Less than a month after the signing of the Yalta agreement, in an URGENT TOP SECRET Personal Message to the President, U.S. Ambassador W. Averell Harriman cabled from Moscow:

Since the Yalta Conference General Deane and I have been making constant efforts to get the Soviets to carry out this agreement in full. We have been baffled by promises which have not been fulfilled...[20]

Specifically, Harriman stated in the same cable, "I am outraged" that the Soviet Government has declined to carry out the agreement signed at Yalta in its other aspects, namely, that our contact officers be permitted to go immediately to points where our prisoners are first collected, to evaluate our prisoners, particularly the sick, in our own airplanes, or to send our supplies to points other than Odessa, which is 1,000 miles from the point of liberation, where they are urgently needed.[21]

Furthermore, Harriman in the same cable stated:

For the past ten days the Soviets have made the same statement that Stalin has made to you, [FDR] namely, that all prisoners are in Odessa or entrained thereto, whereas I have now positive proof that this was not repeat not true on February 26, the date on which the statement was first made. This supports my belief that Stalin's statement to you is inaccurate.[22]

In fact, Harriman in the same cable wrote:

there appear to be hundreds of our prisoners wandering around Poland trying to locate American contact officers for protection. I am told that our men don't like the idea of getting into a Russian camp. The Polish people and the Polish Red Cross are being extremely hospitable, whereas food and living conditions in Russian camps are poor. In addition we have reports that there are a number of sick or wounded who are too ill to move. These Stalin does not mention in his cable. Only a small percentage of those reported sick or wounded arrive at Odessa.[23]

Odessa as a Black Sea port in the Ukraine, through which some 2,900 U.S.soldiers were processed and repatriated. It is the only camp in the entire Soviet occupied zone in Europe in which U.S. contact personnel were allowed -- the Yalta agreement not withstanding -- and was the source of much of Harriman's outrage.

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[20] Cable classified, U R G E N T, TOP SECRET, "A Personal Message for the President, From U.S. Ambassador to Russia, W. Averell Harriman," March 8, 1945.
[21] ibid.
[22] ibid.
[23] ibid.

Six days later Ambassador Harriman sent another cable to Washington, this time to the Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. It deserves to be quoted at some length:

I assume the Department has been informed by the War Department of the great difficulties General Deane [head of the U.S. military Mission to Moscow] and I are having with the Soviet Government in regard to the care and repatriation of our liberated prisoners of war. In the beginning it appeared that the Soviet authorities were going to interpret our agreement substantially as we did, namely that we would be allowed to send our contact officers to several points within Poland to which our prisoners first find their way, to fly in emergency supplies and to evacuate our wounded on the returning trips of the planes, although in Soviet planes rather than in U.S. planes. We obtained authority for one contact team of an officer and a doctor to go to Lublin with one plane load of supplies and they have done extremely useful work there. No other teams or supplies have since been permitted and authority for the Lublin team to remain has secretly been withdrawn. The Soviets have now contended that Odessa is the only present 'camps and points of concentration' referred to in the [Yalta] agreement to which our contact officers are to be permitted.

...Our prisoners have suffered serious hardships from lack of food, clothing, medical attention, et cetera, in finding their way to concentration points in Poland and on the long rail trip to Odessa because we have been stopped from sending in our contact teams and emergency supplies. A considerable number of sick and wounded are still hospitalized in Olan. I have been urging for the last two weeks General Deane be permitted to survey the situation with a Red Army officer. This was first approved in writing with the qualification that arrangements must be made with Polish authorities. An officer of our military mission informally approached the Polish Embassy here and was advised that no Polish authorization was necessary as it was entirely with the competence of the Red Army. We have been unable, however, to get authorization for Dean's trip.

It seems clear that the Soviets have changed their point of view during the last several weeks and are now rigidly determined that none of our officers shall be permitted in Poland.

