The following timeline of newspaper articles, press releases, Congressional testimonies and other documents explains how and why American POWs were left behind in captivity in Southeast Asia. It also explains why Vietnam and Laos continue to hold American POWs today.

Because the POWs were alive when the war ended and because there is no evidence that they have since died, we can conclude only that they are alive and in captivity today. Does America have enough integrity to bring them home, NOW? If we do not, then we have forfeited that for which they believed they were fighting: America's freedom and dignity. If every resource is not marshaled to bring them home, now, then as a country we will have fallen to the lowest moral standard. As friends of mine have observed, when one American is not worth the effort to be found, we as Americans have lost.

For background regarding POWS in Indochina, this Timeline starts with the following:

January 4, 1965 Newsweek, "Vietnam: Fortune's Scapegoat," p. 24.

"After the fall of Dienbienphu in May 1954, a fresh inscription was chiseled in the gray stone war memorial in the little Breton town of Pleudihen. Lettered in gold, it read: `Yves Le Bray, mort pour la France.' [died for France] And on All Saints Day every year thereafter, someone from the Le Bray family joined in placing a wreath beside the plaque honoring Yves and other heroes of Pleudihen who had died for France.

Last week, however, who should be sipping `vin rouge' in a local cafe but Yves Le Bray-rather the worse for wear, but still alive....

Le Bray's lost decade began... when he was a 21-year-old PFC serving as a radioman with a French artillery battalion near the port of Haiphong, in North Vietnam. Ambushed while on night patrol, Le Bray spent the next six months in a Communist prison camp. And at war's end, instead of being returned to France like most of his fellow prisoners, he was packed off by the North Vietnamese Government to Langson, near the Chinese border, to become a slave laborer....

Having lost all trace of him, French authorities presumed that Le Bray had been killed in action and thus it was that his name was added to the `monument aux morts' back in Pleudihen....

Eventually, more than ten years after his capture, the French Ligation in Hanoi found out about Le Bray, obtained his freedom, and sent him winging homeward aboard an Air France jet."

COMMENT: Following the French defeat in Indochina, the North Vietnamese proclaimed that all the French POWs had been given back to France and that there were no more French POWs in captivity. Le Bray was living proof to the contrary. Today, the Vietnamese say the same thing about American POWs. Rigidly following the Stalinist model, the North Vietnamese did not consider captured French servicemen as POWs, nor do they so consider captured American servicemen as POWs. Rather, the POWs are "war criminals" who in the Stalinist doctrine are stateless individuals. Thus, the North Vietnamese could and do say they have been holding no Frenchmen, Americans, nor any POWs, while at the same time it is precisely what they have been doing.

January 23, 1973 1973 Vietnam Peace Agreement, Chap. VIII, Article 21. (The Agreement was initialed and announced on January 23, 1973 and was signed January 27, 1973.) "The United States anticipates that this agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as with all

the peoples of Indo-China. In pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to post-war reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indo-China."

COMMENT: The Paris Peace Agreement, negotiated by Henry Kissinger and ratified by Congress, committed the United States to rebuilding North Vietnam and all of Indochina. President Nixon, in a secret letter to Vietnam Premier Pham Van Dong (quoted later), affirmed the amount of that reconstruction aid at $3.25 billion, with food and other commodity aid of up to $1.5 billion. In other words, to induce North Vietnam to sign the Agreement the United States promised to "pay up." In a very real sense, the United States tried to buy its way out of the war. The choice of words, "Era of Reconciliation" and "Post-War Reconstruction" were tremendous embellishments given the reality of the situation in Vietnam, and served to falsely build North Vietnams expectations.

The North Vietnamese, having no reason to trust the United States, needed collateral for their own protection regarding the United States' promise to provide aid. That collateral was the POWs. Indeed, as is shown later, the North Vietnamese linked release of the POWs to aid at the very beginning of the Peace Talks. Because of the incredibly intense efforts to rescue downed pilots and other servicemen during the war, the North Vietnamese knew how much the POWs meant and held many of them back as a down payment on the promised aid. In effect, the United States promise to provide aid to Hanoi put a price on the POWs' heads of $4.75 billion. These are the POWs who did not come home during Operation Homecoming.

