Possibility that several hundred American prisoners of war liberated from Stalag Luft 1, Berth, are now confined by the Russian Army in the Rostock area pending identification as Americans is reported by an American who recently returned from such confinement.

S/Sgt. Anthony Sherg was one of 1000 air force officers and non- commissioned officers who left Stalag Luft 1 immediately prior to assumption of control in Barth by the Red Army in order to obtain rumored air transport from Wismar. The group of ten in which Sgt Sherg traveled was arrested by Russian soldiers and held in jails in Bad Dorberan, then Rostock. Ten other Americans were soon under similar circumstances in Rostock.

Russian authorities demanded identification papers, which no prisoner possessed, and refused to consider dog tags proof of the Americans' status. The Americans were well fed and well treated but Sherg complains there was no disposition to speed identification and evacuation. After 25 days he escaped from jail and made his way to British Forces.

From his own observations and conversations with other former prisoners he believes several hundred Americans may be held in like circumstances in the Wismar-Bad Doberan-Rostock Area.[63]

In fact, there continued to be many reports of Americans being held by the Soviets. For example, the catalogue of the National Archives lists a memorandum from the State Department Special Projects Division, date February 6, 1946, regarding a conversation between Colonel Kavanaugh, from War Department and Captain George, and Mr. Baily, regarding Doolittle fliers interned by the Soviet Union.[64]

Again, a letter to the leader of France's National constituent Assembly dated August 17, 1946 from the Deputy of the Bas-Rhin stated:

I have brought to the attention of the Minister for ex-Prisoners of War the testimony of Mr. Joseph Bogenschutz, 55 Grand Rue, at Mulhouse (Haut Rhin), who was repatriated on last July 7 from Russia, from Camp 199-6 at Inskaya, which is 70 kilometers from Novisibirsk [...] Bogenschutz states that he wrote at least three cards a month through the Red Cross (Red Crescent) since September 1944 and that none of these cards ever arrived. Bogenschutz, in addition thereto, alleges that there still remain American, British, Belgian, Polish, Rumanian Luxemburg, etc. nationals in the camp.[65]

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[63] Cable, "To: DEANE MOSCOW, HQ 21st ARMY GROUP cite SHGAP signed SCARF (Eisenhower), From: SHAEF MAIN, No. 6590," June 25, 1945.

[64] Listed in the catalog of the National Archives as Memo No. FW 74.00114PW. However, the actual document is missing. The Doolittle flyers were crew members of the daring surprise "Doolittle raid" on Tokyo, a one- way bombing mission in April, 1942 by 16 B-24 bombers, from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet.

[65] Copy of translation of a letter written on Republic of France's National Constituent Assembly stationary, Paris, dated August 17, 1946, signed Henri Meck, Deputy of the Bas-Rhin.

Another example is a report from the Headquarters of the United States Forces in Austria, to the Director of Intelligence, the General Staff of the U.S. Army, dated June 15, 1946 which stated:

SUBJECT: USSR - American Army Personnel in confinement

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The following information was obtained from a former forced laborer who claimed to have been confined in an unregistered lager with Subject personnel. Informant claimed to have been released through an error committed by the commandant of the Moscow hospital where she was transferred because of infantile paralysis.

Approximately 60 km from Moscow, in the direction of Kaline, there is an unregistered labor camp. The confinees, 150 men and 50 women, work in coal mines in the vicinity of the camp. Among those confined are 3 American Air Force soldiers who were captured by the German Wehmacht, Czechoslovakia, during, April 1945. These men are:

Charlie, 21 years, 170 cm, blond, blue eyes, has paralyzed right shoulder.

Joe...165 cm, dark blonde, dark eyes, has stomach wound and is confined in larger infirmary.

Albert, 27 years, 170 cm, black hair, brown eyes, has stiff left hip and burn scar on left side of face, is from Texas.