I saw Molotov again today about the situation. He maintained that the Soviet Government was fulfilling its obligation under the agreement and both the Red Army authorities and the Polish Provisional Government objected to the presence of our officers in Poland. When I pressed him on what valid objection the Red Army could possibly have, he pointed out that we had no agreement with the Polish Provisional Government. In spite of my contention that this was a Soviet responsibility he kept referring to the above fact. I then directly asked him if he was implying that we should make such an arrangement with Poles and if so, whether the Red Army would remove its objections. He did not answer this question directly but left me with the impression that he wished me to draw that deduction.

I am satisfied that the objection comes from [the] Soviet Government and not the Provisional Polish Government as our military mission had been in formal contact with the Polish Embassy here who have been extremely cooperative as have all Polish authorities including the Polish Red Cross to our prisoners in Poland.

I feel that the Soviet Government is trying to use our liberated prisoners of war as a club to induce us to give increased prestige to the Provisional Polish Government by dealing with it in this connection as the Soviet are doing in other cases. General Deane and I have not (repeat not) been able to find a way to force the Soviet authorities to live up to our interpretation of our agreement. Unless some steps be taken to bring direct pressure on the Soviets, our liberated prisoners continue to suffer hardships, particularly the wounded and the sick.

...It is the opinion of General Deane and myself that no arguments will induce the Soviets to live up to our interpretation of the [Yalta] agreement except retaliatory measures which affect their interests unless another direct appeal from the President should prove effective. We therefore recommend that the first step be a second request from the President to Marshal Stalin...In the meantime, however, we recommend further that the [State] Department and War Department come to an agreement on what retaliatory measures we can immediately apply in the event an unfavorable answer is received by the President from Marshal Stalin.

Consideration might be given to such actions as, or a combination thereof: (One) That General Eisenhower issue orders to restrict the movements of Soviet contact officers in France to several camps or points of concentration of their citizens far removed from the points of liberation, comparable to Lwow and Odessa; (Two) That Land-Lease refuse to consider requests of Soviet Government additional to our fourth protocol commitments for such items as sugar, industrial equipment or other items that are not immediately essential for the Red Army and the Russian war effort; (Three) That consideration be given to allowing our prisoners of war en route to Naples to give stories to the newspapers of the hardships they have been subjected to between point of liberation and arrival at Odessa and that in answer to questions of correspondents, the war Department explain the provisions of our agreement and that the Soviet Government's failure to carry out the provisions of our agreement according to any reason- able interpretation.

I request urgent consideration of this question and the Department's preliminary reaction. General Deane requests that this cable be shown to General Marshall [Eisenhower's second in Command, a British officer at Supreme Allied Headquarters].

President Roosevelt sent the following PERSONAL and SECRET cable for Marshal Stalin on March 18, 1945:

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[24] Cable, "To: Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., U.S. Secretary of State, From: Ambassador Harriman in Moscow, No. PH-1449," March 14, 1945.

In the matter of evacuation of American ex-prisoners of war from Poland I have been informed that the approval from General Deane to survey the United States prisoners of war situation in Poland has been withdrawn. You stated in your last message to me that there was no need to accede to my request that American aircraft be allowed to carry supplies to Poland and to evacuate the sick. I have information that I consider positive and reliable that there are still a considerable number of sick and injured Americans in hospitals in Poland and also that there have been, certainly up to the last few days and possibly still are, large numbers of other liberated American prisoners either at Soviet assembly points or wandering about in small groups not in contact with Soviet authorities looking for American contact officers.

I cannot, in all frankness, understand your reluctance to permit American contact officers, with the necessary means, to assist their own people in this matter. This Government has done everything to meet each of your requests. I now request you meet mine in this particular matter. Please call Ambassador Harriman to explain to you in detail my desires.[25]

March 22, 1945, President Roosevelt received Marshal Stalin's reply:

I am in receipt of your message about the evacuation of former U.S. prisoners of war from Poland.

