giving the Soviet authorities any pretext for delaying the return of American POWs of Japanese now in Soviet occupied zone, particularly Manchuria."[40] The Soviets even sent a delegation to Hanoi to forcibly repatriate any French Foreign Legionnaires POWs in custody of the Japanese who were identified as citizens of the Soviet Union, or as citizens of any of the east bloc nations, were surrendered by the Allies to the Soviets.[41]

Five days after victory was announced in Europe (V-E Day) the Associated Press, from Allied Advance Headquarters in Reims, France reported that

Nearly half of the estimated 200,000 British and 76,000 American prisoners of war still in Germany are believed to be within the Russian zone of occupation and Supreme Headquarters has twice requested a meeting or an arrangement to arrange their return.[42]

Ten days later, a meeting between the Soviet and Allied command took place. The meeting, at Halle, Germany, on May 22, 1945 was for the purpose of conferring with representatives of the Russian High Command on the matter of repatriation of prisoners of war and displaced persons.[43]

Lieutenant General K.D. Golubev, Red Army, Soviet Assistant Administrator for Repatriation, led the Soviet delegation, and Major General R.W. Barker, U.S.A., Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, SHAEF led the Allied delegation.

One of the points of discussion at this meeting was the failure of the Soviets to provide U.S. and British liaison officers permission to visit their fellow soldiers who were formerly POWs held by the Germans and who were now being held in camps in Red Army occupied territory. In a cable from Eisenhower's Deputy Commander, British Marshal Tedder, to various Allied Command officials and U.S. diplomats, Marshall Tedder describes Soviet duplicity and policy on this matter:

Before the HALLE Conference we had made numerous attempts to visit PW camps in the Russian Zone and always met a firm refusal. After the HALLE Conference General GOLEBEV asked to visit Camps where Russians were being kept. We agreed and asked him for permission to visit Camps in the Russian Zone. He agreed to allow 1 of our

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[40] Telegram, "To: the United States Political Advisor for Germany (Murphy) at Berlin, From: Secretary of State, No. 740.62114/8-2745," August 29, 1945.

[41] Archimedes L.A. Patti, WHY VIET NAM? PRELUDE TO AMERICA'S ALBATROSS, pp. 4, 141-147, and 178-179 on the deliberated shooting of U.S. Army Captain John Birch, the head of a Mercy Team, by Chinese Communist troops denying him access to a POW camp under their control.

[42] "SHAEF Asks Russians About Freed PW's," Associated Press dispatch, ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS, Reims, France, May 12, 1945.

[43] Report, "From: Major General R. W. Barker, Subject: Report on Conference with Russian Officials Relative to the Repatriation of Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons, To: The Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, AEF (Allied European Forces)," May 23, 1945.

Officers to visit 5 Camps. One of my representatives started on the trip accompanied by a Russian Major who stated he had the necessary orders. After visiting the first and nearest Camp the Russian Officer produced orders signed by General GOLUBEV restricting our Officers visit to the one camp. This is the only instance of Soviet authorities permitting U.S. or British Officers to visit camps in their area, which is in sharp contrast to the liberal policy pursued by us. [44]

From the beginning of the six day conference in Halle, Germany, it was for the Allies, a difficult meeting. In his post meeting report, Barker wrote:

When the Russian Mission was finally assembled it numbered some forty officers and forty to fifty enlisted men. Among the Russian officers were one Lieutenant General and six Major Generals. The Russian party arrived in requisitioned German vehicles of all makes, and American type armored car, fully equipped [armed], and a radio truck, which was in operation most of the time. All Russian male personnel were heavily armed with pistols, sub- machine guns and rifles.[45]

The meeting began with the Soviets refusing to allow repatriation of Allied soldiers by air transport, which made the entire repatriation process much more cumbersome and logistically difficult. As Barker described:

After opening statements...I proposed the immediate initiation of steps looking toward prompt release and return to Allied control of all British and American prisoners of war then in Russian custody, using air and motor transport. This proposal was firmly resisted by General GOLUBEV, who cited all manner of local administrative difficulties which precluded the operation. He stated that serviceable airfields did not exist, which was known by myself to be not the case and I so informed him. The Russian position was very clear that neither now, nor at any time in the future, would they permit Allied airplanes to be used for the movement into or out of their territory of prisoners of war or displaced persons, except 'distinguished persons, sick and wounded.'[46]

After the initial meetings with the Soviets, lower level discussions were held by the parties in an attempt to work out mutually acceptable arrangements. However, as Barker wrote, these meetings "having proven futile," the decision was made that all discussions were to be

carried on directly between the heads of the Missions, with certain members of their respective parties in attendance. On the Russian side, those present numbered normally from twenty to twenty-five, including several general officers. The SHAEF representatives in attendance normally were myself, General MICKELSEN, Brigadier VENABLES and two to four representatives of the technical services.[47]

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[44] Cable, classified Secret, "To: AGWAR FOR WARCOS, From: SHAEF MAIN, SIGNED TEDDER, REF. NO: S-94080," June 29, 1945 describing camp visit incident in late May, 1945.
[45] ibid.
[46] ibid.
[47] ibid.

