories of Laos and
Cambodia. The number of American POWs in the DRV has not been made public
to this day. We have kept this figure secret. At today's Politburo session,
I will report to you, Comrades, the exact number of American POWs.
18
The total number of American POWs captured to date on the fronts of
Indochina, i.e. in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia,
comprises 1205 people. Of them, 671 people were captured in North Vietnam
and 143 aviators [were captured] in South Vietnam. This means the total
number of aviators, and diversionists [special operations] (American
advisors on diversionary ships and divers), captured on the territories of
North and South Vietnam comprises 814 people. In addition, from other
categories of American servicemen in Indochina, we have captured 391 people,
including: 283 in South Vietnam, 65 in Cambodia and 43 in Laos; 814 and 391
comprise 1205 people.
Here is more data on the 1205 POWs.
We have captured 624 American aviators in North Vietnam, to include 7
colonels, 85 lieutenant colonels, 183 majors, i.e. the total number of
senior US Air Force _and Navy officers comprises 275 people. The 624
American aviators include 3 astronauts, i.e. three people who have completed
the necessary training for space flight, for instance, Jim Katlo, who was
captured in the vicinity of Hanoi. This figure also includes 15 US Air
Force aces having more than 4000 flight hours each: Norman Klarvisto,
Karmet, Jim Intist Shasht and others. This is the specific data on American
aviators captured in North Vietnam.
Among the other 47 prisoners captured in North Vietnam, there are 36
advisors of diversionary detachments who were inserted in the border region
between the DRV and Laos; lone diversionists who were conducting
reconnaissance of our main transportation routes from helicopters and
reconnaissance ships; and several seamen who abandoned their ships that we
damaged and whom we picked up. Therefore the figures 624 and 47 add up to
671.
In South Vietnam we have captured 143 US aircrew members, mainly
helicopter aviators and some jet aviators.
Among the 391 American POWs captured in South Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia, we have 9 colonels, 19 lieutenant colonels and 52 majors. The
remaining officers are captain and below,
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as well as American enlisted soldiers.
Thus in summary, I want to remind you again that the 1205 American POWs
presently in prisons of North Vietnam include:
All of them are presently in prisons in North Vietnam. Currently we have
11 prisons where American POWs are held. We used to have 4 large prisons,
however after the American attempt to free their POWs from Ha Tay [Son Tay]
we expanded this number to 11. Each prison holds approximately 100 POWs.
Seven Air Force colonels captured in North Vietnam and nine colonels of
various branches of service captured in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (16
officers in all) are being held together; through them, we are attempting to
gain an understanding of the current situation which has developed in the
American Army, extract the material and information we need. and determine
our position toward them.
We are also holding 104 American lieutenant colonels in one location and
are attempting to extract information secret information about troop
dispositions and information concerning the US Defense Department from them.
We have 235 majors concentrated in two locations.
Thus we have dedicated special prisons for senior officers of the
American Army: one for colonels, one for lieutenant colonels and two for
majors. The rest of the POWs, captains and below, were placed in other
prisons.
A few words about the political views and attitudes of American POWs.
There are 368 POWs who have progressive attitudes.
20
They understand very well that this war is unjust and unpopular on their
part. They condemn the American administration and express a strong protest
against this war. We will be able to release these 368 POWs first. if as a
result of the struggle of the progressive peoples of the world. including
the American people, a favorable international environment will develop,
forcing Nixon to move toward a resolution of the Political issue. We are
carrying out work with this category of POWs to explain to them the
aggressive nature of the war being conducted by the Nixon administration and
the nature of the Nguyen Van Thieu regime, and also to make them understand
the unjust character of this war which is inflicting great damage on the
American people. One can assert that this group of POWs is progressive in
their political views.
There are 372 of the POWs who hold neutral views, i.e. their political
outlook is not fully progressive. yet not too reactionary. We plainly see
that they still do not clearly understand the role of the American
administration in unleashing the aggressive war in Indochina.
The remainder of the POWs hold reactionary views. In spite of the work
carried on to explain to them the real state of things, they have not
changed their reactionary views.
The following is a summation:
All the POWs among the senior officers hold reactionary views, i.e. they
do not condemn Nixon, they do not protest his policies, and they distort our
course of action. We understand that these officers come from rich
families. Their reactionary views are precisely a result of this.