With regard to your information about allegedly large numbers of sick and injured Americans in Poland or awaiting evacuation to Odessa, or who have not contacted the Soviet authorities, I must say that the information is inaccurate. Actually, apart from a certain number who are on their way to Polish soil as of March 16, I have today received a report which says that the 17 men will be flown to Odessa in a few days.

With reference to the request contained in your message I must say that if it concerned me personally I would be ready to give way even to the detriment of my own interests. But in the given instance the matter concerns the interests of Soviet armies at the front and of Soviet commanders who do not want to have odd officers who, while having no relation to the military operations, need looking after, want all kinds of meetings and contacts, protection against possible acts of sabotage by German agents not yet ferreted out, and other things that divert the attention of the commanders and their subordinates from their direct duties. Our commanders bear full responsibility for the state of affairs at the front and in the immediate rear, and I do not see how I can restrict their rights to any extent.

I must also say that U.S. ex-prisoners of war liberated by the Red Army have been treated to good conditions in Soviet camps -- better conditions than those afforded Soviet ex-prisoners of war in U.S. camps, where some of them were lodged with German war prisoners and were subjected to unfair treatment and unlawful persecution, including beating, as has been communicated to the U.s. Government on more than one occasion.[26]

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[25] Cable, "From President Roosevelt, To: Marshal Stalin," March 18, 1945
[26] Cable, classified Personal and Secret, "From: Premier J.V. Stalin,
To: President Roosevelt," March 22, 1945.

President Roosevelt apparently accepted Marshal Stalin's explanation. Ambassador Harriman's and General Deane's suggestion to allow

...our prisoners of war en route to Naples to give stories to the newspapers of the hardships they have been subjected to between point of liberation and arrival at Odessa and that in answer to questions of correspondents, the war Department explain the provisions of our agreement and the Soviet Government's failure to carry out the provisions of our agreement according to any reasonable interpretation...[27]

was rejected. In fact, four days after Marshal Stalin's reply, General George C. Marshall, the U.S. Chief of Staff, issued an order on a "revised policy" to the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow and other Allied European Commands which read:

Superseding WARK-54401 to Deane and Giles is revised policy publicity liberated prisoners: Individual interviews authorized provided personnel briefed beforehand against disclosure camp intelligence activities, evasion and escape briefings equipment. Censor all stories. delete criticism Russian treatment...[28]

This new policy effectively ensured the public perception that the Soviet Union was a stout ally of the United states. In fact, there was a good reason to order censorship of all stories criticizing Soviet treatment of U.S. POWs that the Red Army had "liberated" from Nazi control. A SECRET OSS report dated June 18, 1945, detailed an

informal interview with Lt. Col. William F. Fenell...who was recently returned from Russia where he was stationed at ... Odessa, since early this year, mainly as a contact man with the Russians on problems connected with repatriation of American prisoners of war freed by the Russians. Toward the end of his stay he apparently became persona non grata with the Russians for he was suddenly ordered to leave by the American command and take the first boat out of Odessa, regardless of where it was going.[29]

Under the subtitle of "TREATMENT OF AMERICAN PWs" the OSS report read:

American PWs freed by the Red Army were in the main treated very shabbily and came to hate the Russians. Many of them were robbed of watches, rings, and other personal possessions which they had managed to retain even after extended periods of captivity under the Germans. Their food at Odessa was very poor, consisting mainly of soup with cucumbers in it and sour black bread. The Russians generally tended to throw obstacles in the way of repatriation, frequently calling off shipments at the very last minute, insisting always upon clearance from Moscow for every prisoner released. American PWs at Odessa were guarded by Russian

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[27] Cable, "From: Ambassador Harriman in Moscow, No. PH-1449," March 14, 1945.

[28] Order, "From: Allied Supreme Command, U.S. Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, To: the Military Mission in Moscow, and other European commands,"; March 26, 1945, No. WARX-58751.

