Allied POWs under Red Army control for financial or economic 'credits' probably accurately reflected of Soviet repatriation policy. In fact, the Russian Major's view paralleled the assessment of the Soviet's repatriation policy by U.S. General R.W. Barker. Barker was the Allied Chief Negotiator for the repatriation of Allied POWs under Red Army control. Barker wrote in a report to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Allied Headquarters that after more than four hours of discussions with his Red Army counterparts the SHAEF [Supreme Headquarters of the Allied European Forces] representatives came to the firm conviction that British and American prisoners of war were, in effect, being held hostage by the Russians until deemed expedient by them to permit their release. This latter point was further borne out by subsequent events.[3]
Meanwhile, Siegel, the American GI still being held in Stalag IV-B (who is still alive) decided that as a result of the callousness of his [Major Vershenko's] response and the officious tone in which this information [about repatriation] was given, [it] gave me real pause...That night, my bunkmate, Cpl. William Smith of the 9th Division shared our mutual concerns and [we] decided to take off on our own. The next evening we 'liberated' two Russian bicycles, got thru a gap in the wire where a Russian tank was parked and took off West to where we thought the American Army would be.[4]
They made it safely to American lines, but only after a "two week adventure" that included making another escape after "being captured by a band of fanatical 'Hitler Youth'"[5] still at large in Soviet occupied Germany.
Siegel and his partner made a wise decision to escape. A cable from the Ninth United States Army to the Supreme Allied Headquarters dated May 17, 1945 describes the deteriorating conditions at Stalag IV-B Muhlberg camp after the two GIs escaped:
Reports received that 7,000 United States and British ex-PWs formerly in MUHLBERG [Stalag IV-B] and NOE REISA 8715-E need medical supplies, additional medical attention and food. Many have left because of conditions. Reports indicate camp leader doing all in his power to enforce STAY-PUT order. Russians alleged to have threatened to use force to prevent escape. [emphasis added][6]
Thus, through completely different personal experiences, a GI and a General came to essentially the same conclusion about Soviet repatriation policy. The GI risked escape rather than trust the Soviets to repatriate him. The General concluded and reported to Supreme Allied Headquarters
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[4] Siegel, as cited.
[3] Memorandum by General R.W. Barker on Report on Conference with Russian
Officials Relative to Repatriation of Prisoners of War and Displaced
Persons, dated May 23, 1945.
[5] Siegel, as cited.
[6] Cable, "From: CG Ninth United States Army, To: For Action: CG SHAEF
FORWARD ATTENTION G-1 PWX REF NO: KX-21617," May 17, 1945.
that British and American prisoners of war were, in effect, being held hostage by the Russians until deemed expedient by them to permit their release.[7]
After Siegel -- the intrepid GI -- and his partner escaped to Allied controlled territory, Siegel found that his concerns for other prisoners left behind at 1V-B were treated with initial skepticism, then annoyance at my persistence, and finally with reassurances that the matter 'would be investigated.'[8]
It should be noted that Major Vershenko's comments about economic 'credits' were not wholly inaccurate. Weeks before V-E day (Victory in Europe) Soviets had requested a $6 billion credit line from the United States, the equivalent of $59.8 billion [9] in 1991 dollars, or slightly more than the U.S. cost for the Gulf War. 'Credits' from the United States, were, in fact, an active Soviet consideration throughout the repatriation period. Instead, the Secretary of State, prior to a mid-April 1945 meeting with his Soviet counterpart, Commissar Molotov, received a pre-meeting briefing memorandum, one of the points of which was the Soviet request for $6 billion.[10]
The Soviet rationale for not repatriating Allied soldiers and citizens, however, was motivated by more complex and more repugnant reasons than credits alone. In the memoirs of former Secretary of State under President Truman, James F. Byrnes, there appears an illuminating conversation the Secretary had with Molotov, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs. In September, 1945, several weeks after Japan's surrender, Byrnes recounted that while in London:
Mr. Molotov came to see me, on instructions from Moscow...[Molotov] wanted to complain of the way in which the surrender terms [with Japan] were being carried out. He complained particularly about the way the Japanese Army was being demobilized. It was dangerous, he said, merely to disarm the Japanese and send them home; they should be held as prisoners of war. We should do what the Red Army was doing with the Japanese it had taken in Manchuria -- make them work... No one can say accurately how many Japanese prisoners have been taken to the Soviet Union. In mid-1947, the best guess was that approximately 500,000 were still there.[11]
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[8] Siegel, as cited.