The North Vietnamese -- not the United States -- provided the list of American POWs to be repatriated from Vietnam. (There was no list for the POWs in Laos.) The United States naively accepted the list knowing full well it was incomplete. Major General Eugene Tighe, USAF, then Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said that according to United States intelligence sources he had fully expected the North Vietnamese list to have 600 more names than were on it. To the United States intelligence community, the list for our POWs in North Vietnam was 600 names short.

January 24, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "U.S., N. Viets to Exchange POW Lists."

..."Kissinger said those held by the Communists will be released in groups at about 15-day intervals throughout the 60 days allotted for repatriation.

`American prisoners held in Laos and North Vietnam will be released to us in Hanoi,' he said. `They will be received by American medical

evacuation teams and flown on American planes to places of our own choice,'..."

COMMENT: According to Henry Kissinger, the release of the POWs held in Laos was the responsibility of the North Vietnamese under the terms of the Paris Peace Agreement. However, not only was the war in Laos still underway, including intense bombing by the United States, but also the Laotians claimed sovereignty over the American POWs there. (This is explained in detail later.) That sovereignty was affirmed by the North Vietnamese. At this stage, though, there were two critically important points in Kissinger's comment: first, his verification of the existence of American POWs in Laos; and, second his confusion over their status.

January 29, 1973 The New York Times, "Communists List 555 POWs."

..."The Defense Department spokesman, Jerry W. Friedheim, said that the Communists' lists were `incomplete' because they did not include American servicemen known to have been captured in Laos. He emphasized that the United States would continue to press the other side for a listing of prisoners held in Laos.... There have been conflicting statements from United States officials on whether North Vietnam was required to turn over a list of American prisoners held in Laos under the agreement or the accompanying protocols."

COMMENT: Not surprisingly, given Kissinger's misunderstanding about the POWs in Laos, even other American officials did not understand the situation.

January 30, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "Reds Fail to List POWs Taken in Laos."

"The North Vietnamese have failed to furnish the United States with a list of American fighting men taken prisoner in Laos, Pentagon officials and an organization of POW families said Sunday....

Some military officers suggested the North Vietnamese might be holding back on this information to deter further U.S. bombing of the North Vietnamese supply trails through Laos. More than 120 American bombers hit Laos and Cambodia after the Vietnam cease-fire....

Pentagon spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim said it is true that no Laos list was provided.

He said the matter is being discussed with the North Vietnamese through diplomatic channels in Paris.

`We do expect to receive a list,' Friedheim said....

Laos is not covered by the Vietnam cease-fire, although Henry A.

Kissinger, the chief U.S. peace negotiator, has said the U.S. government has firm expectations there will be an early halt to the fighting there....

In explaining the agreement with North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, Kissinger told a White House news conference that `American prisoners held in Laos and North Vietnam will be returned to us in Hanoi.'"

COMMENT: The United States complained that the North Vietnamese had not provided a list of POWs held in Laos and reiterated the American perception of the Agreement that those POWs were the responsibility of the Vietnamese. The suggestion by some United States military officers that the POWs were being held back deliberately was most certainly correct, both as a deterrent to further bombing in Laos and as a down payment on promised American aid.

January 31, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "Fate of 56 POWs Is Still a Mystery."

"The Defense Department said Monday 56 American servicemen previously carried by the United States as prisoners of war remain unaccounted for by North Vietnam.

Pentagon spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim said their names `are not on the two lists we have received so far.'

These lists, handed to U.S. officials in Paris Saturday by the North Vietnamese, identified 555 U.S. fighting men held in Communist prison camps in North and South Vietnam as well as the names of 55 POWs the Communists said died in captivity.

In turning over these lists, the Communists also failed to furnish information on Americans taken prisoner in Laos or provide clues to the fate of more than 1,300 Americans still missing in action throughout Southeast Asia....

The State Department said `We firmly expect to have a list of POWs to cover Laos.'

Presumably Washington is pressuring Hanoi for its Laos list, although State Department spokesman Charles Bray declined to specify what diplomatic effort was underway."

