31 March 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William H. Sullivan

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Subject: Rallier Report on Vietnamese Communist Treatment of U.S. Prisoners

1. Attached for your information is the intelligence report on the Vietnamese Communists' handling of US prisoners that I mentioned at the 27 March meeting of the NSC's Vietnam Sub-committee. As indicated during our discussion, we are giving this report very limited distribution because of the sensitivity of the topic and our reservations about the detailed extent of the source's knowledge and the accuracy of his claims.

2. In the field dissemination is being limited to senior officials in Saigon, Paris and at CINCPAC. In Washington, the Director is sending copies to Dr. Kissinger (for the President), Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird and General Wheeler. Because a the potential internal security aspects raised if the report is accurate, Mr. Helms is also sending a copy to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director Of the FBI.

I am sending copiers to you and to our colleagues on the Vietnam Committee as indicated below.

/s/

George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment CS 317/090141/70

cc: Mr. Doolin

Admiral Epes

Mr. Matthews

[name unreadable]

CS 317/090l4/70

27 March 1970

MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: Exploitation of Families, Friends and Relatives of American Prisoners of War in North Vietnam

FIELD COMMENT: This report is the result of a debriefing by an experienced American Interrogator at the National Interrogation Center of Dang Tan, who rallied on 26 September 1969. Tan was born on 15 April 1929 in Quang Ngai province. South Vietnam (SRV). He joined the Viet Minh in April 1945 and served in various command and military and political staff positions until late 1952. He joined the Lao Dong Party in 1948. After attending a medical technicians course in North Vietnam from early 1953 until late 1954 he held various medical positions. From 1956 until October 1965 he served first as chief of the plans section of the Public Health Service of the General Department of Railroads, Ministry of Communications and Transportation. From 1956 until late 1961 he also took an extension course at the University of Hanoi Medical School and received an MD degree. From October 1965 until mid-1967, Tan received extensive training in various specialized medical fields in preparation for assignment in SVN. He infiltrated into SVN in September 1967 and served until September, 1969 as chief of the Viet Cong Gia Lai province (the GVN's Pleiku province) dispensary. His highest Party position in SVN was that of member of the Current Affairs Committee on the Party Executive Committee of Gia Lai province. Independent investigation has confirmed that Tan is a medical doctor who held the positions he claims to have held. He has been a prolific reporter for the past several months. he is believed to be reporting accurately what he has seen and heard and his information is considered generally valid. He acquired the information in this report from various official Party briefings, for lectures given by senior cadres of the Central Committee's Propaganda and Education Departments from a

number of courses which he attended as a medium-level Party and senior-level administration cadre, from material gleaned as a student of the Nguyan Ai Quoc correspondence course,* briefings given prior to his infiltration into SVN and form personal discussion with officials and medical personnel for various ministries and agencies in North Vietnam. Because Tan wa a member of neither the Ministry of National Defense nor the Ministry of Public Security, his general knowledge of the subject matter was acquired from various second-hand and documentary sources, and many specifics, details and nuances are unknown to him.

SUMMARY: In addition to exploiting prisoners of war (POW 's) for the intelligence information in their possession, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) has also undertaken a program to exploit the families, friends and relatives of the American POW's. These individuals in U.S. are being exploited under this program both to collect intelligence information and to persuade them to undertake anti-war activities in order to apply pressure upon the U.S. Government to end the war in South Vietnam. The DRV considers that approximately 80 percent of the American POW's can be categorized as "progressive" because of their willingness to cooperate with the DRV in making use of a certain number of POWs for the program described.

1. American prisoners of war (POW's) are being exploited by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) for the collection of intelligence on the U.S. This is being done not only through direct interrogations of the POW's but also through relatives, families and friends whom the DRV attempts to induce to undertake activities in the U.S. which will bring the war to an and in South Vietnam (SVN). Friendly socialist countries assist the DRV in this exploitation because of the support facilities which these countries have and because a number of the people from these countries have been been able to establish better rapport with the American POW's than have the North Vietnamese.

* Nguyen Ai Quoc ("Nguyen the Patriot") was the pen name and principal Party pseudonym used from about 1916 until 1942 by the founder of the Vietnamese Communist Party who, in 1942, adopted the name of Ho Chi Minh. The course referred to is a course for senior Party cadre.

2. To meet its objective, the DRV separates American POW's into the following three categories for exploitation:

a: Those who are considered special or important POW's by virtue of the importance of the information which they have provided or because of the potential which they offer to NVN at some future date.

b. Hard-core POW's who, because or in spite of heir refusal to cooperate or provide information, are considered to have the same potential as POW's in the paragraph 2a category.

c. Non-important or "progressive" POW's whose continued presence in NVN after trough debriefing, will bring little or no further advantages to NVN and who, therefore, can be released whenever it best serves the DRV's purposes.

3. Only the "progressive" POW's can be exploited for purposes of collection intelligence information through their contacts in the U.S. or by persuading these contacts to engage in anti-war activities. Prisoners of the other two categories cannot be exploited for this purpose because it could lead to the surfacing of their identities. The identities of POWs in the first category are carefully guarded because identifying them as POW's rather than as missing or killed in action would permit the enemy to employ countermeasures to negate the value of the information which they are providing. Similarly, the identities of hard-core POW's are kept secret because they may not survive the application of interrogation and other techniques to make them cooperate.