[9] Computed by the Congressional Research Service according to Price
Index of the Office of Budget Management, in FY 1992 U.S. Government
Budget, p. 17. Historical Tables.
[10] State Department memorandum, "To: the U.S. Secretary of State,
regarding an upcoming meeting with Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar
Molotov," April 19, 1945. The memorandum contains a list of nine points
with a brief description of U.S. policy on each point.
[11] James F. Byrnes, SPEAKING FRANKLY, (New York: Harper & Brothers
Publishers, ), pp.213-214.
[7] Memorandum, "From: Major General R.W. Barker on Report with Russian
Officials Relative to Repatriation of Prisoners of War and Displaced
Persons," May 23, 1945
The problem of accounting for POW/MIAs was complicated by the fact that the Soviets were just as uncooperative in the repatriation of the millions of displaced civilians. In Europe, as well as in the Far East, the Soviets guarded a sea of prisoners -- human capital and slave labor in their view -- who were not only Allied and Axis POWs, but also hundreds of thousands of displaced Western European citizens, as well as Eastern European citizens, who desperately wanted to flee from Red Army occupied territory. Nationalities of smaller countries of Western Europe, like the Dutch, and Belgians, as well as formerly occupied countries like France, tragically, had little military, political or diplomatic leverage with the Soviet government to secure the repatriation of their citizens at the end of the War. As a result, tens of thousands of Dutch and Belgians, and hundreds of thousands of French were never repatriated by the Soviets.
The French in particular bore the brunt of the Soviet "make them work" policy. This policy was implemented by the Soviets not only with regard to the Japanese POWs captured in the Pacific theater, but also with regard to hundreds of thousands of French, Dutch, Belgian, and other Western Europeans who were caught in Soviet occupied territory in Europe.
A window through which a glimpse of the fate of these citizens -- in this particular case, French POWs -- can be seen in the following cable from the Allied Command's Mission in France, to the Supreme Allied Headquarters for all of Europe. Sent May 30, 1945 (Victory in Europe, VE day was May 7, 1945) the cable read:
Accordance your telephone request, cable from Fifteenth Army French Detachment to General CHERRIERE MMFA Hotel CONTINENTAL PARIS of May 25 is paraphrased for your information.
Report of Lt. D HAVERNAS according to CONFIRMED reports, Russians still do not release thousands of French ex-PW's and civilians, forcing them to work. Many transferred eastwards to unknown destination. Please inform high authority. 700 ex-PW's are evacuated daily from this area to UDINE. Civilians held under difficult food and accomadation conditions. [emphasis added][12]
The next day, a cable detailing the magnitude of Allied prisoners of War and displaced citizens held in Soviet territory was sent from Supreme Allied Headquarters signed by Eisenhower, to the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow. Eisenhower wanted an explanation from the Soviets for the slow pace of repatriation of these citizens. The "discrepancies" between the Allies' most up-to-date figures of various displaced Western European citizens and prisoners of war known to be in Soviet occupied territory, and the number actually repatriate by the Soviets, were outlined by Eisenhower.
Latest available displaced persons and prisoners of war figures show almost 1,600,000 Western European (French, Belgian, Dutch and Luxemborgeois) either repatriated from or at present held in SHAEF area. Soviet delegates at LEIPZIG conference stated only 300,000 Western Europeans in their area.
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[12] Cable classified Secret Routine, "To: SHAEF FORWARD, From: SHAEF
MISSION FRANCE, to SHAEF FORWARD G-5," REF NO: MF-14427, May 30, 1945.
Combined working party on European food supplies, composed of representatives from UNRRA, SHAEF, USSR, UK, and USA, including Soviet delegate LIUSHENKO, estimated approximately 3,000,000 displaced Western Europeans in enemy-held territory at beginning 1944. This discrepancy of over 1,000,000 Western Europeans is causing the Dutch and French Governments considerable anxiety.[13]
More than two weeks later, Eisenhower sent another cable to the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow with more detailed numbers of "discrepancies". Again, Eisenhower requested a detailed Soviet response to his concerns over these unrepatriated prisoners of war and other Allied citizens in the Red Army occupied territory. The cable, dated June 19, 1945, stated:
2. A further approach to the Soviets regarding numbers of western Europeans in Soviet occupied area of Eastern Europe is urgently necessary. About 1,200,000 French have been repatriated. Less than 100,000 remain in SHAEF-occupied area. French insist total POW and displaced persons is 2,300,000. Even allowing for several hundred thousand unaccounted for trekkers, discrepancy is still very great. About 170,000 Dutch have been repatriated, with less than 25,000 in the SHAEF area. Total Dutch estimate of deportees is 340,000.[14]
In response to Eisenhower's cable, the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow sent the Soviet government a letter dated June 20, 1945, parts of which are quoted below:
Dear General Golubev:
We have been requested by General Eisenhower to make an urgent appeal to you for an estimate of the number of displaced Western Europeans who are now in Soviet-occupied areas of Eastern Europe.