COMMENT: The United States not only acknowledged that all of the known POWs in Vietnam had not been accounted for but also reiterated our knowledge of the existence of POWs in Laos. Ultimately, the United States repeated the mistake it made in Korea of accepting the enemy's list of American POWs despite our own intelligence that many more men were being held back. Indeed, as cited by then Major General Eugene Tighe previously, the belief among the intelligence community was that there should have been 600 more men than the 555 identified by the North Vietnamese. The 56 were " hard core" POW cases.

February 1, 1973 Former President Nixon's "Message to Prime Minister Pham Van Dong" (This letter was kept secret during and after the negotiations and was finally declassified and published in The Department of State Bulletin on June 27, 1977, p. 674.)

"The President wishes to inform the Democratic Republic of Vietnam of the principles which will govern United States participation in the postwar reconstruction of North Vietnam....

1) The Government of the United States of America will contribute to postwar reconstruction in North Vietnam without any political conditions.

2) Preliminary United States studies indicate that the appropriate programs for the United States contribution to postwar reconstruction will fall in the range of $3.25 billion of grant aid over five years. Other forms of aid will be agreed upon between the two parties....

3) The United States will propose to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the establishment of a United States-North Vietnamese Joint Economic Commission within 30 days from the date of this message.

4) The function of this Commission will be to develop programs for the United States contribution to reconstruction of North Vietnam. This United States contribution will be based upon such factors as:

(a) The needs of North Vietnam arising from the dislocation of war;

(b) The requirements for postwar reconstruction in the agricultural and industrial sectors of North Vietnam's economy.

5) The Joint Economic Commission will have an equal number of representatives from each side. It will agree upon a mechanism to administer the program which will constitute the United States contribution to the reconstruction of North Vietnam. The Commission will attempt to complete this agreement within 60 days after its establishment.

6) The two members of the Commission will function on the principle of respect for each other's sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit. The offices of the Commission will be located at a place to be agreed upon by the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

7) The United States considers that the implementation of the foregoing principles will promote economic, trade, and other relations between the United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and will contribute to insuring a stable and lasting peace in Indochina. These principles accord with the spirit of Chapter VIII of The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam which was signed in Paris on January 27, 1973....

In regard to other forms of aid, United States studies indicate that the appropriate programs could fall in the range of 1 to 1.5 billion dollars depending on food and other commodity needs of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."

COMMENT: In this communication to Pham Van Dong, President Nixon delineated the United States reconstruction package for North Vietnam at $3.25 billion, with a supplement for food and commodity aid of up to $1.5 billion. Note that the package applied to North Vietnam only. (Laos and Cambodia were not mentioned.) Although per Article VIII, Chapter 21 of the Paris Peace Agreement the United States referred to the rebuilding of North Vietnam in only the most general of terms, in this letter Nixon put $4.75 billion on the table, just for the North Vietnamese. The existence of this commitment was kept secret from Congress and the American people.

No matter how any Westerner interprets it, to the Vietnamese a deal had been made. Holding back POWs became their security for the deal to be consummated. What the North Vietnamese did not anticipate, though, was that Nixon would choose to abandon the POWs instead of providing the aid. (This is explained later.) Also, Principle #7 of the letter was an unequivocal statement to the North Vietnamese that the United States also would pursue normal commercial relations with them in the future. This did not and has not happened.

February 16, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "U.S., Hanoi Tell Plan To Rebuild Vietnam."

"The United States and North Vietnam will create a joint economic commission to oversee rebuilding of the war-torn country with U.S. dollars, the two sides announced Wednesday.

A communique issued by the White House and Hanoi on four days of talks by President Nixon's envoy, Henry A. Kissinger, and North Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi listed no specific figures for U.S. post war aid.

But the language displayed a new cordiality between the two nations."

COMMENT: Note that the details of the aid package, i.e., $4.75 billion, still were kept secret by Nixon and Kissinger and that reference was made only to "rebuilding" North Vietnam with American dollars.

With this narrower public announcement, the United States even more deeply committed itself to providing reconstruction aid to North Vietnam. We had promised aid as part of the Agreement (Article 21), we had fixed that aid at $4.75 billion (secret letter from Nixon to Pham Van Dong), and now we went public with a program to implement aid. The North Vietnamese could not have had a clearer understanding of our intentions.

February 17, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "Laos POW Release Tied to Truce."