4. "Progressive" POW's are those prisoners who have voluntarily turned over material in their possession upon capture; who have provided all the information available to them including information about themselves and all their friends, relatives, and families; and who have been successfully indoctrinated into "a state of full consciousness of the reality san atrocities of war and its effect upon North Vietnam." These POW's are given ever increasing privileges depending on the extent of their utility. Not every "progressive" POW is suitable for exploitation, however. Some have few or no useful contacts in the U.S., and some cannot be used because of their intellectual limitations, some are overly concerned with the well-being of their families and the negative effect their actions will have, and others will refuse to engage in such activities even though they have

otherwise cooperated with the DRV. American officers, particularly [unreadable] are considered to have great potential because of their class origin, their intellectual capabilities, and their influential contacts in social, military, political and technological circles.

5. The following principles underlie the exploitation of the POW's families, friends, and relatives:

a. The POW must know individuals in the U.S.. who, in his estimation, will cooperate in one form or another.

b. The POW must be able, understand the guidance of his handlers to establish contact with the person(s).

c. "Cover content'' letters must be devised which will convoy to the recipient in the U.S. that the writer is a POW in NVN, without specifically stating this, and yet will not jeopardize the personal security of the recipient. According to Tan, the DRV assumes that all mail in the U.S. is subject to censorship, particularly that received by individuals who know POW's.

d. The DRV must be able to mail letters from American POW's to contacts in the U. S. from a country from which it would be logical for the recipient to receive such a letter so that the recipient will not become an object of suspicion to the U.S. Government. The DRV depends, in large part, upon its friendly socialist allies for support in mailing letters to the U.S.

e. There must be a logical address to which the individual in the U. S. can write a reply to the American POW in NVN, again without attracting attention to himself. Preferably the POW should know someone in a third country to whom the individual can write or to whom his letters can be delivered.

f. There must be secure and reliable intermediaries to receive letters form individuals in third countries for passage to NVN.

g. Before attempting any exploitation of the contact in the U.S. the exchange of letters between the American POW and his contact must be prolonged enough to permit a bond to

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be established between them which would induce the individual in the U.S. to continue the correspondence because of the value of these letters to him.

h. Various inducements are used to solidify the bond between the POW and his contact in the U.S. With immediate members of the family, this pressure usually takes the form of promises of photographs and tape recordings from the POW, and also can include holding out the hope of being able to meet with the POW.

i. Playing upon the characteristics and weaknesses of his contact in the U.S., the American POW must then be able to begin applying pressure upon his contact. The most common form of pressure is that designed to convince the contact that the POW's survival in NVN depends [unreadable] "upon the behavior of the individual in the U.S., upon receipt of the letter; upon this individual's response to the POW's request, which are not demanding initially' upon acceptance of the POW's statements about the horrors and atrocities of the war; and upon the individual's cooperation in engaging in the activities requested by the POW. Every aspect of American sentimentality is exploited.

6. The exploitation begins in low key. Even a relatively noncommittal reply to the POW's first letter is considered evidence of future cooperation inasmuch as the DRV views the exchange as clandestine act in which the individual has engaged without the knowledge or authorization of the U.S. Government. While the acquisition of scientific technical and military information is of primary interest, the DRV likewise attempts or persuade each individual to provide information on the "political struggle" taking place in the U.S., and to encourage him to participate in this struggle, to speak against the war to his friends and contacts, to engage in anti-war activities, and to provide information on the shipment of materials or to impede its shipment to SVN.

7. Tan does not know the details of the exploitation of individuals in the U.S. However, he has heard that the embassies and other organizations of the socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union and Cuba, have been of great assistance. In those cases where individuals in the U.S. can or do logically receive letters for abroad, letters form American POW's are mailed from various capitalistic countries by members of the local Communist Party. Tan has also heard that families and relatives of American POW's are not concerned with monetary considerations in

attempting to assist the POW's or in attempting to establish contact with them indirectly.

8. In writing his letters, the American POW is placed under sufficient pressure to compel him to devise the most appropriate ways in which to induce his friends or relatives in the U. S. to assist him. This in turn places considerable pressure upon the individual in the U.S., particularly wives and other very close relatives, to assist the POW in any way possible. Inducements such as the receipt of letters and photographs from his loved ones are also used to persuade the POW to engage in letter writing. However, negative inducements such as the withdrawal of those privileges, which reportedly are so important to the American POW's are most commonly used. Another inducement is the surfacing of the POW's name to the world. This is usually accomplished by permitting journalists of visiting delegations to interview and photograph the progressive POW's. The surfacing of these POW's also serves an important political purpose for NVN, which is extremely sensitive to world opinion, since it "proves" that NVN is no mistreating its POW's. By mid - 1967 the name of over 100 American POW's had been made known to foreign journalists or delegations.