[29] Office of Strategic Services, Report No. EES/18645/1/22 - USSR - General.

soldiers carrying loaded rifles with fixed bayonets, and Russian security was more stringent there than German security had been in the various Stalags and Oflags. A number of American officers who went to Poland at various times to coordinate the hunt for liber- ated PWs were ordered out very quickly at Russian insistence. [30]

Despite the fact that Moscow was clearing the release of every U.S. prisoner held in Red Army territory -- literally releasing them one at a time -- U.S. forces were ordered:

that no repeat no retaliatory action will be taken by US forces at this time for Soviet refusal to meet our desires with regard to American contact teams and aid for American personnel liberated by Russian forces.[31]

The Soviets also refused the British contact teams access to their prisoners in Red Army controlled territory who came under Soviet control when the Red Army overran Nazi prison camps. A British government cable dated April 20, 1945, from the Acting Secretary of State, Sir Orme Sargent, to Lord Halifax, then the British Ambassador to the United States reads

It is clear that the Soviet Government will not allow our contact team into Poland. The Russians deny the existence of any British prisoners of war in Poland but we have evidence that there are prisoners of war concentrated at Cracow and Czestochow and in hospitals. This is a clear breach of the Yalta agreement...We have therefore turned to the Red Cross channel...[32]

The same day that Lord Halifax received the above telegram, Sargent, sent Lord Halifax a telegram which concluded that the Soviets have
some inclination to blackmail us with Warsaw authorities.[33]

In other words, the Soviets were attempting to force the British to give de facto recognition to the Soviet puppet Polish Provisional government, the same demand that Ambassador Harriman believed was being pressed by the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Molotov, in order to end the "serious hardships from lack of food, clothing, medical attention, et cetera."[34] of U.S. soldiers, about which Ambassador Harriman cabled the U.S. Secretary of State.

The U.S. and British forces, meanwhile, were living up to the Yalta agreement. Soviet liaison officers were infused into the Allied command structure, and these Soviet officers went about their business of assisting

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[30]Office of Strategic Services, Report No. EES/18645/1/22-USSR-General..

[31] See copy of orders, "To: Commanding General of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations Allied Force Headquarters Casseta, Italy, From: Headquarters Communication Zone European Theater of Operations US Army Paris, France signed by Major General J.E. Hull," April 20, 1945.

[32] Telegram, "From: Acting Secretary of State, To: Lord Halifax," No. 3936, April 20, 1945

[33] Telegram, "From: Acting Secretary of State, To: Lord Halifax," No. 3923, April 20, 1945

[34] Cable, "To: Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., U.S. Secretary of State, From: Ambassador Harriman in Moscow," No.PH-1449, March 14, 1945.

Allied forces to repatriate, forcibly or otherwise, Soviet and Eastern European citizens and soldiers who were in Allied controlled territory. As a cable from Eisenhower's Deputy Commander, a British Marshal, states

that we now have 153 Soviet Liaison Officers working under the direction of Major General Dragun who is charged with the responsibility of assisting us in the problem of repatriation.

2. That each Army group has an organization to handle repatriation matters, and in these organizations we have woven Soviet Liaison Officers who are doing valuable work. [35]

Soviet liaison officers assisting with repatriations of Soviets in Allied control, were taken to one camp, set up -- in accordance with the Yalta agreement -- for Soviet citizens and soldiers, in Bari, Italy where, as reported to the U.S. Secretary of State in a TOP SECRET cable:

Russians were permitted and encouraged to set up their own camp administration. Russians of all categories are accepted at Florence camp, outfitted with clothing, PX supplies and same facilities as for United States personnel. After minimum processing they are flown to Bari to await shipment to Russia. When Soviet military missions representatives were taken to inspect both camps, they [Soviet liaison officers] expressed pleasure and said treatment was 'too good'.[36]

Less than a week after the Secretary of State received the above cited cable, he received a pre-meeting briefing memorandum to prepare for his meeting with the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs. With regard to the repatriation issue, the Secretary of State was advised to assure Mr. Molotov, that we have no intention of holding Soviet citizens after the collapse of Germany regardless of whether they desire to return to the Soviet Union or not.[37]