"A Communist Pathet Lao spokesman said Saturday his group is holding Americans prisoners of war who will be released after a cease-fire goes into effect in Laos.

Soth Petrasy, the Pathet Lao's permanent representative in Vientiane, declined to give any details about American POWs in Laos. But he said the Pathet Lao leadership has a detailed accounting of prisoners and where they were being held and that both sides in the cease-fire negotiations are ready to exchange prisoners once the fighting ends.

White House advisor Henry Kissinger has said that North Vietnam pledged to return American prisoners from Laos in Hanoi, an undertaking that was apparently contradicted by Soth's statement.

The exchange will take place in Laos, Soth said. `If they were captured in Laos, they will be returned in Laos.'...

Continued fighting was also reported going on in south and central Laos with increased air strikes by American B52 bombers, F111 swing-wing bombers and tactical fighter-bombers being flown to support CIA-sponsored irregular troops.

U.S. Embassy officials said Soth's comments Saturday were the first reference the Pathet Lao has made to American prisoners since the cease-fire went into effect in Vietnam Jan 28."

February 18, 1973 The Washington Post, "Pathet Lao Says No Truce, No American POWs."

"The Communist Pathet Lao said today [February 17, UPI] that they will not free American prisoners of war until there is a cease-fire in Laos. It also said that the release would take place in Laos, rather than in North Vietnam."

COMMENT: These were very important pronouncements by the Pathet Lao: first, in that they confirmed that they were holding American prisoners, and second, in that they, and not the North Vietnamese, would release them. Thus, Kissinger's understanding of the Paris Peace Agreement -- that the prisoners in Laos were the responsibility of the North Vietnamese and would be released at the same time as the prisoners in Vietnam -- was completely contrary to the Vietnamese and Laotian understanding.

Another confirmation of prisoners in Laos was a Pathet Lao military training film, "Twenty-Five Years of Revolution", showing dozens of captured American pilots. The film was shown to recruits in Pathet Lao training camps. Copies of the film which are shown to Lao soldiers today have the POW scenes clipped out.

February 18, 1973 The Washington Post, "Prisoners Claim VC Torture."

"American prisoners released by the Vietcong have claimed they were kept chained in cages in dense jungle along the border between South Vietnam and Cambodia.

One man said he had been caged for months without contact with other American prisoners or with anyone who spoke English....

According to the hospital sources, many were bitter about their treatment by the Vietcong."

COMMENT: The torture issue became the factor which ultimately blocked the aid package and caused Nixon to abandon the POWs, as explained later.

February 21, 1973 1973 Laos Peace Agreement (Cited in Treaties and Alliances of the World published by the U.S. State Department.)

"A peace agreement between the Government of Laos and the `Pathet Lao' was signed on Feb. 21, 1973. It comprised 12 articles, of which the first laid down the general principles on which the future of Laos should be based....

Art. 10(c) `The two parties take note of the declaration of the US Government that it will contribute to healing the wounds of the war and to post-war reconstruction in Indo-China. The Provisional National Union Government will hold discussions with the US Government in connection with such a contribution regarding Laos.'"

COMMENT: Although the Laotian treaty was between the Royal Lao and Pathet Lao and was not a treaty signed by the United States, the Lao parties did take careful note of the Paris Peace Agreement and said, "Give us the same!" regarding reconstruction aid. In other words, as the Paris Peace Agreement provisions extended to "all the Peoples of Indochina" (see page 2), the new Provisional National Union Government in Laos felt it was entitled to American aid, too. Indeed, it went so far as to say that discussions would be conducted with the United States on the aid issue.

Inevitably, the situation regarding the POWs in Laos thus became the same as in North Vietnam, except that in Laos all the POWs -- not just some of them -- were held back as collateral.

February 23, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "Rogers: Don't Bar N. Viet Aid."

"Secretary of State William P. Rogers Wednesday refused to rule out reconstruction aid to North Vietnam by presidential order if Congress fails to appropriate the funds....

Rogers three times called for `restraint' by members of Congress in making adverse comments on the aid issue, at least until American troops are out of Vietnam and all American prisoners are released."