9. In official briefings and lectures which he attended prior to his departure for SVN in mid 1967, Tan heard that up to 80 percent of the American POW's were considered to be "progressive." No figures were mentioned, however, which would indicate what portion of the "progressive" POW's might be used for letter writing activities. It was also mentioned that American POW's are psychologically prepared for the eventuality of capture. This conclusion was based on information collected on and from the POW's which ranged from the absence of any ideological motivation to fight in SVN to such minor indicators as the Vietnamese phrases which the POW's have learned in anticipation of capture; phrases such as "I am hungry," "I want water," "I'm wounded." As a result, the DRV has concluded that, because of majority of Americans are in SVN only because they are obeying orders rather than because they believe in a cause, most POW's are psychologically prepared to cooperate fully with the enemy once captured. Tan's personal observations and conclusions are that the official DRV position is relatively accurate with respect to the American POW's lack of ideological motivation; his general forthrightness and honesty which makes him susceptible to exploitation; his basic sentimentality' his previous lack of exposure to hardships which is easily exploited by instituting a severe discipline; his poor political comprehension of the world situation and of the enemy; and his revulsion at the atrocities which have been committed against the North Vietnamese. This, combined

with an effective indoctrination program and the proper psychological approach by the interrogator, reportedly makes the American POW and easy victim for exploitation by the Party in NVN.

10. Tan does not known whether the letter writing program has succeeded in collecting intelligence information for individuals in the U.S. He does not believe, however that the DRV would engage in the program were it not yielding results or if tit did not have potential for yielding results. It was mentioned officially during the briefing and lectures that the prevalence of anti-war attitudes in the U.S. can be attributed in part to the letter writing activities of the American POW's. Aside from the significant contribution which American POW's have reportedly made to the DRV's understanding of American combat techniques, thereby aiding the North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong in SVN, the American POW's have also made a significant contribution to the DRV's comprehension of the American psychology and ideology. This has permitted the DRV to mount a more effective psychological warfare approach against the U.S. in the attempt to persuaded the American people to demand an end to the war.

11. The exploitation of American POW's is the responsibility of both the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and close coordination exists between them in implementing this program. Since the POW's ultimately will be [word unreadable] because of this exploitation, they will sooner or later come under the jurisdiction of the MPS. Moreover, because the MPS has a larger security network abroad and it is tasked with responsibilities related to the sturdy of constitutions, laws, and regulations of foreign countries, the MPS is the major action element in this exploitation program. In implementing the program through third countries, the MPS must coordinate with the MND to determine what affect it might have on broader MND objectives in these countries. Consideration is given to the possible compromise of assets or channels of communications in these third countries and the possible unfavorable repercussion to the DRV if and when the POW's letter writing attempts are compromised to the U.S. Government.

12. After his arrival in SVN Tan learned that American deserters who have taken refuge in Sweden and are known to various American POW's in NVN are being exploited as intermediaries between the POW's and their contacts in the U.S. This is reportedly possible because of the willingness of American deserters in Sweden to proselytes others. According to Tan, dependents of American POWs' who have traveled abroad to effect contact

with DRV representations are doing so, in large part, as a result of the MPS and the MND letter writing program. Reportedly despite the alleged lack of satisfaction which is derived from such contacts and which is overtly manifested by the relative, the relatives do indeed covertly receive letter, tapes and photographs form the American POW's trough those DRV representatives. In passing such times to the dependents, the DRV representatives exert pressure on these individuals in an attempt to achieve the objectives of the program. Physical contact between the American POW's and their dependents or relatives [word unreadable] not excluded and represents the ultimate in the privileges which are accorded in return for their and their contacts cooperation. While this is not engaged in except under exceptional circumstances, such contact reportedly takes place in Cuba and a number of other socialist bloc countries.

13. Field Comment: Because he did not learn the information contained in paragraph 12 from any official briefings or lectures, Tan says he cannot evaluate the reliability of this information. He points out, however that none of the foregoing points are inconsistent in his estimation, with information he had learned earlier in NVN. Tan's sources for the paragraph 12 information include Senior Colonel Ha, chief of the Military Region 59 Rear Services Element who concurrently holds a position in the Gia Lai province Party committee having responsibility for all military matters and operations of the province unit: Nam Vinh and Dang, both member of the MR-5 Party committee who were assigned to the Gia Lai province Party committee; Doctor Mang, formerly a member of the MR-5 medical staff and later assigned to Tan's medical staff in Gia Lai province; and agricultural engineer cadre -- name no longer recalled -- who had studied in the USSR; Miss Sau, a senior pharmacist on Tan's medical staff in Gia Lai province; from Phuoc; a cadre of the Gia Lai province propaganda and indoctrination section; and from other lesser personalities both from MR-5 and from the Gia Lai province Party committee. According to Tan, cadres assigned to MR-5 are in frequent contact with senior members of various departments and commissions of the Central Committee in NVN, also with members and alternate members of the Central Committee itself, in as much as MR-5 is a transit point through which cadres from NVN are infiltrated to both the Central office for South Vietnam (COSVN) and to other military regions of SVN and through which cadres from various areas of SVN return to NVN. #Military Region 5 covers I Corps and most of II Corps.