The lager confinees will never be repatriated and are not permitted to write letters.[66]

The reasons that the Soviets kept U.S. POWs and other Western European citizens and POWs are difficult for the citizens of free countries to fathom. However, one may speculate on at least five explanations.

First, for economic concessions, or as Major Vershenko stated, for 'credits.'

Second, to satisfy the Soviet view--as described by Molotov--that it "was dangerous" merely to disarm an adversary (or in the case of the U.S., an ally who may be a future adversary) but it was also necessary to "make them work."

Third, as a source of slave labor to rebuild their industrial base.

Fourth, as the British cable stated, to satisfy the Soviet "inclination to blackmail us into dealing with Warsaw authorities" and for other political concessions.

Fifth, to ensure that the Allies forcibly repatriated Russian and other eastern European citizens who did not wish to return to their countries under Soviet control.

--------
[66] Memorandum, classified Confidential, "To: Director of Intelligence, General Staff, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C. From: C.P. Bikel, Colonel GSC, Director of Intelligence for the Headquarters, United States Forces in Austria," July 13, 1948.

The daughter of one such U.S. Army officer, Major Wirt Thompson, was never told that in 1955 a German repatriate from the Soviet concentration camp system reported to the United States government that while he was in prison, he met Major Thompson. The German repatriate told American officials that Thompson told him that he had been imprisoned at Budenskaya prison near Moscow, and also in the Tayshet labor camp after World War II. Not only was Thompson's daughter "overwhelmed" when she found out early in 1991 that this information existed, but she wondered how her family could have been told by the United States government in 1944 that Major Thompson had been killed in action, body not recovered.[67]

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[67] See "Men Who Never Returned," Editorial, The Washington Times, March 13, 1991.

Unlike the result in World War II, Allied forces did not achieve a military victory in Korea. The Korean War ended at the negotiating table between Communist North Korean representatives and United Nations representatives.

With regard to POW repatriation, the North Koreans initially demanded an "all-for-all" prisoner exchange. In other words, the North Koreans wanted an agreement similar to the Yalta Agreement of World War II. The United States was reluctant to agree to this formula based on its World War II experience with mandatory repatriation, knowing that thousands of those forced to return to the Soviet Union were either shot or interned in slave labor camps, where most of them died. After two long years of negotiations, the North Koreans agreed to the principle of voluntary or "non-forcible repatriation"." This agreement stated that each side would release only those prisoners who wished to return to their respective countries.

Operation BIG SWITCH was the name given to the largest and final exchange of prisoners between the North Koreans and the U.N. forces, and occurred over a one-month period from August 5, 1953 to September 6, 1953.[1] Chinese and North Korean POWs were returned to North Korea and U.S. and other U.N. troops were returned to South Korea. Approximately 14,200 Communist Chinese POWs elected not to return to the Peoples Republic of China; but only 21 American POWs elected to stay with the Communist forces, and likely went to China. These 21 American are defectors and obviously are not considered as unrepatriated U.S. POWs.

However, U.S. government documents state that nearly one thousand known captive U.S. POWs -- and an undetermined number of some 8,000 U.S.MIAs -- were not repatriated at the end of the Korean War.

Three days after the start of operation BIG SWITCH, the New York Times reported that

Gen. James A. Van Fleet, retired commander of the United States Eighth Army in Korea, estimated tonight that a large percentage of the 8,000 American soldiers listed as missing in Korea were alive.[2]

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[1] KOREAN WAR ALMANAC, Harry G. Summers, Jr. Colonel of Infantry, Facts on File, pp.33,62.
[2]"8,000 Missing, Van Fleet Says," The New York Times, August 8, 1953

A report by the U.N. Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activity, Korea, five days into operation BIG SWITCH, stated:

"Figures show that the total number of MIAs, PLUS KNOWN CAPTIVES, LESS those to be US repatriated, leaves a BALANCE of 8,000 unaccounted for." [emphasis added][3]