COMMENT: Rogers' statement was very important. Kissinger and Nixon knew they had made a substantial promise to the North Vietnamese and that the aid was the quid pro quo if all the POWs were to be released. Therefore, they could not afford to default on the aid and threatened to get it by Presidential order instead if Congress did not appropriate it. (As Secretary of State, Rogers had become point-man in the attempt to get Congress to appropriate the aid funds.)

This article also revealed that Congress was beginning to vacillate about the aid package when the first prisoners came back and told about their torture in captivity.

March 2, 1973 President Nixon's News Conference (Cited in Presidential Documents, Richard Nixon 1973).

In answer to a question by Courtney R. Sheldon of the Christian Science Monitor, "...first, with regard to Laos, the agreement there was made by the Royal Laotian Government, and it is an agreement which we, of course, supported and we accept."

COMMENT: Here, by acknowledging and supporting the intra-Laotian peace treaty, the United States committed itself to providing aid to Laos, too. As was the case with regard to the United States promising aid to North Vietnam to induce it to sign the Paris Peace Agreement, the United States provided similar inducement to the Pathet Lao to sign a treaty with the Royal Lao. Nixon and Kissinger could not use American military power to win the Indochina war, so they turned to the all-powerful dollar.

March 7, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, " U.S., N. Viet Paris Envoys Discuss Reconstruction Aid."

"U.S. and North Vietnamese representatives met Monday to discuss postwar reconstruction aid to North Vietnam, diplomatic sources said.

William H. Sullivan, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Nguyen Co Thach, North Vietnamese deputy foreign minister, opened talks for the North Vietnamese peace talks delegation sources said.

The American peace delegation declined to confirm the opening of the talks on President Nixon's plan for the postwar financing of North Vietnam's reconstruction. The proposed aid already has prompted criticism in congress and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has demanded Congressional approval of any aid to Hanoi.

Diplomatic sources said that Hanoi and Washington officials were discussing the establishment of a Joint Economic Commission which would channel American aid to North Vietnam and prove plans for the postwar reconstruction.

Nixon answered Congressional critics by saying aid money would come out of Defense and Agency for International Development funds instead of the domestic budget. The president said giving money to help North Vietnam rebuild its bombed country would contribute to `lasting peace and stability in the area.'"

COMMENT: It is important to note that the discussions were held with Nguyen Co Thach, who was aware of Nixon's secret letter and who today is Foreign Minister of Vietnam. Thach clearly understood the $4.75 billion deal, yet today we tell him the POW issue is humanitarian. To him it was and is economic. Keep in mind that Thach handles POW negotiations with the United States today.

Knowing that the aid was the price to be paid for the POWs in Laos and the unrepatriated POWs in North Vietnam, and facing opposition from Congress to the aid because of the torture issue, Nixon escalated the issue and threatened to secure the funds from the Defense Department and Agency for International Development budgets. This revealed Nixon's dilemma and desperation: he had to have the money to get the POWs, but he could not get Congress to appropriate it.

March 8, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "Rogers: We'll Go to Congress For Hanoi Aid OK."

"Secretary of State William P. Rogers said Tuesday the Nixon administration will seek prior authority from Congress for any economic assistance program to Vietnam....

At one point he was asked if the administration felt it had authority to provide aid without congressional approval.

`Not to my knowledge,' the secretary answered."

COMMENT: Nixon's capitulation on Congressional approval of aid attenuated the acrimonious debate. While this reversal was not uncommon for Nixon, it is surprising in view of his previous statements.

It is fundamentally important to note that this capitulation turned the fate of the POWs over to Congress. However, Congress was entirely unaware that the return of POWs demanded a $4.75 billion price. Congress did not perceive the North Vietnamese linkage between aid and the POWs because it had never seen the details of the aid package as spelled out in Nixon's letter of February 1 to Pham Van Dong. Congress simply did not know that the POWs were in its hands.

March 25, 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, "U.S. Fears Laos POWs Will Be Used as `Pawns'."

"U.S. officials said Friday that despite continued efforts, they have been unable to learn anything more of the fate of an undetermined number of American prisoners of war in Laos.

The officials said no new light had been shed on the total number or whereabouts of the Laos POW's. Concern mounted that the Communists plan to hold them back as pawns in the continuing struggle in Indochina.