10 May 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Planned Surfacing in Saigon of NVA Rallier Knowledgeable of North Vietnamese Prisoner handling Policies

1. Attached for your information is a cable from our Station in Saigon, sent to Washington and Paris, outlining the proposed scenario for the surfacing to the press of a North Vietnamese Army doctor who rallied in October 1969 and who has demonstrated himself knowledgeable of North Vietnamese policies with respect to the handling of US prisoners of war.

2. According to the present script, the doctor -- Dang Tan is to be presented at a Saigon press conference at 0900 on Tuesday, 11 May (2100 Monday, 10 May, Washington time) under the auspices of the South Vietnamese Central Intelligence Organization (CIO). The details of his surfacing and the handling thereof have been developed in Saigon jointly with MACV, the Embassy, JUSPAO and, of course, the CIO. Ambassador Berger has reviewed the proposed surfacing statement and raised no objections. The project was to be discussed with Ambassador Bunker on 10 May, Saigon time, i.e., Sunday 9 May, Washington time.

3. Although this project has been thoroughly and extensively coordinated in the field and either the Ambassador or MACV may have

raised it through their respective channels to Washington, I am forwarding this memorandum to be certain that the surfacing of Dr. Tan does not catch you or any of this memorandum's other recipients by surprise.

/s/

Dick

Richard Helms

Director

Attachment SAIGON 30300

cc; Secretary Rogers

Secretary Laird

Admiral Moorer Deputy

Assistant Secretary Sullivan

The following is the text of CAS Saigon Message 30300, dated 8 May 1971.

1. The GVN Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) has arranged to surface Dr. Dang Tan at a press conference 11 May 1971 0900 local at GVN press center. Scenario and formal statement (for handout and to be read by Dr. Tan prior question-answer session) now being polished by the CIO will include the following topics:

A. Outline of Dr. Tan bio data, his Viet Minh, Viet Cong and Lao Dong Party activity 45-69, and reasons for rallying.

B. NVN long time subversion/aggression Laos Cambodia as in integral facet its aggression in SVN.

C. Communist subversion of SVN political parties, student groups, labor unions and other mass organizations based on his knowledge NVN plans to eventually surface "Peoples Democratic Peace Front" (PDPF). (Comment: Parallel between what he describes as PDPF and the current rash of overt "struggle for right to live" groups now active in SVN should be readily apparent to press.)

D. His personal acquaintance with many ranking NVN personalities, particularly Vice Minister of Public Security, Pham Kiet and Vice Minister of national Defense, Nguyen Don.

E. NVN treatment and political exploitation of American POW'S.

2. In order that wire services can have sufficient time to interview in depth and prepare worthwhile detailed stories, Dr. Tan is being made available (via JUSPAO) 7 May for private interviews by Saigon A.P., UPI, AFP and Reuters Reps with explicit agreement no repeat no copy filed until press conference held. Further, Dr. Tan instructed to make no comment, answer no questions re American POW issue at 7 May preliminary interview

3. Believe at press conference much interest will focus on his knowledge and comments re American POW'S. For this reason, wish detail for Paris following statement which he intends to make on this topic (all information included this statement- previously reported in TDCS-314/00146-70, CS-317/09031-70, CS-317/09014-70, CS-311/08693-70, and CS-311/08702-70.)

in greater detail later. My knowledge about American POW's is derived not only form numerous official briefings given by senior cadres of the propaganda and training commission of the Central Committee; but also from discussions with various officials and individuals who were directly and indirectly involved in the exploitation of American POW's.

4. Subsequent question period expected establish more clearly Dr. Tan's reasonable access to this type of information, albeit, not direct first-hand knowledge on his part.

5. We have provided Paragraph 3 statement in some detail to permit Headquarters to alert the Department of Defense to likelihood of press inquiries following 11 May, surfacing. Station will similarly alert Embassy, MACV and JPRC.

6. FYI, following spontaneous news story appeared inner pages "Chinh Luan" newspaper 20 March source to "Tin Viet" News Service (apparently went unnoticed by Foreign Press): "VC rallier talks about American prisoners of War"

- "Saigon: 20 March: A rallier just disclosed that American prisoners of war captured by the VC in South Vietnam are only held there for a period of six months, then must be sent to North Vietnam, by order of North Vietnam.