We well understand that the American POW issue has great significance
for the resolution of the South Vietnamese problem. We must continue
propagandistic and educational work.with the American POWs, leading to their
understanding
21
of the nature of the aggressive war which the US is carrying out in Vietnam,
as well as the senseless obstinateness of Nixon, which only delays the
release of POWs and their return to their homeland. Soon we will free
several POWs in order to put pressure on the Nixon administration, observe
his reaction and the reaction of the American public, as well as to
demonstrate our good intentions in this matter.
Thus, the 1205 American POWs captured on the fronts of Indochina (in
North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), presently kept in prisons in
North Vietnam represent a significant force in the American army, a basic
part of which is made up of American aviators.
The large number of American aviators imprisoned during the time of
Johnson and Nixon inflicted huge damage on the US Air Force. This should
cause the US government and Nixon himself to reflect. We intend to resolve
the American POW issue in the following manner:
2. While the American side is resolving the above-mentioned problems,
we can free several more aviators from the number who are progressively
inclined. Nixon should not hinder the return of these aviators to their
homeland and not undertake any disciplinary measures toward them.
3. Nixon must compensate North Vietnam for the great damage inflicted on
it by this destructive war.
Here then are the principles on the basis of which we may resolve the
American POW issue. However, Nixon continues to resist resolving the
Vietnamese question, thereby delaying the resolution of the American POW
issue.
I have reported these specific figures and fundamental aspects of the
American POW issue to the Politburo. But we also have these comrades who do
not understand this problem correctly.
24
Vietnam from the Saigon regime; the matter of American POWs, captured on the
three fronts of Indochina.
Today on assignment of the Supreme Command, the State Defense Council
and the Military Committee of the Politburo, I reported to you on these
matters so that the Politburo could study these problems, could express its
opinion on them, and set forth forms and methods for their resolution-
Soon the State Defense Council, together with the Supreme Command will study
The matters related to carrying out new operations at the front. Th. State
Defense Council assigned the Supreme Command, and the latter in turn the
General Staff. to address matters related to the development of new
military_ plans for the year 1973. At the present time these plans are
being worked out with the goal of preparing the necessary forces for their
implementation- We are occupied with matters of mobilization and training
of reinforcements for all three Indochinese fronts. We should mobilize
250.000 men, 200.000 of which would be sent to South Vietnam and 50.000 to
Laos and Cambodia.
Summing up this report it is necessary to say that I have touched on the
fundamental features of the situation which has developed in South Vietnam,
on our difficulties and successes, and also on the difficulties existing for
the enemy- I set out our plans and our course, and also illuminated a
series of matters which the Politburo assigned to the State Defense Council
and Supreme Command. At the next Politburo session. I shall set forth
matters touching upon the present situation in Laos and Cambodia and views
on its development-
Presently, the situation is turning out quite favorably- The peoples of
South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have decisively frustrated the plan for
"Vietnamization" of the war and identical plans being implemented in Laos
and Cambodia. We hold high the invincible banner of Marxism-Leninism!
We are carrying out the precepts of Ho Chi Mirth. The war of
resistance against American imperialists for the salvation of the Fatherland
will yet be stubborn and hard, yet we will definitely grasp victory. We
will decisively frustrate the plans of Nixon or anyone who takes his place
and continues the aggressive war! The course of our party is assuredly
correct. Our people are heroic
25
people. Our forces are heroic forces!
The three countries of Indochina, closely united one with another, will
fight to the last drop of blood for the freedom and independence of their
Fatherlands. The Vietnamese people will fully carry out its international
duty toward the fraternal peoples of Laos and Cambodia!
To the current session of the Politburo I wish successful work. I have
completed the presentation of the report.
The brochure contains 24 pages of text RKSS/I 2235-24. II.72, Title page
and cover order No 00/817
+
624 aviators captured in North Vietnam;
143 aviators captured in South Vietnam;
47 diversionists and other American servicemen captured in North
Vietnam;
391 American servicemen of other categories, which includes 283 captured
in South Vietnam, 65 in Cambodia, and 43 in Laos.
-- 368 POWs holding progressive views can be released first;
-- 372 POWs hold neutral positions;
-- 465 POWs hold reactionary_ views.
1. The US government must demonstrate compliance, i.e. a cease fire
and the removal of Nguyen Van Thieu, and then both sides can begin
discussing the matter of returning POWs to the Nixon government.