Barker wrote that it was after the first four-hour session of the meeting in Halle, Germany that

the SHAEF [Supreme Headquarters of the Allied European Forces] representatives came to the firm conviction that British and American prisoners of war were, in effect, being held hostage by the Russians until deemed expedient by them to permit their release.[48]

This is the first high level report that openly suggested that the Soviets may not repatriate all of the Allied POWs in Red Army occupied territory. In fact, after six days of meetings with the Soviets, Barker concluded that

There is every indication that the Russians intend to make a big show of rapid repatriation of our men, although I am of the opinion that we may find a reluctance to return them all, for an appreciable time to come, since those men constitute a valuable bargaining point. It will be necessary for us, therefore, to arrange for constant liaison and visits of inspection to 'uncover' our men.[49]

On May 19, four days before the start of the Halle meeting, a cable signed by Eisenhower at the Allies Supreme Headquarters, stated that:

Numbers of US prisoners estimated in Russian control 25,000.[50]

After the Halle meeting, given Barker's conclusion that British and American prisoners of war were, in effect, being held hostage by the Russians and that the Soviets were reluctant to return them all, for an appreciable time to come, since those men constitute a valuable bargaining point," the return of all U.S. and British POWs held in Red Army occupied territory appeared to be in serious doubt.

Furthermore, a TOP SECRET May 31, 1945 letter from Major General John R. Deane, the U.S. Army Commanding General of the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow to Lt. General Slavin, the Assistant Chief of the Red Army in Moscow indicated that the Soviets were still holding over 15,500 U.S. "liberated" POWs. Deane's letter stated:

I have had a cable from General Marshall in which he states he has received information which indicates that 15,597 United States liberated prisoners of war are now under control of Marshal Tolbukhin.[51]

--------
[48] ibid
[49] ibid
[50] Cable, classified Secret Priority, "To: AGWAR, From: SHAEF MAIN SIGNED EISENHOWER, REF. NO: S-88613," May 19, 1945.

[51] Letter, Top Secret, "To: Lt. General Slavin, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Red Army, People's Commissariat for Defense, Moscow, U.S.S.R., From: Major General John R. Deane, U.S. Army, Commanding General, U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, No. 1009," May 31, 1945.

The day before Major General Deane sent his letter to Lt. General Slavin, General Kenner, Eisenhower's Surgeon General at SHAEF Headquarters, received a memorandum on the subject "Displaced Persons, Allied ex-PW and German PW."[52] The following accounting from the Kenner memorandum detailed the number of Allied ex PW and Displaced Persons Allied Supreme Command reported were being held captive in territory occupied by the Red Army on May 30, 1945:

2. RUSSIAN SPHERE.

	PW	DP
Belgian	50,000	115,000
Dutch	4,000	140,000
British	20,000
U.S.	20,000
French	250,000	850,000

The Kenner memorandum, dated May 30, 1945, stated 20,000 Americans remained under Red Army control. Major General Deane requested information from the Assistant Chief of the Red Army in Moscow about over 15,500 Americans the Soviets were believed to be holding in a letter dated May 31, 1945. Therefore, it is difficult to reconcile these facts with a cable signed by Eisenhower on June 1, 1945, which read:

C. It is now estimated that only small numbers of U.S. prisoners of war still remain in Russian hands. These no doubt are scattered singly and in small groups as no information is available of any large numbers in specific camps. They are being received now only in small driblets and being reported as received.

Everything possible is being done to recover U.S. personnel and to render accurate and prompt reports thereon to the War Department. [53]

The claim of the second Eisenhower cable that "only small numbers of U.S. prisoners of war still remain in Russian hands" and that these "no doubt are scattered singly and in small groups as no information is available of any large numbers in specific camps," directly contradicts the information in the Kenner memorandum which states, a mere 48 hours earlier, that 20,000 U.S. POWs were still being held by the Red Army. Furthermore, it directly contradicts the information in General Deane's letter dated the day before that "information which indicates that 15,597 United States liberated prisoners of war are now under control of Marshal Tolbukhin." Given the contents of Major General Deane's TOP SECRET letter, and given the contents of the Kenner memorandum, the Eisenhower cable of June 1 appears to be an attempt to gloss over a serious problem.