"Rallier (Dr. Tan) a doctor in charge of a VC civil health dispensary who recently returned to the Government, said that according to a directive from the Central Committee of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, only in cases such as a lack of route security or a prisoner being necessary for the exploitation of local information will he be held in South Vietnam over six months.

"Rallier also disclosed that Communist countries allied with North Vietnam such an Russia and Cuba can participate in the task of interrogating the American prisoners because of a treaty signed with North Vietnam. Russia. and China cannot only interrogate and frequently visit, with the American prisoners, but can also borrow a number of them to bring them back to their countries for exploitation. These prisoners, belonging to the classes with broad knowledge and understanding, can provide information relating to the international situation between the United States and Russia and Cuba."

"... The next topic deals with the prisoners of war who are being detained in North Vietnam. This is a tragic aspect of this unending war. Human beings - American, POW's held in North Vietnam - are being treated as commodities. According to the policies of the Central Committee, the Lao Dong Party intends to use these American 's as hostages in bargaining to achieve its political objectives. Illustrative of this is, the statement made by Hanoi's representatives in Paris that NVN now holds only 367 American POW's in captivity. Ladies and Gentlemen, this is untrue. I know that already by mid-1967, when I departed NVN, over 800 American POW's were then in captivity in NVN. The politburo policies require them these Americans be exploited, intensively as possible, and both the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Public Security have been charged with this responsibility. The Politburo considers each American POW to be an extremely valuable source of information. Not only does the Ministry of National Defense exploit each American POW particularly the highly knowledgeable pilots, for tactical and strategic information, but the MPS exploits these American POW's for long-range purposes. This includes trying to take advantage of families, and friends of those POW's in the USA. Moreover, NVN in violation of the laws and regulations which apply POW's has permitted other Communist bloc countries to exploit these American POW's including Communist China, the USSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia and other countries.

When will these American POWs be released? It is possible that some may never be released, as they are too valuable to as sources of information an for the technical skills they possess. I already mentioned that NVN never released all the French POW's in 1954. Why does Hanoi refuse to identify all the American POW's it holds? Because some are no longer alive after the attempts to gain their cooperation, while others may not live through the treatment to which they are being subjected, also because some of the American 's have been taken to other Communist countries. According to Politburo policies, all types of methods are employed to extract information from the POW's. This goes beyond the normal brainwashing and political indoctrination and includes the use of different drugs to weaken their will. I know of this because of my medical background and contacts in the medical field. The ruthless interrogation and exploitation of American POW's is inhumane. It is the objectives of the Central Committee policies to win over the minds of the American POW's. As a medical doctor and as a person who is concerned with saving human lives, I am deeply concerned over the fate of all the American POW's in NVN, but most particularly over 500 more who were not named by NVN in Paris. These unnamed American POW's will continue to be exploited by NVN and will serve as the tool for NVN in blackmailing the USA. If you are interested, I can elaborate on this topic

NVA doctor Dang Tan "rallied when his unit was confronted by U.S. forces on September 26, 1969. He was debriefed by an experienced American interrogator at the National Interrogation Center on November 26, 1969.

Tan held medical positions with the railroads department before his 1967 insertion into South Vietnam, where he was chief of the VC -Gia Lai Province dispensary; his highest party position in the South was that of member of the current affairs committee of the Party executive committee of Gia Lai Province.

CIA information reports issued in January and February 1970 state that Tan's "reporting reliability has not been established" and that his knowledge is based on hearsay and "Party briefings and discussions." Those CIA reports are focused American POWs.

On March 31, 1970, the CIA's George Carver sent a memo to EAP DAS Sullivan transmitting a detailed report on Tan's comments DRV treatment of U.S. POWs. Carver writes that the CIA in "giving this report very limited distribution because of the sensitivity of the topic and our reservations about the detailed extent of the source's knowledge and the accuracy of his claims." However, the CIA, report itself states that Tan as been a prolific reporter for the past several months He is believed to be reporting accurately what. he has seen and heard and his information is considered generally valid. At the same time, the report notes that Tan's knowledge on POWs "was acquired from, various second-hand and documentary sources, and many specifics, details, and nuances are unknown to him. The report was sent to Kissinger, Rogers, Laird, Wheeler and J. Edgar Hoover.

