1. PURPOSE: I hereby, request to resign my position as the Chief of
the Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action. (POW/MIA)
2. BACKGROUND
a. Motivation. My initial acceptance of this posting was based upon
two primary motives: first, I had heard that the job was highly
contentious and extremely frustrating, that no one would volunteer for
it because of its complex political nature. This, of course, made it
appear challenging. Secondly, since the end of the Vietnam War, I had
heard the persistent rumors of American Servicemen having been
abandoned in Indochina, and that the Government was conducting a
"cover-up" so as not to be embarrassed. I was curious about this and
thought that serving as the Chief of POW-MIA would be an opportunity to
satisfy my own interest and help clear the Government's name.
b. The Office's reputation. It was interesting that previous exposure
to the POW-MIA Office, while assigned to the DIA, both as a Deputy
Director for Intelligence (DDI) and as the Chief Of the Asia Division
for Current Intelligence (JSI-3) was negative. DIA personnel who worked
for me, when dealing with or mentioning the office, always spoke about
it in deprecating tones, alluding to the fact that any report which
found its way there would quickly disappear into a "black hole."
c. General Attitudes. Additionally, surveys of active duty military
personnel indicated that a high percentage (83%) believed that there
were still live American prisoners in Vietnam. This idea was further
promulgated in a number of legitimate veterans' periodicals and
professional journals, as well as the media in general, which held that
where there was so much smoke there must be fire.
d. Cover up. The dark side of the issue was particularly unsettling
because of the persistent rumors and innuendoes of a Government
conspiracy, alleging that U.S. military personnel had been left behind
to the victorious communist governments in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia,
and that for "political reasons" or running the risk of a second Vietnam
War, their existence was officially denied. Worse yet was the
implication that DIA's Special Office for POWs and MIAs was an integral
part of this effort to cover the entire affair up so as not to embarrass
the Government nor the Defense Establishment.
e. The Crusade. As a Vietnam veteran with a certain amount of
experience in Indochina, I was interested in the entire POW-MIA
question, and willingly volunteered for the job, viewing it as a sort of
holy crusade.
3. CURRENT IMPRESSIONS, BASED ON MY EXPERIENCE
a. Highest National Priority. That National leaders continue to
address the prisoner of war and missing in action issue as the "highest
national priority" is a travesty. From my vantage point, I observed
that the principal government players were interested primarily in
conducting a "damage limitation exercise" and appeared to knowingly and
deliberately generate an endless succession of manufactured crises and
"busy work". Progress consisted in frenetic activity, with little
substance and no real results.
b. The Mindset to Debunk. The mindset to "debunk" is alive and well.
It is held at all levels, and continues to pervade the POW-MIA Office,
which is not necessarily the fault of the DIA. Practically all analysis
is directed to finding fault with the source. Rarely has there been any
effective, active follow through on any of the sightings, nor is there a
responsive "action arm" to routinely and aggressively pursue leads. The
latter was a moot point, anyway, since the Office was continuously
buried in an avalanche of "ad hoc" taskings from every quarter, all of
which required an immediate response. It was impossible to plan ahead
or prioritize courses of action. Any real effort to pursue live
sighting reports or exercise initiative was diminished by the plethora
of "busy work" projects directed by higher authority outside DIA. A
number of these grandiose endeavors bordered on the ridiculous--quite
significantly--there was never an audit trail. None of these taskings
was ever requested formally. There was, and still is, a refusal by any
of the players to follow normal intelligence channels in dealing with
the POW/MIA office.
c. Duty, Honor, Integrity. It appears that the entire issue is being
manipulated by unscrupulous people in the Government, or associated with
the Government. Some are using the issue for personal or political
advantage and others use if as a forum to perform and feel important, or
worse. The sad fact, however, is that this issue is being controlled
and a cover up may be in progress. The entire charade does not appear
to be an honest effort and may never have been.
e. The DIA Involvement. DIA's role in the affair is truly unfortunate.
The overall Agency, has generally practiced a "damage limitation drill"
on the issue, as well. The POW/MIA Office has been cloistered for all
practical purposes and left to its own fortunes. The POW office is the
lowest level in the Government "effort" to resolve the issue, and oddly
for an intelligence organization, has become the "lighting rod" for the
entire establishment on the matter. The policy people manipulating the
affair have maintained their distance and remained hidden in the
shadows, while using the Office as "toxic waste dump" to bury the whole
"mess" out of sight and mind in a facility with limited access to
public scrutiny. Whatever happens in the issue, DIA takes the blame,
while the real players remain invisible. The fact that the POW/MIA
Office is always the center of an investigation is of no surprise.
Many people suspect that something is rotten about the whole thing, but
cannot find an audit trail to ascribe blame, so they attack the
DIA/POW/MIA "dump", simply because it has been placed in the line of
fire as a cheap, expendable decoy.
f. "Suppressio Veri Suggesto Falsi". Many of the puppet masters play a
confusing murky role. For instance, the Director of the National League
of Families occupies an interesting and questionable position in the
whole process. Although assiduously "churning" the account to give a
tawdry illusion of progress, she is adamantly opposed to any initiative
to actually get to the heart of the problem, and, more importantly,
interferes in or actively sabotages POW-MIA analyses or investigations.