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[52] Memorandum, "To: General Kenner, Eisenhower's Surgeon General at SHAEF Headquarters, Subject: Displaced Persons, Allied ex-PW and German PW, No. SHAEF 383.6-2 MED," MaY 30, 1945.

[53] Cable, "To: AGWAR, From: SHAEF FORWARD, SIGNED EISENHOWER, REF. No. FWD-23059," June 1, 1945.

At any rate, the Eisenhower cable was merely following the official news propaganda line. On the same day as the cable stating "only small numbers of U.S. prisoners of war still remain in Russian hands," The New York Times reported the War Department had announced that

'substantially all' of the American soldiers taken prisoner in Europe are accounted for, Under-Secretary Robert P. Patterson said 'This means that it is not expected that many of those who are still being carried as missing in action will appear later as having been prisoners of war.'[54]

In other words, on June 1, 1945, the U.S. government's public position was that most American GIs taken prisoner have come home and been repatriated, even though the classified cable traffic for the previous fortnight was reporting between 15,000 and 20,000 still held.

On June 5, 1945, Allied command, from its headquartersin Paris, France, announced that 25,000 of some 90,000 men who had returned from German POW camps after the Allied military victory were men who had been listed as Missing in Action (MIA).[55] Given that 90,000 U.S. soldiers had returned at the time of the announcement, and that the U.S. War Department, for the European Theater had records of 77,500 U.S. "Prisoners Taken," 102,500 Americans should have returned from Europe, not 90,000.[56]

In other words, the sum of 77,500 known POWs and 25,000 returned MIAs equals 102,500 American soldiers; however, only some 90,000 were repatriated. These numbers may be summarized in tabular form:

Total Prisoners Taken	+ Repatriated MIAs	= Total To Be Repatriated
77,500	+ 25,000	= 102,500

However, the total number of men who were repatriated in June, 1945, were only 90,000. The net number not repatriated, therefore, is as follows:

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[54] "10,000 Ex-Captives Coming by Week-End; Army Sees All in Europe Accounted For," The New York Times, June 1, 1945.

[55] "25,000 Missing U.S. Soldiers Turn Up Alive," New York Herald Tribune, June 6, 1945.

[56] See chart "CAPTURED OR INTERNED UNITED STATES ARMY PERSONNEL," December 7, 1941 - October 31, 1945, compiled by the Statistical Branch, Department of Defense, January 7, 1946.

Total To Be Repatriated	- Actual Repatriated	= Total Not Repatriated
102,500	- 90,000	= 12,500

The conclusion is that even a rudimentary assessment of the Allies' own figures suggests that some 12,500 Americans were never repatriated from Red Army controlled territory.

However, the 12,500 figure is significantly lower than the 20,000 POWs known to be in Soviet control as detailed in the Kenner memorandum, which was written 48 hours before the War Department's announcement that "it is not expected that many of those who are still being carried as missing in action will appear."[57]

Was the figure of 20,000 U.S. POWs still held in Red Army occupied territory cited in the SHAEF memorandum to General Kenner correct? Was the real figure closer to 12,500 Americans kept as slave laborers and hostages by the Red Army, as indicated by the Allies own public figures announced by Lt. Colonel Schweitzer? Or, was the correct number of Americans soldiers not repatriated by the Soviets the figure cited by Major General Deane, in his May 31, 1945 letter to the Soviets, that "indicated" 15,597 American soldiers were under the control of Marshal Tolbukhin?

On February 25, 1946, some eight months later, the Chief of the Strength Accounting Office, in the War Department's Chief of Staff Office, transmitted to the National Headquarters of the Red Cross in Washington, D.C., a "chart showing Missing in Action (including captured) U.S. Army personnel for the period 7 December 1941, through 31 December 1945." [58]

In his letter Ballard stated:

It will be noted that the items "Prisoners of War (Current Status)" are still large. The reason of course is that as of 31 December 1945 these categories reflected latest definite reports available for statistical compilation, and the situation to date has not materially changed. You will appreciate that for statistical purposes these casualties cannot be moved to other categories until detailed disposition records have been processed. In many cases, final disposition must await a legal determination of death under PL 490 which may take up to next September, even though investigation to date leaves little logical doubt that a given man is permanently lost.... The foregoing data was classified "Restricted", but has been approved for release to you.[59]

--------
[57] See "10,000 Ex-Captives Coming By Week-End; Army Sees All in Europe Accounted For," The New York Times, June 1, 1945.

[58] Letter, To: Maurice Fate, Esq., Director, Relief to Prisoners of War, National Headquarters, American Red Cross, Washington, D.C., From: L.L. Ballard, Jr., Lt. Col., Chief, Strength and Accounting and Statistical Office, OCS (Office of the Chief of Staff)," February 26, 1946.