In other words, the United States was fully committed to the policy of forcible repatriation. The Yalta agreement included the principle of "forced repatriation" of all Soviet citizens, meaning, any Soviet citizen, regardless of whether they wanted to return to the Soviet Union, were forcibly sent back to life under Stalin. This agreement, the Allies initially believed, would result in the repatriation of all of their soldiers and citizens. This provision of the Yalta agreement, in large part, the Allies abided by. despite the fact that hundreds of thousands of those forcibly repatriated to Soviet control were either shot or sent to forced labor camps.

In fact, when Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges, Commander, First U.S. Army inquired of Eisenhower's staff at Supreme Allied Headquarters,

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[35] Cable, "To: AGWAR, From: SHAEF MAIN, SIGNED TEDDER (Eisenhower's Deputy Commander British Marshal Tedder," REF NO. S-94080, June 29, 1945.

[36] Telegram, "To: Secretary of State," Department of State, No. ASB 1304 April 13, 1945.

[37] State Department memorandum to the U.S. Secretary of State, regarding an upcoming meeting with Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar Molotov. April 19, 1945. The memorandum contains a list on nine points and a brief description of U.S. policy on each point.

as to how much force an Army Commander should use in the control of displaced Russians...Talking with Judge McCloy today, he agreed that of course an Army Commander could use any force necessary to insure the success of his operations.[38]

Many Soviet citizens did not want to return to Soviet occupied territory, since those Soviets captured by the Germans, and recovered by Allied forces, were often recovered in German work camp uniforms. These Soviets captured by the Germans had been given the option of starving or joining a labor battalion. Most joined German labor battalions. Once repatriated to the Soviet Union, many of these Soviets were imprisoned immediately in slave labor camps. However, the Soviets sent to slave labor camps were considered lucky, since the others were often shot.

As a result, Soviet citizens and soldiers in Allied control were extremely reluctant to be repatriated. The following description is of an attempt by Allied soldiers to repatriate 399 former Russian soldiers by train to the Soviet Union:

All of these men refused to entrain. They begged to be shot. They resisted entrainment by taking off their clothing and refusing to leave their quarters. It was necessary to use tear gas and some force to drive them out. Tear gas forced them out of the building into the snow where those who had cut themselves fell exhausted and bleeding in the snow. Nine men hanged themselves and one had stabbed himself to death and one other who had stabbed himself subsequently died; while 20 others are in the hospital for self inflicted wounds. The entrainment was finally effected of 368 men who were sent off accompanied by a Russian liaison officer on a train carrying American guards. Six men escaped enroute. A number of men in the group claimed they were not Russians...[39]

In the Pacific theater, even though the Soviets were late-comers in the war effort against Japan, they managed to take control of territory just across the Soviet Union's contiguous borders with Manchuria, China -- as well as the northern islands of Japan. In doing so, the Soviets were able to seize some Japanese POW camps holding Allied prisoners.

In 1945, during the closing days of the war with Japan, U.S. military intelligence "Mercy Teams" were sent into China, and Manchuria to arrange for the well-being of the Allied POWs in Japanese camps. Generally, Japanese troop commanders cooperated with the Mercy Teams, but the Soviets (as in Europe) and Chinese Communists denied Mercy Teams access to camps in areas under their control.

A cable from the Secretary of State to the United States Political Adviser for Germany states that the State Department "has been anxious in handling" the return of Soviet citizens and soldiers from Western Europe "to avoid

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[38] RESTRICTED letter, "To: Lieutenant General Hodges, Commanding, First U.S. Army, From: John C.H. Lee, a Major General on Eisenhower's Supreme Allied Headquarter's staff, April 13, 1945.

[39] Memorandum, "To: the United States Political Advisor for Germany (Murphy), From: Mr. Parker W. Buhrman, Munich," January 28, 1946

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