Documents related to the POW/MIA issue

Release Date January 28, 2014 - Memo dated May 11, 2011 - Memo written by Dr. Jay Silverstein detailing concerns over "Scientific Integrity of Archaeological Fieldwork" in the Lab Section of the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command. In his memo Dr. Silverstein writes, "There appears to be a pattern of malfeasance of duty and abuse of scientific ethics with regard to archaeological methods in work conducted by the JPAC CIL."

For more click here to read the Silverstein Memo

March 2 2005 -- "....you families have been deceived for the past several years into thinking that no effort is spared and that all live sightings are investigated in a timely manner. This simply could not be further from the truth! In reality, very little to nothing has been done. Although Stony Beach has tried to launch initiatives to truly get to the truth surrounding these live sighting reports, they have been obstructed, discouraged, and stopped at every turn... It is a myth and a lie to believe that Stony Beach is allowed to effectively do their jobs. " For more click here

Feb. 2005 "On 22 May 2002 the group visited Tel Aviv; on 25 May the group traveled to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and on 29 May all concerned traveled to Kuwait. Personnel on the DPMO staff admitted that the sole purpose of the trip was to "get the DASD out of the office!"

During the period 21 May - 31 May 2002, SPEICHER WAS NOT ON THE AGENDA. As a matter of fact, the Israelis took the initiative to bring up the Speicher case. In other words the trip was a boondoggle at taxpayer's expense and had nothing to do with the POW issue." For more click here

2004 Good-bye Note detailing deficiencies within the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) "I am extremely disappointed regarding many aspects of the POW issue...."

Information Provided by Warren Gray, as published in our newsletters of Sept. 11th 18th and 26th, 2004

February 18, 2003 - Fax detailing denial of case work to the Life Science Lab. -- "The lab is being denied casework. This to me is a serious violation of the trust our families have put into our government to solve these cases...."

April 28, 1997 -- Memo from Dr. Timothy Castle, Chief SE Asia Archival Research, DPMO. -- "Unauthorized Contact With Hanoi -- in their efforts to ensure that Hanoi's version is accepted, Mr. Destatte and Lt.Col Shiff have engaged in unauthorized contact with the Vietnamese government and Detachment 2, JTF-FA.... "

March 26, 1996 -- "Background Paper Accountability of Missing Americans from the Korean War, Live Sighting Reports by I.O. Lee of the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO). -- "There are too many live sighting reports, specifically observations of several Caucasians in a collective farm by Romanians and the North Korean defectors' eyewitness of Americans in DPRK to dismiss that there are no American POW's in North Korea.

Shortly after writing this memo Mr. Lee was transferred from DPMO.

June 28, 1995 -- Testimony of Michael Janich, formerly of Joint Task Force Full Accounting. -- "BG Needham.... then explained what he called his "80 percent rule." His philosophy, and consequently that of his new command, was that completing a task quickly with an 80 percent standard of success was preferable to completing it perfectly but taking more time. He emphasized that this rule was to be the guiding principle in all JTF operations, including all field investigations. "

October 30, 1992 - Memorandum for the Record "Obstruction of the Investigation" by John F. McCreary, Investigator with the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. "This anticipatory discrediting of a Select Committee potential witness is tantamount to tampering with the evidence.... the Department of Defenses' continuing access to sensitive Committee Staff papers is resulting in obstructions of the investigations by the Senate Select Committee by various agencies of the Executive Branch."

Feb. 12, 1991 -- Resignation Letter of Col. Millard A. (Mike) Peck - "The mindset to debunk is alive and well....."

July 10, 1986 -- Letter from Dr. Samuel Dunlap detailing deficiencies at the Central Identification Lab in Hawaii and failure to follow accepted procedures when identifying remains of POW/MIAs. "The CID documentation you have undoubtedly seen about CILHI has led myself, my two colleagues, Drs. Lundy and Miller and several stateside forensic scientists to the inescapable conclusion that Lt. Col. Webb, Mr. Helgensen and Mr. Furue are incompetent at best..."