[59] ibid

The chart enclosed with Ballard's letter revealed the following statement, as of December 31, 1945, for the German theaters:

Captured		Other in Action [60]	Missing MIA
Returned to Mil. Control	P.O.W. (Curr.Stat)	Declared Dead	(Current Status)
90,937	5,414	11,753	2,997

According to the cable above, as of December 31, 1945, 5,414 men were still listed as "P.O.W. (Current Status)". Figures for "Prisoners Not Returned to Military Control," essentially the same category as "P.O.W. (Current Status)" list 6,595 men in that category as of October 31,1945. [61] Two months later, the number decreased from 6,595 to the number listed above, 5,414.

Because the number of U.S. prisoners repatriated between October 31, 1945, and December 31, 1945, totaled only 435, (stragglers, no doubt) the decrease in the number of prisoners listed in the P.O.W. (Current Status) category from 6,595 to 5,414 cannot be explained merely by the repatriation of 435 POWs still returning from Red Army occupied territory. This still leaves a decrease of 646 men from P.O.W. (Current Status) unexplained. (Roughly only 1,000 POWs were repatriated in the last half of 1945.)

The remaining decrease in the number of men still listed as POWs (646) can, however, be explained by the War Department issuing Presumed Findings of Death for these individuals. In fact the numbers in the category of known POWs not returned in June, 1945 were likely close to or slightly greater than 12,500.

This number would not include MIAs, but only known POWs.

By the end of October, the War Department was likely able to make legal Presumed Findings of Death in some 5,900 cases, leaving the number of "Prisoners Not Returned to Military Control" not 12,500, but 6,595.

--------
[60] Chart, "MISSING IN ACTION U.S. ARMY PERSONNEL," German and Japanese Theaters, December 7, 1941-December 31,1945, Source: "Battle Casualties of the Army" January 1,1946, from the Strength Accounting and Statistics Office, February 25, 1946.

[61] See Chart "CAPTURED OR INTERNED UNITED STATES ARMY PERSONNEL," dated December 7, 1941-October 31,1945, compiled by the Statistical Branch, Department of Defense, January 7, 1946

Thus, the figure of 11,753 Declared Dead under the category Other Missing in Action, in the chart of casualty figures for December 31, 1945, actually represent Presumed Findings of Death (PFDs), as authorized by U.S. law. These PFDs were made from both the MIA (Current Status) list, decreasing the numbers in those categories and increasing the number in the Declared Dead category.

As a result, Lt. Col. Ballard felt obligated to explain to the Director of the Relief to Prisoners of War of the Red Cross that for "statistical purposes" the numbers in the Prisoner of War (Current Status) and the Missing in Action (Current Status) were "still large." Ballard explained to the Red Cross that "these casualties cannot be moved to other categories" until each man can be found, legally, to be dead. This finding of death occurs, as Lt. Col. Ballard points out, after an "investigation to date leaves little logical doubt that a given man is permanently lost."[62]

The most striking aspect of these documents is the revelation that the War Department's Chief of the Strength Accounting and Statistic Office, in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the War Department, main function was to resolve each outstanding case by determining--as soon as enough time elapsed to make it legally possible--that each man is "permanently lost," and therefore, dead.

The thrust of the War Department's efforts were not in the direction that most Americans would expect their government to proceed; that is, to make a thorough effort to determine the fate of each man. Given the obvious and observed policy by the Soviet government to hold citizens and soldiers from Western countries, known to senior U.S. officials, Lt. Col. Ballard's efforts should have been concentrated on determining where the Soviets were holding these men, and not merely to "await a legal determination of death under PL 490 which may take up to next September."

Thus, the bureaucratic precedents created in World War I in the cases of "presumed dead" amount these missing from the American Expeditionary force were once again followed. Thousands of U.S. personnel who were known to be POWs held by the Germans in World War II, but, were not repatriated once the territory they were being held in was occupied by Red Army, and were legally determined to be dead.

Where were these thousands of Americans and hundreds of thousands of Europeans? Nearly a month after the Eisenhower cable claimed that "only small numbers of U.S. prisoners of war still remain in Russian hands" and that these " no doubt are scattered singly and in small groups as no information is available of any large numbers in specific camps," Eisenhower sent a SECRET PRIORITY cable to General Deane in Moscow which read

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[62] Letter, Tl: Maurice Fate, Esq., Director, Relief to Prisoners of War, National Headquarters, American Red Cross, Washington, D.C., From: L.L. Ballard Jr., Lt. Col., Chief, Strength and Accounting and Statistical Office, OCS (Office of the Chief of Staff)," February 26, 1946.

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