The CIA issued at least three more information reports in November and December 1970 based on debriefs of Tan; they also focused on POW issues. Those reports described Tan as a "probably reliable reporter"

The key points Tan made were:

- The DRV established an elaborate program to exploit American POWs. To facilitate this, POWs were categorized an (1) "special or important POWs, who have provided, or have the potential to provide important information (2) hard-core POWs who refuse to provide information but are considered to have potential to do so; (3) progressive" POWs who have either cooperated or who do not have useful information, and therefore can be released whenever it is advantageous.

-The DRV kept the identities of POWs in the first two categories secret in case they did not survive efforts to make them cooperate. About 80 percent of POWs were considered "progressive' because of their willingness to cooperate.

-The POW exploitation program was run by the MND and MPS and primarily consisted of POWs sending letters to Americans to collect intelligence and also encourage opposition to the U.S. war effort.

-Tan said he understood that in rare cases some Pows could have physical contact with their relatives as an ultimate reward for cooperating, and that this took place in Cuba and a number of other socialist bloc countries."

-The number and names of American POWs was being kept secret, and the DRV is "deliberately withholding the names of all POWs.

-In September 1969 there were approximately 800 U.S. pilots held as POWs in the North. (Note: DIA says that as of September 30, 1969 there were 1,516 POW/MlAs -- they cannot cannot break it down further -- and 807 KIA/BNR.)

-Tan had not heard of any POWs, American or otherwise, being sent to the USSR or the PRC. - Some American pilots cooperated with air defense planning and these pilots "will be the prisoners which NVN will refuse to return."

- The USSR had an "insatiable" desire for information on U.S. POWs, and the North's "decision to permit the USSR and other Communist countries to have access to U.S. prisoners resulted from Soviet demands for a quid pro quo for the weapons they provided.

- After a several month interval, on May 10, 1971. CIA Director Helms sent a memo to Kissinger describing Tan as having demonstrated himself knowledgeable of North Vietnamese policies with respect to the handling of U.S. POWs, and outlining the proposed scenario for surfacing him to the press."

- Tan had already met with wire service reporters 'on May 7, but was instructed not to comment on U.S. POWs at that time.

- On May 11, Tan was to be surfaced at a major press conference in Saigon. A script for Tan was provided by the CIA station in Saigon, in coordination with the CIO, and was attached to the Helms memo to Kissinger. The key points for Tan to make were:

- Hanoi claims to hold only 367 American POWs, but when Tan left the North in mid 1967 they already held over 800 U.S. POWs;

- Some American POWs have been taken to other Communist countries, and Hanoi has permitted China, the USSR, Cuba, and Czechoslovakia to "exploit" American POWs;

- Hanoi never released all French POWs, and and may never release all American POWs, including some who may not survive the use of drugs for brainwashing;

- The CIA script notes that "subsequent question period expected to establish more clearly Dr. Tan's reasonable access to this type of information, albeit not direct first-hand knowledge on his part."

On May 11, 1971 the NY Times ran a brief AP story reporting that a "high-ranking" defector from North Vietnam foreign military advisors, including former French POWs, were aiding Hanoi. The article -- which notes that there was explanation as to why Saigon did not publicize Tan's defection for more than one year -- makes no mention of American POWs. Presumably this story was based on the private interviews with wire service reporters.

A May 11, 1971 cable from the Department to Saigon indicates that Tan used the CIA script in his press conference, and that the media coverage has "occasioned serious concern among POW/MIA wives and families." The cable, which was approved by DAS Sullivan adds that the Department is "unaware of any independent confirmation of Dr. Tan's comments, and are so advising families, pointing out also that Dr. Tan left North Vietnam over four years ago, defected nearly two years ago, and that he he himself admits much of his information is hearsay." The cable suggests that the Embassy issue a public statement making these points.

Inexplicably, on May 12, 1971 Saigon responded by saying they were "at a loss" to explain the origin of the remarks attributed to Tan in the Department's cable. The embassy claimed that in both his May 7 and May 11 press appearances, Tan never mentioned numbers of American or French POWs nor the use of drugs for brainwashing. (Note: It is possible that the CIA changed Tan's script at the last minute, but copies of the earlier version were leaked to the press.)

On June 15, 1971, the Department continued to downplay the significance of Tan's public statement. In a letter to Rep. Fulbright who wrote to ask about Tan's allegations on French POWs A/S Abshire stated that the Embassy has already noted to the press that Tan's remarks were "based largely on hearsay."