The report mentions numerous reports of U.N. POWs who were transferred to Manchuria, China, and the USSR since the beginning of hostilities in Korea.[4] Specifically, the report stated

many POWs transferred have been technicians and factory workers. Other POWs transferred had a knowledge of Cantonese and are reportedly used for propaganda purposes.[5]

The number of known U.S. POWs not repatriated from the Korean War was cited by Hugh M. Milton II, Assistant Secretary of the Army in January, 1954, in a memorandum he wrote four months after the conclusion of operation BIG SWITCH. Section 3, Part B reads

1. There are approximately 954 United States personnel falling in this group. What the Department of the Army and other interested agencies is doing about their recovery falls into two parts. First, the direct efforts of the UNC Military Armistice Commission to obtain an accurate accounting, and second, efforts by G2 of the Army, both overt and covert, to locate, identify, and recover these individuals. G2 is MAKING an intensive effort through its information collection system world-wide, to obtain information on these people and has a plan for clandestine action to obtain the recovery of one or more to establish the case positively that prisoners are still being held by the Communists. No results have been obtained yet in this effort. The direct efforts of the UNC [United Nations Command] are being held in abeyance pending further study of the problem by the State Department...

2. A further complicating factor in the situation is that to continue to carry this personnel in a missing status is costing over one million dollars annually. It may become necessary at some future date to drop them from our records as 'missing and presumed dead.'[6]

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[3] Report, U.N. Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activity Korea, (CCRAK). CCRAK SPECIFIC REQUEST Number 66-53.

[4] The United States had not recognized the People's Republic of China and, as a result, the U.S. did not deal directly with the Chinese throughout the negotiations.

[5] (CCRAK) Report, REQUEST Number 66-53

[6] Memorandum, classified Secret, "TO: Secretary of the Army, Subject: The Twenty-One Non-Repatriates and the Unaccounted-For Americans Believed to be Still Held Illegally by the Communist, From: Assistant Secretary Milton," January 16, 1954.

In fact, the Defense Department did in fact "drop them" from the DOD records as "missing and presumed dead," as were non-repatriated U.S. POWs from the American Expeditionary Force in World war I and World War II. In a memorandum to Milton from Major General Robert Young, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 of the U.S. Army, Young updates Assistant Secretary Milton on the progress on dropping U.S. POWs from DOD records:

2. Under the provisions of Public LAw 490 (77th Congress), the Department of the Army, after careful review of each case and interrogation of returning prisoners of war, has placed 618 soldiers, known to have been in enemy hands and unaccounted for by the Communist Forces in the following categories:

313 - Finding of Death - Administratively determined, under the provisions of Public Law

490 - by Department of the Army

275 - Report by Death - reported on good authority by returning prisoners.

21 - Dishonorable Discharge.

4 - Under investigation, prognosis undecided. Missing in Action for over one year.

2 - Returned to Military control.[7]

The number had already been dropped from 954 to 618 through a series of presumed findings of death for the "unaccounted-for Americans believed to be still held illegally by the Communists." Presumed findings of death were also used to whittle down the number of U.S. soldiers listed as MIA.

According to the "Interim Report of U.S. Casualties," prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as of December 31, 1953 (Operation BIG SWITCH ended September 6, 1953), the total number of U.S. soldiers who had been listed as Missing In Action from the Korean War was 13,325. Still listed as MIA in January 1, 1954 were 2,953, and the figure for died, or presumed dead, was 5,140. 5,131 MIAs had been repatriated and 101 were listed as "Current captured."[8]

On June 17, 1955, almost two years after the end of operation BIG SWITCH, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, issued an internal report titled, "Recovery of Unrepatriated Prisoners of War." The report admitted that,

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[7] Memorandum, classified Secret,, "To: Hugh Milton, the Assistant Secretary of The Army, (M&RF) Subject: United States Personnel Unaccounted for by Communist Forces, From: Major General Robert N. Young, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1," April 29, 1954

[8] See"Interim Report of U.S. Battle Casualties," as of December 31, 1953 (Source: Progress Reports and Statistics, OSD, as of January 25, 1954).