Thus far, about 1,200,000 French have been repatriated. Less than 100,000 French remain in German areas occupied by British- American forces. This makes a total of 1,300,000 French accounted for, exclusive of those who still remain in Soviet- controlled territory. French authorities insist that the total number of prisoners of war and displaced persons amount to 2,300,000. Even allowing for several hundred thousand unaccounted for individuals, there still remains a great discrepancy.
About 170,000 Dutch have been repatriated. Less than 25,000 Dutch still remain in Germany under control of British-American forces. However, the Dutch authorities estimate that there were originally 340,000 Dutch nationals deported, thus leaving a great discrepancy.
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[14] Cable, classified Secret Routine, "TO: US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW for
DEANE FROM: SHAEF MAIN signed SCARF, S-91662,' June 19, 1945.
[13] Cable, "To: US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW FOR DEANE, FROM: SHAEF MAIN
SIGNED SCARF (EISENHOWER), REF NO: S-89942, " May 31, 1945
The Belgian authorities also reported a discrepancy but it is comparatively smaller than those of the French and Dutch...[15]
In the French and Dutch cases, the "discrepancy" figures are astonishing. Even assuming that a quarter of a million French citizens were "trekkers" -- a seemingly exaggerated estimate -- heading West to Allied lines, 850,000 French citizens still were not repatriated from Red Army occupied territory.
With regards to the Dutch citizens, assuming one quarter of the total Dutch "discrepancy" number were "trekkers", then some 116,250 Dutch citizens still were not repatriated from Soviet occupied Europe. It is understandable, as Eisenhower stated in an earlier cable to the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow, that these figures were "causing the Dutch and French governments considerable anxiety."
In late June, the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow sent Eisenhower a cable with the Soviet reply. The Soviet reply was not encouraging. The cable read:
Upon receipt of S-91662 dated 19 June, we presented the queries contained therein to [Lieutenant General] GOLUBEV [Soviet Assistant Administrator for Repatriation] and have received the following reply [from the Soviets]:<
In answer to your letter of 20 June:
1. I do not have the exact data on the moving around of persons from Western EUROPE and therefore cannot say much about them. 2. I know that they have been freed by the Red Army.
French: About 250,000 of which 202, 456 persons have already been sent home and about 50,000 who are getting ready to be sent home.
Belgians: 27,980 persons freed of which 25,920 have been sent home, the remainder in the process of being turned over.[16]
The discrepancy between the Soviet numbers for both the French and the Dutch and SCHAEF's numbers is unsettling, as is the Soviets' claim that they "cannot say much about" the hundreds of thousands of Western European soldiers and citizens who apparently disappeared in Red Army occupied territory.
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[15] See letter, "To Lieutenant General K.D. Golubev, Red Army, Soviet Assistant for Repatriation, From: Major General John R. Deane, Commanding General U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, June 20, 1945.[16] Cable, "To: SHAEF MAIN FOR EISENHOWER, FROM: US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW FROM GAMMELL AND DEANE, REF NO: M-24784," June 25, 1945.
3-6
[ W O R L D W A R I I ]
"NOT EVEN VERBAL ASSURANCES WERE TO BE HAD"
However, even before Eisenhower had received his reply, the Soviets had informed U.S. military officials at a separate meeting in Halle, Germany, that "all political prisoners held in German concentration camps overrun by the Red Army had been released." Furthermore, Allied officials reported to the Secretary of State with respect to the "category of displaced persons, not even verbal assurances were to be had."