She insists on rewriting or editing all significant documents produced
by the Office, inserting her own twist or meaning to what was originally
prepared. This is then touted as the DIA position. She apparently has
access to top secret, codeword message traffic, for which she is
supposedly not cleared, and she receives it well ahead of the DIA
intelligence analysts. Her influence in "jerking around" everyone and
everything involved in the issue goes far beyond the "war and MIA
protester gone straight" scenario. She was brought from the "outside"
into the center of the imbroglio, and then, cloaked in a mantel of
sanctimony, routinely impedes real progress and insidiously "muddles up"
the issue. One wonders who she really is and where she came from. . .
a. The Stalled Crusade. Unfortunately, what began on such a high note
never succeeded in embarking. In some respects, however, I have managed
to satisfy some of my curiosity.
b. Everyone is Expendable. I have seen firsthand how ready and willing
the policy people are to sacrifice or "abandon" anyone who might be
perceived as a political liability. It is quick and facile, and can be
easily covered.
c. High-Level Knavery. I feel strongly that this issue is being
manipulated and controlled at a higher level, not with the goal of
resolving it, but more to obfuscate the question of live prisoners, and
give the illusion of progress through hyperactivity.
d. "Smoke and Mirrors". From what I have witnessed, it appears that
any soldier left in Vietnam, even inadvertently, was, in fact, abandoned
years ago, and that the farce that is being played is no more than
political legerdemain done with "smoke and mirrors", to stall the issue
until it dies a natural death.
e. National League of Families. I am convinced that the Director of
this organization is much more than meets the eye. As the principal
actor in the grand show, she is in the perfect position to clamor for
"progress", while really intentionally impeding the effort. And, there
are numerous examples of this. Otherwise, it is inconceivable that so
many bureaucrats in the "system" would instantaneously do her bidding
and humor her every whim.
f. DIA's Dilemma. Although greatly saddened by the role ascribed to
the Defense Intelligence Agency, I feel, at least, that I am dealing
with honest men and women who are generally powerless to make the system
work. My appeal and attempt to amend this role perhaps never had a
chance. We, all, were subject to control. I particularly salute the
personnel in the POW-MIA Office for their long suffering, which I
regrettable was unable to change. I feel that the Agency and the Office
are being used as the "fall guys" or "patsies" to cover the tricks of
others.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS
a. One Final Vietnam Casualty. So ends the war and my last grand
crusade, like it did actually did end, I guess. However, as they say in
the Legion, "je ne regrette rein..." For all of the above, I
respectfully request to be relieved of my duties as Chief of the Special
Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action.
b. A Farewell to Arms. So as to avoid the annoyance of being shipped
off to some remote corner, out of sight and out of the way, in my own
"bamboo cage" of silence somewhere, I further request that the Defense
Intelligence Agency, which I have attempted to serve loyally and with
honor, assist me in being retired immediately from active military
service.
Signed Millard A. Peck
E P I L O G U E
Date: 12-Feb-1991 memorandum
ATTENTION : POW/MIA U-0173/POW/MIA
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR RELIEF
TO: DR
[ E P I L O G U E ]
f. The Harsh Reality. Heading up the Office has not been pleasant. My
plan was to be totally honest and forthcoming on the entire issue and
aggressively pursue innovative actions and concepts to clear up the live
sighting business, thereby refurbishing the image and honor of the DIA.
I became painfully aware, however, that I was not really in charge of my
own office, but was merely a figurehead or whipping boy for a larger and
totally Machiavellian group of players outside of DIA. What I witnessed
during my tenure as the cardboard cut-out "Chief" of the POW/MIA could
be euphemistically labeled as disillusioning.
[ E P I L O G U E ]
d. POW/MIA Officers Abandoned. When I assessed the office for the
first time, I was somewhat amazed and greatly disturbed by the fact that
I was the only military officer in an organization of more than 40
people. Since combatants of all Services were lost in Vietnam, I would
have thought there would at least be a token service representation for
a matter of the "highest National priority". Since the normal mix of
officers from all services is not found in my organization it would
appear that the issue, at least at the working level, has, in fact, been
abandoned. Also, the horror stories of the succession of military
officers at the 0-5 and 0-6 level who have in some manner "rocked the
boat" and quickly come to grief at the hands of the Government policy
makers who direct the issue, lead one to the conclusion that we are all
quite expendable, so by extrapolation one simply concludes that these
same bureaucrats would "sacrifice" anyone who was troublesome or
contentious -- including prisoners of war and missing in action. Not a
comforting thought. Any military officer expected to survive in this
environment would have to be myopic, an accomplished sycophant, or
totally insouciant.
[ E P I L O G U E ]
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Colonel, Infantry USA