After the official repatriation efforts were completed, the U.N. Command found that it still had slightly less than 1000 U.S. PWs [not MIAs] "unaccounted for "by the Communists.[9]

Although frank and forthright, this report -- written by the staff of the Special Operations -- provides a glimpse into the thinking of those involved in the Korean POW issue. Sections of the report follow:

At the time of the official repatriation, some of our repatriates stated that they had been informed by the Communists that they (the Communists) were holding 'some' U.S. flyers as 'political prisoners' rather than as prisoners of war and that these people would have to be 'negotiated for' through political or diplomatic channels. Due to the fact that we did not recognize the red regime in China, no political negotiations were instituted, although [the] State [Department] did have some exploratory discussions with the British in an attempt to get at the problem. The situation was relatively dormant when, in late November 1954, the Peking radio announced that 13 of these 'political prisoners' had been sentenced for 'spying'. This announcement caused a public uproar and a demand from U.S. citizens, Congressional leaders and organizations for action to effect their release.[10]

The eleven U.S. "political prisoners," were not the only U.S. servicemen the Chinese held after the Korean War. The New York Times,reported

Communist China is holding prisoner other United States Air Force personnel besides the eleven who were recently sentenced on spying charges following their capture during the Korean War. This information was brought out of China by Squadron Leader Andrew R. MacKenzie, a Canadian flier who was released today by the Chinese at the Hong Kong border. He reached freedom here two years to the day after he was shot down and fell into Communist hands in North Korea...Held back from the Korean war prisoner exchange, he was released by the Peiping [sic] regime following a period of negotiations through diplomatic channels... Wing Comdr. Donald Skene, his brother-in-law who was sent here from Canada to meet him, said guardedly at a press conference later that an undisclosed number of United States airmen had been in the same camp with Squadron Leader MacKenzie...Wing Commander Skene said none of the Americans in the camp was on the list of eleven whose sentencing was announced by the Chinese November 23 [,1954].[11]

Despite some political inconvenience to the Department of Defense, the government felt that the issue and controversy had been controlled. a concluding report, "Recovery of Unrepatriated Prisoners of War," stated:

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[9] Report, classified Confidential, prepared by Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, Study Group III, titled "Recovery of Unrepatriated Prisoners of War," a document presented by the Office of Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense, written by James J. Kelleher, Report No. CPOW/3 D-1, June 8, 1955.

[10] ibid

[11] "Fredd Flier Says Peiping Is Holding More U.S. Airmen, Canadian Now in Hong Kong Brings News of Americans Other Than 11 Jailed," The New York Times, December 6, 1954.

Such as they are, our current efforts in the political field, plus the 'stand by' alternatives developed by the military, represent the full range of possible additional efforts to recover personnel now in custody of foreign powers. On one hand, we are bound at present by the President's 'peaceful means' decree. The military courses of action apparently cannot be taken unilaterally, and we are possessed of some rather 'reluctant' allies in this respect. The problem becomes a philosophical one. If we are "at war," cold, hot or otherwise, casualties and losses must be expected and perhaps we must learn to live with this type of thing. If we are in for fifty years of peripheral 'fire fights' we may be forced to adopt a rather cynical attitude on this for political course of action something like General Erskine outlined which would (1) instill in the soldier a much more effective 'don't get captured' attitude, and (2) we should also push to get the military commander more discretionary authority to retaliate, fast and hard against these Communist tactics.[12]

Reports of the fate of these Americans continued to come to the attention of the United States government. One such report, a Foreign Service Dispatch (cable) by Air Pouch dated March 23, 1954, sent from the U.S. diplomatic post in Hong Kong to the State Department in Washington, sheds some light on the fate of hundreds of U.S. POWs captured during the Korean War. The report reads:

American POWs reported en route to Siberia.