The results of the Allied-Soviet meeting in Halle, Germany, were detailed in a memo sent to the U.S. Secretary of State and is quoted below. The meeting produced an agreement on a plan for repatriation, agreed to by representatives of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and Supreme Command Red Army, at Halle, Germany, May 22, 1945, for the most expeditious overland delivery of Allied and Soviet ex-prisoners of war and displaced persons liberated by the Allied Expeditionary Force and the Red Army. The two delegations were headed Lieutenant General K.D. Golubev, Red Army, Soviet Assistant Administrator for Repatriation, and Major General R.W. Barker, U.S.A., Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, SHAEF.[17]
This meeting, more than any other, determined the fate of hundreds of thousands of people trapped in the Red Army occupied territory of Eastern Europe. This memorandum, which was sent June 1, 1945 to the U.S. Secretary of State, explains that at the Halle, Germany, meeting the Red Army refused to permit the Allies to fly transport aircraft into Soviet-occupied territory... Although General Golubev would not agree to the incorporation of a paragraph providing first priority delivery of U.S. and U.K. ex- prisoners of war, he gave his most solemn personal assurances that all U.S. and U.K. ex-prisoners of war would, in fact, be given preferential treatment. A request for second priority for Western European ex-political deportees, in accordance with the desires of the Western European governments that such persons be repatriated before their respective ex-prisoners of war and other displaced persons, was countered by the flat assertion that all political prisoners held in German concentration camps overrun by the Red Army had been released and that there were, accordingly, no more political prisoners in Soviet-occupied territory. With respect to this category of displaced persons, not even verbal assurances were to be had.[18]
Thus, as far as former political prisoners were concerned, the official Soviet position was that all political prisoners had been released. With regard to the repatriation of displaced persons who found themselves in Red Army occupied territory at the end of the War, "not even verbal assurances were to be had."
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[17] Memorandum, classified SECRET, "To: Secretary of State, From: Health, Deputy to Robert Murphy, Subject: Overland Exchange of Ex-Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons Liberated by all Allied Expeditionary Force and the Red Army," June 1, 1945.[18] ibid.
3-7
[ W O R L D W A R I I ]
"HOUSED NOT IN HUTS BUT IN DUG-OUTS"
The following U.S. intelligence report from OSS-CIG files, dated April-MAy 1945, may provide some insight into the fate of the hundreds of thousands of French, Dutch, and Belgians of whom the Soviets would not even give "verbal assurances":
1. Informant, a Pole forced to serve in the German Army, was taken prisoner by the Russians in 1944. He was kept for a time in Transit Camp in KAUNAS, then NINSK until he was deported across SIBERIA to the SEVINSKAYA camp near VLADIVOSTOK. At the end of 1945 - April, he escaped and tried to get to Europe. He was however, arrested by the NKVD after he got beyond MOSCOW, and placed in the P.O.W. and Internee Camp in TAMBOV, which was occupied by Germans, French, Americans, British, Dutch, Belgians...The prisoners numbered, in the informants [sic] estimation, well over 20,000;they were both military and civilian, most likely overrun by the Russians during the offensive.
2. All prisoners were forced to work, and the food they were given was very bad and monotonous. They were housed not in huts but in dug-outs.
3. The monotonous food caused some strange disease which made the legs and arms swell...After a time men afflicted with this disease died. Informant was told that more than 23,000 Italians, more than 2,500 French and approximately 10,000 Rumanian [sic] and Hungarian prisoners had died in this manner. There were also many casualties among Poles and other nationalities.
4. Prisoners in this camp included men of very high culture and learning and great experts in many fields of science. Informant observed that German engineers were employed on a special task - the drawing up of blue-prints for a four engined aircraft, which would carry about 500 men and achieve a speed - it was alleged - of 1,000 kilometers per hour. The Russians were extremely interested in these blue-prints, and men working on the invention were granted all possible facilities both in work and the conditions of life in the camp...
5. there were also some Belgians and Dutch, and others, including some English men and several score Americans, the presence of whom in this camp is probably unknown to the British and the U.S.A. authorities. When he was leaving, these Englishmen and Americans asked him to urgently (as did the French officers and men) to notify the Allied authorities of their plight. Informant succeeded in reaching France with a convoy of Allied nationals.[19]
"HUNDREDS OF OUR PRISONERS WANDERING ABOUT POLAND"
In anticipation of the hundreds of thousands of soldiers and citizens who would have to be repatriated in the wake of the Western Allies and Red Army victory over the Nazi forces, the Western Allies and the Soviets agreed February 11, 1945, at the Yalta Conference to provisions which would expedite their repatriation. These provisions allowed their respective military officers into Allied and Soviet controlled territory at various collection points in each country throughout
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[19] Document classified Secret, Office of Stategic Services - Central Intelligence Group, report number 49584, titled "U.S.S.R. P.O.W. and Internee Camp near TAMBOV," April-May 1945."