Elliot Richardson Memo

I am concerned over the situation in Laos regarding our men who are still being held prisoner or missing. To date, there has been no accounting of US personnel missing in Laos other than the 1 February 1973 list of ten who were probably all captured in Laos by the North Vietnamese rather than the Pathet: Lao.

As you know, there are over 350 US personnel listed by DIA as missing or captured in Laos. The 1 February list of ten amounts to only a 2.5% accounting; whereas the North Vietnamese have accounted for 45% and the PRG has accounted for 20% of the people we have carried as missing or captured in their respective areas.

I recommend the President consider the following diplomatic track in order to gain some accounting of our men held/missing in Laos:

A. After the recovery of the last prisoners from NVN, Hanoi should be advised unequivocally that we still hold them responsible for the return of all POWs being held in Indochina. And in this regard, any further mine sweeping activity as well as all future US reconstruction assistance should be described as wholly dependent upon the accounting for and/or release of US prisoners being held in Laos. Once again, NVN should be clearly informed that an accounting for ten men out of a total of more than 350 is considered unacceptable.

B. In the meantime (about 28 March) , a strong demarche should be made to the ranking LPF representative in Vientiane by the US Ambassador personally. This initiative should plainly and forcefully assert that the U.S. will no longer play games with the POW issue in Laos. The LPF should be told that we know they hold US prisoners, and we demand their immediate release as well as an accounting and information on all those who may have died. Finally, the LPF should be advised that failure to provide a satisfactory answer could result in direct United States actions.

C. Simultaneous with our representations to the LPF, the US Ambassador to Laos should also ask the USSR, PRC, NVN, French, British and ICC senior representatives to Vientiane to use their good offices with the LPF in order to avoid a serious situation.

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D. Shortly after 28 March, assuming the LPF have not responded favorably, intensive and obvious tactical air reconnaissance of North and South Laos should commence. Additionally, the movement of a new carrier task force into the waters off Vietnam should be publicly announced.

E. Concomitant with the foregoing, the LPF and NVN should be privately advised that the Thai Volunteer Forces now in Laos will not be removed until there is a satisfactory resolution of the POW issue.

F. As an accompanying measure, Ambassador Godley should be instructed to "lean hard" on Souvanna Phouma and tell him to let the LPF know that political concessions in the new Provisional Government of National Union (especially as regards LPF appointments to cabinet posts) will be next to impossible without resolving the POW question.