A recently arrived Greek refugee from Manchuria has reported seeing several hundred American prisoners of war being transferred from Chinese trains to Russian trains at Manchouli near the border of Manchuria and Siberia. The POWs were seen late in 1951 and in the spring of 1952 by the informant and a Russian friend of his. The informant was interrogated on two occasions by the Assistant Air Liaison Officer and the Consulate General agrees with his evaluation of the source as unknown reliability. The full text of the initial Air Liaison Office report follows:

First report dated March 16, 1954, from Air Liaison Office, Hong Kong, to USAF, Washington, G2.

"This office has interviewed refugee source who states that he has observed hundreds of prisoners of war in American uniforms being sent into Siberia in late 1951 and in the spring of 1952. Observations were made at Manchouli (Lupin), 49 degrees 30' Manchuria Road Map, AMSL 201 First Edition, on USSR - Manchurian border. Source observed POWs on railway station platform loading into trains for movement into Siberia. In railway restaurant source closely observed three POWs who were under guard and conversing in English. POWs wore sleeve insignia which indicates POWs were Air Force noncommissioned officers. Source states that there were a great number of Negroes among POW shipments and also states that at no time later were any POWs observed returning from Siberia. Source does not wish to be identified for fear of reprisals against friends in Manchuria, however is willing to cooperate in answering further questions and will be available

-------
[12] Report, classified Confidential, prepared by the Defense Advisory Committee of Prisoners of War, Study Group III, "Recovery of Unrepatriated Prisoners of War," a document presented by the Office of Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense, written by James J. Kelleher, Report No. CPOW/3 D-1, June 8, 1955.

Hong Kong for questioning for the next four days."

Upon receipt of this information, USAF,Washington, requested elaboration of the following points:

1. Description of uniforms or clothing worn by POWs including ornaments. 2. Physical condition of POWs.
3. Nationality of guards.
4. Specific dates of observations.
5. Destination in Siberia.
6. Presence of Russians in uniform or civilian clothing accompanying movement of POWs.
7. Complete description of three POWs specifically mentioned.

The Air Liaison Office complied by submitting the telegram quoted below.

"FROM USAIRLO SGN LACKEY. CITE C4. REUR 53737 following answers submitted to seven questions.

(1) POWs wore OD outer clothing described as not heavy inasmuch as weather considered early spring. Source identified from pictures service jacket, field, M1943. no belongings except canteen. No ornaments observed.

(2) Condition appeared good, no wounded all ambulatory.

(3) Station divided into two sections with tracks on each side of loading platform. On Chinese side POWs accompanied by Chinese guards. POWs passed through gate bisecting platform to Russian train manned and operated by Russians. Russian trainmen wore dark blue or black tunic with silver colored shoulder boards. Source says this regular train uniform but he knows the trainmen are military wearing regular train uniforms.

(4) Interrogation with aid of more fluent interpreter reveals source first observed POWs in railroad station in spring 1951. Second observation was outside city of Manchouli about three months later with POW train headed towards station where he observed POW transfer. Source was impressed with second observation because of large numbers of Negroes among POWs. Source states job was numbering railroad cars at Manchouli every time subsequent POW shipments passed through Manchouli. Source says these shipments were reported often and occurred when United Nations forces in Korea were on the offensive.

(5) Unknown

(6) Only Russian accompanying POWs were those who manned train.

(7) Three POWs observed in station restaurant appeared to be 30 or 35. Source identified Air Force non-commissioned officer sleeve insignia of Staff Sergeant rank, stated that several inches above insignia there was a propeller but says that all three did not have propeller. Three POWs accompanied by Chinese guard. POWs appeared thin but in good health and spirits, were given what source described as good food. POWs were talking in English but did not converse with guard. Further information as to number of POWs observed source states that

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