WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
In reply refer to :
I-35174/73
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: U.S. POW/MIA Personnel in Laos - ACTION MEMORANDUM
REF: Your 13 Mr 73 query on Laos, POWs (attached)
On 1 February 1973, North Vietnam (NVN) released the names of ten POWs who were captured in Laos. NVN claimed that these ten people were prisoners of the Pathet Lao, but DIA analysts indicate these individuals were captured by the North Vietnamese in Laos. The ten POWs identified consist of nine Americans (six USAF, one USN, two civilians) and one Canadian. The evidence indicates that most, if not all, of the ten are currently being held in Hanoi.
DIA lists approximately 350 U.S. military and civilians as missing or captured in Laos. Therefore, the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) list of ten POWs constitutes only a 2.5% accounting. In contrast, the NVN list represents 45% and the PRG list represents 20% of the POW/MIA personnel carried on our lists in these respective areas. There is an obvious lack of reporting on the part of the LPF. Because of the foregoing statistics and analysis of the conditions under which our people have been lost, DIA concludes that the LPF may hold a number of unidentified U.S. POWs although we cannot accurately judge how many. The American Embassy, Vientiane, agrees with this judgment.
Several diplomatic moves have been made recently in an attempt to get an accounting and release of American prisoners being held in Laos. On 10 March 1973, the LPF Delegation chairman in Vientiane informed us that recent U.S. demarches regarding prisoners in Laos had been conveyed to Souphannouvong, the Lao communist chief, personally. No other information was made available.
On 15 March the Secretary of State instructed Ambassador Godley to "...single out Soviet Ambassador for the full treatment..." regarding the lack of progress in Vientiane on political and POW matters. Godley was also instructed to inform the Soviet Ambassador that we "... continue to hold North Vietnam to its commitments on releasing all U.S. POWs in Laos by 28 March and will not tolerate any delays." No communist response to this line of action has been noted as yet.
2
On 22 March 1973, the United States informed NVN and the PRG that the U.S. would "complete withdrawal of its military forces fro South Vietnam in accordance with the terms of the agreement and coincident with the release of all repeat all American prisoners held throughout Indochina." This statement was aimed directly at securing release of all U.S. prisoners held by the Pathet Lao.
On 22 March Ambassador Godley addressed the Laos POW/MIA question at length in Vientiane 2139 (attached). Godley separates the 1 February list of ten prisoners from the issue of accounting for the remaining POW/MIAs in Laos. The Ambassador states that the LPF "...just has not focused on the PW repatriation and accounting problem until very recently..." Godley concludes by recommending that we concentrate on helping the RLG get an acceptable military protocol; to the Laos cease-fire agreement approved by the LPF. In this way the Ambassador is hopeful that we can eventually gain LPF cooperation in the POW/MIA matter. However, Godley also states that his is having great difficulties in influencing the RLG negotiators; and he states we must expect many nonconcurrences from the LPF.
On 23 March, the U.S. Delegation to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC) was instructed by Washington to reaffirm our negotiating stance. General Woodward was instructed to seek a private meeting with the NVN representative and inform him that the U.S. must have assurances that the prisoners on the 1 February list will be released by 28 March. Given these assurances, private or otherwise, we will complete our troop withdrawals. This 23 March guidance to the field also indicates that "...we intend to pursue the question of other U.S. personnel missing or captured in Laos following the release of the men on the 1 February list."
To review the biding to date, the U.S. is prepared to accept release of the ten men on the 1 February list along with the other U.S. personnel being held in NVN as the final condition for complete U.S. troop withdrawal. However, there has been no accounting of U.S. personnel MIA in Laos other than the 1 February list of ten who were probably all captured in Laos by the NVA rather than the Pathet Lao. Hence, assuming all the prisoners currently being held in NVN are released by 28 March, we still have the Laos MIA question remaining unresolved. Additionally, Ambassador Godley proposed that we rely upon the yet-to-be developed and approved Lao Military Protocol as a means of gaining satisfaction on this issue. And finally, Ambassador Godley does not discuss Hanoi's influence or control of the LPF on this issue.
From the foregoing, there appears to be need for a well-orchestrated plan for solving the problem of our Laos POWs and MIAs. Therefore, I am recommending below a series of diplomatic moves aimed at gaining a proper accounting of our men lost in Laos. You may wish to pass along to the President part or all of the following diplomatic track:
3
A. After the recovery of the last prisoners from NVN, Hanoi should be advised unequivocally that we still hold them responsible for the return of all POWs being held in Indochina. And in this regard, any further mine sweeping activity as well as all future U.S. reconstruction assistance should be described as wholly dependent upon the accounting for and or release of U.S. prisoners being held in Laos. Once again, NVN should be clearly informed that an accounting for ten men out of a total of more than 350 is considered unacceptable.
B. In the meantime (just after 28 March), a strong demarche should be made to the ranking LPF representative in Vientiane by the U.S. Ambassador personal personally. This initiative should plainly and forcefully assert that the U.S. will no longer play games with the POW issue in Laos . The LPF should be told that we have reason to believe they hold additional U.S. prisoners, and we demand their immediate release as well as an accounting and information on all those who have died. Finally, the LPF should be advised that failure to provide a satisfactory answer could result in appropriate United States actions.
C. Simultaneous with our representations to the LPF, the U.S. Ambassador to Laos should also ask the USSR, PRC, NVN, French, British and ICC senior representatives to Vientiane to use their good offices with the LPF in order to avoid a serious situation.
D. Shortly after 28 March, assuming the LPF have not responded favorably, intensive and obvious tactical air reconnaissance of North and South Laos should commence. Additionally, the movement of a new carrier task force into the waters off: Vietnam should be publicly announced.
E. Concomitant with the foregoing, the LPF and NVN should be privately advised that the Thai Volunteer Forces now in Laos will not be removed until there is a satisfactory resolution of the POW issue.
Other moves that may be worthy of consideration are listed below. They should only be contemplated if we are reasonably strongly convinced that the Pathet Lao hold POWs.
A. Ambassador Godley could be instructed to "lean hard" on Souvanna Phouma and tell him to let the LPF know that political concessions in the new Provisional Government of National Union (especially as regards LPF appointments to cabinet posts) will be next to impossible without resolving the POW question.
B. As a last step, U.S. air strikes and Lao and Thai irregular offensive operations could be resumed in Laos in order to force the release of our prisoners in Laos.
4
The foregoing recommended diplomatic/military moves would represent a considerable toughening of the U.S. stance regarding our POWs being held in Laos. Such a line is even harder to take without a clear picture as to how many U.S. personnel are actually being held in Laos. The intelligence data available is voluminous but imprecise. However, the evidence indicates that the NVN/Pathet Lao forces have captured U.S. personnel since 1964, and the LPF have provided no prisoner or casualty data at all other than the ten names listed on 1 February. Therefore, the hard negotiating track outlined in steps A through E above, and possibly even the optional steps A and B seems clearly justified . Finally, it is recognized that this is a very delicate situation, and the application of any one or all of the above actions cannot assure success -- there is, of course, little physical risk associated with options A through E.
If you approve of the above listed courses of action, I recommend you sign the attached memorandum for Dr. Kissinger.
Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Acting Assistant Secretary
Attachments: (3)
SecDef query dtd 13 Mar
AmEmbassy Vientiane msg 2139
Proposed memo to Dr. Kissinger
No coordination required.
Prep: Ltc Secord/1s/AS/23Mar73/53164
Dist:: Orig #1 addee
b I #2 RC
yelo -#3 AD
lwh #4 ISA/S
Prepared by RADM Bigley, X54175
& LTC Secord, X53164